

155 SECRET ANNEX III "SKI" SITES - SUMPARY OF ATTACKS FOR PERIOD 2nd - 15th APRIL, 1944 Attacks TACTICAL AIR FORCES..... No. of Sites Attacked 2nd - 15th April 1944 TOTAL No. of Sites Attacked 5th December 1943 - 15th April 1944 96 "SKI" SITES - CUMULATIVE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT AS ON 15th APRIL, 1944.
 CATEGORY A
 61


 CATEGORY B
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
 CATEGORY C
 11
 TOTAL No. of Confirmed Sites 96 LARGE SITES - SUMMARY OF ATTACKS - 2nd - 15th APRIL, 1944. Target Attacks Tonnage Dropped 26 51 39 MIMOYECQUES SIRACOURT WATTEN 116 LARGE SITES - CUMULATIVE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT AS ON 15th APRIL, 1944. Order of Priority for Attack 1. WIZERNES
2. WATTEN
3. MIMOYECQUES
4. SOTTEVAST
5. SIRACOURT
38. LOTTINGHEM
(after "Ski" Sites) CATEGORY W (3 months to repair (Suspended))..... 1 MARTINVAST CATEGORY X (1½ - 3 months to repair)...... 2 LOTTINGHEM WIZERNES PUBLIC CATEGORY Y (2 weeks - 12 months to repair)..... 4 STRACOURT SOTTEVAST MIMOYECQUES CATEGORY Z (No damage)....-TOTAL No. of Large Sites..... 7 BOMB TONNAGE Period Period "SKI" SITES 2nd - 15th April 1944 252 LARGE SITES 2nd - 15th April 1944 116 Period "SKI" SITES 5th December 1943 - 15th April 1944..16188 LARGE SITES 31st January - 15th April 1944..... 3922 20110. GRAND TOTAL


FOR PERIOD 2nd - 15th APRIL, 1944.							
Order of Priority	CONFIRMED SITES		Scheduled for	Total Tonnage Dropped	Total Tonnage Dropped	Previous	Present Assessment
for Attack	Locality	Target No.	Attack by	During Period	to Date	Assessments	Assessment
(1 -	5 LARGE SITES)						
6	ZUDAUSQUES	XI/A/100	T.A.F. and EIGHTH A.F.		94.4		C
7	LA GLACERIE	XI/A/26(a)			89.3		C
, 8	HARDINVAST LA MOTTERIE	XI/A/26(c)			50.7		C
9	BOIS D'ESQUERDES	XI/A/11			199.7		C
10	CORMETTE	XI/A/57			182.1	A *	C
11	GORENFLOS	XI/A/37	"	64.1	279.6		В
12	BRISTELLERIE	XI/A/26(d)	•		411.3		В
13	FLOTTEMANVILLE HAGUE II	XI/A/10(b)	•		164.7		C
14	WISQUES	XI/A/96	* #	1	45.7		С
15	VACQUERIETTE	XT/A/83		16.3	329.7	B - C	В
16	BONNIEPES	XI/A/85	•	43.7	589.7		В
17	LINGHEM	XI/A/72	1	19.6	209.7		В
18	BOIS CARRE	XI/A/39	•	26.7	305.7	A	В
19	BOIS DES HUIT RUES	XI/A/73		24.8	631.4		В
20	BEHEN	XI/A/59		3.6	147.9		В
21	BEAUVOIR	XI/1/79		45.0	260.0	A - C	В
22	NOTRE DAME FERME	XI/A/112	•		85.0	A	В
		XI/A/40		8.1	226.4	A	В
23	MESNIL AU VAL	XI/A/41	1		146.1	A *	В
24		XI/A/74			117.6		В
25	BOIS DE LA JUSTICE				129.2	В	C
26	FORET NATIONALE DE TOURNE				224.0	A	В
27	BOIS DE LA COUPELLE	XI/A/67			106.4		В
.28	BOIS COCQUEREL	XI/A/60		23.6	80.3	A	. в
29	LE PLOUY FER E	XI/A/66			197.1	A	В
30	COCCOAE	XI/A/70			370.0	•	В
(b) 31	DOMART EN PONTHIEU	XI/A/36			142.2		-0
32	FLOTTEMANVILLE HAGUE I	XI/h/10(a)		3.5-	237.9		В
33	MARQUENNEVILLE	XI/4/78		3.57	138.2	A.	В
34	HEURINGHEM	XI/A/32			190.5	A	В
35	CROISETTE	XI/A/15		00 -	190.5		В
36	PETIT BOIS TILLENCOURT	XI/4/62	19	22.5	WE THE RESERVE TO THE RESERVE TO	Market State	В
37	LE GROSEILLIER	XI/A/121			72.9		
	BOUILLANCOURT	XI/A/84	2 Group	7.8	83.1		
Not		, T. (C)	Suspended		76.2		A
	AGENVILLERS	XI/4/58	puspermed	3.1	881.8		A
	ATILIT DE FUT CLOCHER ARDOUVAL	四/4/38			120.9		

				· Total Tonnage	Total Tonnage	157	
Order of Priority	CONFIRMED SITES		Scheduled for Attack by	Dropped During	Dropped to	Previous Assessments	Present Assessment
for Attack	Locality	Target No.	Avanta Sy	Period	Date		V 11
Not authorised							
	AUDINCTHUN	XI/4/94	Suspended		` 188.1		A.
	BAILLY LA CAMPAGNE	XI/A/31			99•1		A
	BEAULIEU FERME	XI/1/91	•		77.7		A
	BEAUMONT LE HARENG	XI/L/115	-		58.0		Α.
	BEAUTOT	XI/4/124			56.6		A
	BELLEVUE	XI/A/51			61.0		A .
	BELLEVILLE-EN-CAUX	XI/4/77			165.1		A .
	BELMESNIL	- XI/A/105			66.9		A
	BOIS DE CREQUY	XI/A/82			145.7		A
	BOIS D'ENFER	XI/A/99			74.3		A
	BOIS DE POTTIER	XI/A/54	· • .		192.4		A
	BOIS DE RENTY	XI/A/102			199.7		A
	BOIS MEGLE	XI/A/114	u		25.5		A
	BOIS DE WARIPEL	XI/A/25	0		160.1		A .
	BOIS REMPRE	XI/A/53			174.8		
	BONNETOT	XI/A/27	•		86.6		A
	BRUNEHAUPTRE	XI/A/24			190.3		A
	CAMPNEUSEVILLE	XI/A/45	• / .		54.0		A
	CHATEAU DE BOSMELET	XI/A/92			84.7		A
	DRIONVILLE	XI/A/50			41.0	1	A
	ECALLES SUR BUCHY	XI/A/101			264.1		A
	ECLIMEUX	XI/A/76			270.5		A
	FEBVIN PALFART	XI/A/87			62.5		Δ.
_	FORET D'HESDIN	XI/4/74			118.4		Α .
	FREVAL	XI/4/30	· ·		211.3	A - B	A
	GRAND PARC	XI/L/107			125.7	A - B	A .
	GUESCHART	XI/A/20			181.9		A
0 .	HAMBURES	XI/A/64			147.9		A
	HEUDIERE	XI/A/106			42.5		· A
	HERBOUVILLE	XI/h/42	- × n		131.0		Å
21.	LABROYE	XI/i/22			343.2		A
	LA LONGEVILLE	XI/i/117			108.9		A /
	LA SORELIERIE II	XI/A/93			99.2		A
	LA SORELLERIE III	XI/4/26(b)	n .		95.2		A
	LE GRISMONT	XI/A/95			158.2		A
•	LE MEILLARD	XI/4/75			192.0		A .
	LE NIEPPE	XI/i/86			45.8		A
The second	LE MESNIL ALLARD	XI/4/48			134.7		A

		rof	CONFIRMED SITES			Total Tonnage	Motel m				
			rity r ack	Locality	Target No.	Scheduled for Attack by	Dropped During Period	Total Tonnage Dropped to Date	Previous Assessments	Present Assessment	
	THE ANALYSIS OF		prised								
				LES PETITS MORAUX	XI/1/89	Suspended		200 5			EL
				LIVOSSART	XI/A/120		-	109.5		A	PUB
	House and Street, the Street,			LONGUEMONT	XI/A/63			79 . 5		A	2 2 5 8
				LOSTEBARNE	XI/A/58						RECORD
	* G. D. A. 1976			MAISON PONTHIEU I	XI/A/21(a)			346.3		A ,	# OFFIC
a and	an one had usult the			MAISON PONTHIEU III	XI/A/21			64.9		A	- 25 CE
-				MONTORGUEIL	XI/A/81			112.5		A	F
	to the last			MOYENNEVILLE	XI/A/61			60.6		A	
	100 (100 (100 (100 (100 (100 (100 (100			NOYELLE-EN-CHAUSSEE	XI/A/44			215.6		A	Seferen
				LE PETIT BOIS ROBERT	XI/A/52	ne ·	•	90.5		A	0
•	- Frank St. St. A			POMMEREVAL	XI/1/56			106.0		A	000
	The sales day			PREUSEVILLE	XI/A/29			96.8		A	8
	THE PART OF REAL			PUCHERVIN				174.0		A	
				QUOEUX	XI/A/47			77.7		A	82
	TOTAL STOCKERS			ST. ADRIEN	XI/4/80			124.8		A.	
					XI/1/109			47.9		A .	R 2 R 9
	real man desired			ST. AGATHE D'ALTEREMENT	XI/1./46			100.3		A	PER
		1-2-1		ST. JOSSE AU BOIS	XI/A/19	•		344.0	A - B	A	OFFI O
				ST. PIERRE DES JONQUIERES	XI/A/28	/ · *		266.0		A	HOTO
				VACQUERIE LE BOUCQ	XI/A/71			166.8		A	THE THE
.				MAISONCELLE	. XI/A/55			83.3	A	В	HI CALLY WITH-
				RUISSEAUVIILE	XI/A/65	"		85.1	В .	C	
							* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *				======================================
	6			Estimated number of to	one discussed 0.3						13,23,61
				Estimated number of to	ans aropped 2nd -]	ember 1943 - 15th April	252				







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in Washington are concerned. General Wedemeyer fears that if the matter is referred formally to the United States Chiefs of Staff for the concurrence of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, the former will be bound to obtain the official views of the State Department and other United States Agencies, and that this process will entail an unacceptable delay.

General Wedemeyer believes that it will be quite sufficient if the Chiefs of Staff in London were to inform Admiral Mountbatten that the directive in AXE 32 has received the concurrence of the interested Departments in London. It will then rest with him to issue the directive and to see that it works.

General Wedemeyer has also pointed out that any modification to the draft directive in AXE 32 would entail reference to Washington, and might lead to further delay: in these circumstances and after consultation with the India Office, we are prepared to withdraw the amendment to which I referred in paragraph 3 of my letter, and to accept the draft as it stands.

In the light of General Wedemeyer's views, we are prepared to recommend that the Chiefs of Staff should accept the draft directive as a basis for the control of political warfare in South East Asia Command, and to despatch the draft telegram which is attached.

I am sending copies of this letter to Patrick, Rowlands, Joubert and Brooks.

x Appendix

APPENDIX TO ANNEX I

Copy of draft Telegram from Chiefs of Staff to
Admiral Mountbatten

Reference SEACOS 100.

We understand from Wedemeyer that draft directive on psychological warfare contained in AXE 32 has been cleared with interested agencies in Washington, who are prepared to work on the lines proposed.

- 2. Departments in London, who have examined it in consultation with Joubert and Rowlands, can see no objections so far as they are concerned.
- 3. Wedemeyer has suggested that adoption of draft directive would resolve difficulties referred to in SEACOS 100, and that no further action is required in London or Washington. Please confirm.

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AXE 32 25th March 1944 .Following from AXIOM. viewpoint. Directive BEGINS. Commander. lines. operational requirements. strategic aims.

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ANNEX II

Copy of a Telegram dated 25th March, 1944 from Joint Staff Mission (Washington) to 8.A.C.S.B.A.

The following is submitted as proposed basic directive for Psychological Warfare in S.E.A.C. Request you pass text of proposed directive to SULTAN inasmuch as U.S. cannot transmit it verbatim through its signal channels. It is suggested that this proposal is the best and most workable solution possible under the circumstances. Request that if further controversy develops action should await return of WEDEMEYER. U.S. War Department have not taken final action but it is expected SULTAN will be informed that the directive is suitable from their viewpoint.

SECTION I. Authority. A combined Psychological Warfare Division is to be established in SEAC under authority of Supreme Allied

SECTION II. Psychological Warfare Division will not deal with controversial political or postwar matters. It will cover the following phases of psychological warfare:

(a) Combat Psychological Warfare:

Activities directed toward the enemy forces in forward areas and the populations behind the enemy

(b) Consolidation Psychological Warfare:

Activities designed to ensure the co-operation of the population in restoring essential services so as to help secure the safety of lines of communication and to assist in the fulfilment of


(c) Strategic Psychological Warfare:


Activities designed to further military


SECTION III. Control and Co-ordination. Psychological Warfare Division will operate under the control of the Supreme Allied Commander and its activities will be co-ordinated with agencies not under SEAC through the Combined Liaison Committee (CCS 196/4)


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
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ANNEX

DRAFT MINUTE TO THE PRIME MINISTER


Move of French 2nd (Leclerc) Armoured Division


In their minute of the 12th April, the Chiefs of Staff reported that the War Office had been informed that SHAFF were reconsidering the question of providing American equipment for this division after its arrival in U.K, and the hope was expressed that some reduction in the amount of the MT shipping required for the move might thereby


SHAEF has now reported that -


- (a) no initial equipment for this division can be provided from U.S. stocks in U.K. nor U.S.A.
- (b) the issue of British type vehicles and equipment to this U.S. equipped division would introduce serious maintenance problems and is therefore not considered feasible;
- (e) the whole of the initial equipment for this division must therefore be moved from the . Mediterranean;
- (d) the subsequent maintenance of the division will be the responsibility of the U.S. War Department.


The original proposals for bringing back in about MT ships from the Mediterranean the balance of the vision's equipment and vehicles which cannot be moved returning LST, must therefore stand.
























































































































































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6. To attain full production, the Ministry of Supply would require to recruit and train an additional 3,500 operatives of a high standard of health. In addition, approximately 400 operatives at present engaged in the manufacture of smoke weapons would be transferred to the manufacture of gas. In the present scarcity of manpower, the Ministry of Supply are already very much concerned at the difficulties which they consider will confront them in implementing their undertaking to obtain full scale production in six months from the initiation of gas warfare.

7. We, therefore, consider that the degree of probability of the initiation of gas warfare by the enemy, as assessed by the Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee, is at present matched by our state of preparedness to retaliate.

Effect of proposed Reduction.

8. The effect of the proposed reduction on the industrial staff of the Ministry of Supply would involve a loss of some 1,400 personnel, mostly skilled operatives highly trained in a particularly dangerous type of work. The industrial staff would thereby be reduced to a figure only slightly in excess of the 1,500 personnel required to keep the six factories on an adequate care and maintenance basis. Owing to the loss of this skilled labour, and owing to the length of time taken to train new personnel, the Ministry of Supply state that they could not undertake to reach full production in under twelve months from the date of the initiation of gas warfare. The result would be that the planned scale of attack would have to be very considerably reduced or alternatively we should have to build up greater reserves of gas and gas weapons to cover this longer interval until production could meet expenditure. The production necessary to build up increased reserves would certainly not allow of any present decrease in industrial personnel. If, therefore, we are to continue a proper state of readiness adequate in our opinion to match the present threat, the suggested reduction in industrial personnel engaged in the manufacture of gas and gas weapons and their charging and maintenance is not practicable.

9. The Chemical Defence Research Department of the Ministry of Supply is responsible for all chemical warfare research, development and experiments on behalf of the three fighting Services, the Ministry of Home Security, the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Food. The Department has recently been entrusted with additional work, not connected with chemical warfare. This includes a study of the preparation, use and distribution of D.D.T. (anti-malarial and anti-typhoid insecticide), the development of incendiary weapons for the Army and problems in connection with the synthesis of penicillin. The staff, as reduced by the 10% cut referred to, was regarded as about adequate to deal with the high priority investigations submitted by the Services and Ministries. The additional work thrown on the Department by the investigations mentioned above means that a cut of 30% would reduce, in greater degree, the capacity of the Department to carry out chemical warfare research Should gas warfare start, the Department would be called upon to solve urgently a large number of ad hoc problems which would fully tax their existing resources. Further, as we have pointed out in our report on Chemical Warfare Research in the Tropics, there exists an urgent need for research personnel to strengthen the exists an urgent need for research personnel to strengthen the exists an urgent need for research personnel to strengthen the exists an urgent need for research personnel to strengthen the exists an urgent need for research personnel to strengthen the exists an urgent need for personnel to strengthen the exists an urgent need for research personnel to strengthen the exists an urgent need for personnel to strengthen the exists an urgent need for personnel to strengthen the exists an urgent need for personnel to strengthen the exists an urgent need for the Ministry of Supply.

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