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C.O.S.(44)(0) Series.

**WAR CABINET**

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

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306	31.3.44	CANADIAN JOINT STAFF MISSION IN LONDON Note by Secretary
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308	31.3.44	"CROSSBOW": Tenth Report by Assistant Chief of Air Staff (Intelligence)
309	1.4.44	SERVICE LEAVE AND TRAVEL Note by Secretary
310	1.4.44	OPERATION NEPTUNE - EVACUATION OF CASUALTIES Memo. by S.C.A.E.F.
311	1.4.44	FRENCH PARTICIPATION IN "OVERLORD" - MOVE OF LE CLERC DIVISION Note by Secretary
312	1.4.44	ANTI-AIRCRAFT DEFENCES FOR "OVERLORD" BASES Note by Secretary
313	2.4.44	"CROSSBOW". 14th Progress Report by the Deputy Chief of Air Staff.
314	3.4.44	S.O.E. OPERATIONS IN BULGARIA Copy of letter from Foreign Office to Secretary, Chiefs of Staff Committee
315	3.4.44	FRENCH PARTICIPATION IN "OVERLORD" Copy of letter from Foreign Office to Secretary, Chiefs of Staff Committee
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317	4.4.44	RETURN OF L.S.T's FROM MEDITERRANEAN Memorandum by First Sea Lord
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333	11.4.44	BAN ON THE USE OF INFRA-RED DEVICES Memorandum by Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force
334	12.4.44	ORGANISATION AND EMPLOYMENT OF FRENCH FORCES Copy of a letter Z 2440/7/9 (dated 10th April, 1944) from the Foreign Office to the Secretary, Chiefs of Staff Committee

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328	14.4.44	"OVERLORD" - SECURITY MEASURES Note by the War Office
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332	14.4.44	SOUTH-EAST ASIA COMMAND - POLITICAL WARFARE IN THE EAST Memorandum by Chief of the Staff General Ismay
333	14.4.44	REPORT ON THE USE OF THE AIR FORCE IN THE EAST Memorandum by General Ismay, Allied Commander, Far East
334	18.4.44	REPORT ON THE USE OF THE AIR FORCE IN THE EAST Copy of a letter 3.4.44 (dated 10th April 1944) from the Foreign Office to the Secretary, Chiefs of Staff Committee

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342	15.4.44	CONTROL OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN THEATRE Note by the Secretary
343	16.4.44	COASTERS FOR FAR EAST OPERATIONS Report by the Admiralty
344	16.4.44	"CROSSBOW" 15th Progress Report by the D.C.A.S.
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347	17.4.44	FRENCH PARTICIPATION IN "OVERLORD" Note by the War Office
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349	18.4.44	"OVERLORD" SECURITY - MOVEMENT OF ALLIED PERSONNEL Copy of a letter HDE/146/01/4 dated 18.4.44 from Sir Findlater Stewart to Lieut.-General Sir Hastings L. Ismay
350	19.4.44	DESPATCH OF YUGOSLAV PARTISAN AIRMEN TO RUSSIA Copy of a letter dated 19th April from the Foreign Office to the Secretary, Chiefs of Staff Committee

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358	22.4.44	"OVERLORD" - SECURITY Note by Secretary
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360	22.4.44	OPERATION "CALIPH" Note by Secretary
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362	23.4.44	TRANSFER OF NO. 23 NIGHT INTRUDER SQUADRON FROM M.A.A.F. TO THE U.K. Note by the Chief of the Air Staff
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364	24.4.44	DISTRIBUTION OF R.A.F. SQUADRONS DURING THE SECOND QUARTER OF 1944 Note by the Chief of the Air Staff
365	24.4.44	REDUCTION OF LABOUR FORCE EMPLOYED IN CHEMICAL WARFARE PREPARATIONS Report by Inter-Services Committee on Chemical Warfare

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369	26.4.44	FUTURE OPERATIONS CONNECTED WITH "OVERLORD" Note by the Secretary
370	26.4.44	PROVISION OF ARTIFICIAL HARBOURS Copy of a letter dated 25th April from the Ministry of Production to the Secretary, Chiefs of Staff Committee
371	26.4.44	SHOOTING OF GERMAN PRISONERS BY YUGOSLAV PARTISANS Copy of a letter (R.6132/6132/G) dated 25th April 1944 from the Foreign Office, to the Secretary, Chiefs of Staff Committee
372	26.4.44	"OVERLORD" - SECURITY Note by Secretary
373	28.4.44	AMERICAN VT FUZES Report by the Sub-Committee on the Allocation of Active Air Defences
374	28.4.44	THE RADIO PROGRAM - PRODUCTION OF RADIO VALVES Memorandum by the Chairman of the Radio Board
375	28.4.44	"CROSSBOW" Twelfth Report by Assistant Chief of Air Staff (Intelligence)
376	28.4.44	BRAZILIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE Note by Secretary
377	29.4.44	AVIATION SPIRIT FOR THE PORTUGUESE AIR FORCE IN THE AZORES Note by Secretary
378	29.4.44	HORTA - EMDEN CABLE Note by Secretary
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376	28.4.44	BRAZILIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE Note by Secretary
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378	29.4.44	HORTA - EMDEN CABLE Note by Secretary
379	30.4.44	INFORMATION ON NORWAY AND FINLAND Note by the Secretary
380	1.5.44	"CROSSBOW" 16th Progress Report by the Deputy Chief of the Air Staff

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381	1.5.44	AMERICAN V.T. FUSES Report by the Sub-Committee on the Allocation of Active Air Defences
382	1.5.44	TRANSFER OF BRITISH COMMONWEALTH AND UNITED STATES PRISONERS OF WAR FROM CAMPS IN GERMANY TO BARCELONA Note by the War Office
383	1.5.44	PROCUREMENT OF OIL REHABILITATION EQUIPMENT FOR SUMATRA Letter dated 1st May, from the Chairman of the Oil Rehabilitation Board, to the Secretary, Chiefs of Staff Committee
384	1.5.44	LABOUR PROBLEM IN CEYLON Memorandum by the First Sea Lord
385	1.5.44	PROVISION OF SUPPLY DROPPING PARACHUTES Memorandum by SCAEF
386	2.5.44	"OVERLORD" SECURITY - CONTROL OF MOVEMENTS OF ALLIED SERVICE PERSONNEL Note by Sir Findlater Stewart
387	2.5.44	ARTILLERY RECONNAISSANCE PROCEDURE IN MEDITERRANEAN THEATRE Note by Secretary
388	2.5.44	EXTENSION OF BASE FACILITIES TO THE UNITED STATES AFTER THE WAR Report
389	2.5.44	"OVERLORD" - BROADCAST TRANSMITTER FOR SAS BRIGADE Note by Secretary
390	3.5.44	CO-ORDINATION OF ALLIED ACTIVITIES IN THE BALKANS Note by the Secretary

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367	25.4.44	OPERATION "OVERLORD" - SECURITY DURING PORT-BLINDING PERIOD Report
368	25.4.44	"OVERLORD" - SECURITY Note by the Secretary
369	25.4.44	FUTURE OPERATIONS OVERLORD WITH "OVERLORD" Note by the Secretary
370	25.4.44	PROVISION OF AMBULANCE SERVICES Copy of a letter dated 23rd April from the Ministry of Production to the Secretary, Chiefs of Staff Committee
371	25.4.44	SHOOTING OF GERMAN PRISONERS BY VULCAN Memorandum
372	25.4.44	Copy of a letter (S.C.S. 44/27) dated 23rd April 1944 from the Ministry of Production to the Secretary, Chiefs of Staff Committee
373	25.4.44	"OVERLORD" - SECURITY Note by Secretary
374	25.4.44	AMERICAN V.T. FUSES Report by the Sub-Committee on the Allocation of Active Air Defences
375	25.4.44	THE RADIO PROGRAM - PRODUCTION OF RADIO VALVES Memorandum of the Chairman of the Radio Board
376	25.4.44	"OVERLORD" Twelve Reports by Assistant Chief of Staff (Intelligence)
377	25.4.44	GERMAN RECONNAISSANCE METHODS Note by Secretary
378	25.4.44	AVIATION SQUADS FOR THE PORTUGAL AIR FORCE IN THE AZORES Note by Secretary
379	25.4.44	NORTH - SOUTH CASE Note by Secretary
380	20.4.44	INVESTIGATION ON NORWAY AND SWEDEN Note by the Secretary
381	1.5.44	"OVERLORD" 16th Progress Report by the Deputy Chief of the Air Staff

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31ST MARCH, 1944

WAR CABINET

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

CANADIAN JOINT STAFF MISSION IN LONDON

Note by Secretary

The Prime Minister has minuted as follows on the attached minute+ by Lord Cranborne:-

"General Ismay for C.O.S. Committee.

I should be glad if C.O.S. could reconsider this.

(Initialled) W.S.C. 30.3.44"

(Signed) L.C. HOLLIS

Offices of the War Cabinet, S.W.1.,

31ST MARCH, 1944.

+ Annex.

ANNEX

Copy of a Minute dated 28th March, 1944 from Lord Cranborne to the Prime Minister

General Ismay has sent me a copy of his minute of the 23rd March to you about the appointment of a Canadian Joint Staff Mission in London.

I am very glad that the Chiefs of Staff have recommended acceptance of Mr. Mackenzie King's proposals (a), (b) and (c) which were addressed jointly to you and the President. But I think that it is most unfortunate that they should feel themselves

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unable to accept the fourth proposal (d) that the Canadian Joint Staff Mission in London should be a link between the Canadian Chiefs of Staff and the United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff.

As paragraph 5 of General Ismay's minute states, the right of access of representatives of all Dominion Governments to the United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff cannot in theory be disputed. The Chiefs of Staff fear, however, that the practical application of this principle may not work out satisfactorily. I feel their fears may be exaggerated. In practice, the Mission is unlikely to trespass over-much on the Chiefs of Staff time, and I do not think there need be any fear that security may be affected or complications introduced by references to the Canadian Government. The establishment of the Mission is much more likely to have the contrary effect. I feel too that we need not be deterred by the possibility that other Dominion Governments may wish to send similar staff missions here. This seems to me very unlikely in present circumstances, since they have not the same interest as have the Canadians, as a result of the large Canadian forces to be engaged in forthcoming operations; and it should always be possible for us to resist any such application on these grounds.

We are hoping after the war for the closest possible collaboration, militarily and otherwise within the British Commonwealth. Canada has, as you know, at times displayed a tendency to pursue an independent line and to seek closer co-operation with the United States rather than with us. This proposal for closer liaison in London in the military sphere is, coming as it does from the Canadian Government, a rare and encouraging sign for future collaboration, and for us to suggest that the existing machinery for liaison in Washington with the Combined Chiefs of Staff is sufficient would surely be most unwise.

I hope, therefore, that you will agree that proposal (d) should be reconsidered.

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1ST APRIL 1944

WAR CABINET  
CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

THE FLEET TRAIN

Memorandum by First Sea Lord

As invited I attach at Annex a statement showing those proposals relating to the Fleet Train upon which an immediate decision is required.

(Intd.) A.B.C.

Offices of the War Cabinet, S.W. 1.

1ST APRIL 1944.

C.O.S. (44) 103rd Meeting (0), Item 9

A N N E X

U.K. CONSTRUCTION

"(a) 4 Accommodation Ships

Four accommodation ships, which Ministry of War Transport has stated on D.C. (S) (44) 12 should be provided out of the existing passenger fleet, should be nominated now. Having been nominated it is necessary to prepare drawings and collect material for the conversion of the ships, the whole process from nomination to completion taking about four to six months. Two of these ships are required to leave the United Kingdom for the Indian Ocean in July 1944 and the third and fourth in September 1944 and November 1944 respectively. It is therefore urgent that the nominations should be made now".

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"(b) 5 Aircraft Engine and Component Repair Ships

10

Five P.F.C. hulls now building in this country should now be allocated for conversion to Aircraft Engine Repair and Aircraft Component Repair. All drawings for this type of hull are ready and the material has been ordered. There are only a limited number of these ships building at any one time in this country. Even if we convert the earliest of them they cannot be completed before two in March and three in April 1945. If we miss these early ships completion will be correspondingly delayed. The five ships are required - two in mid 1944 and three by December 1944. We are therefore some six months behind programme already".

CANADIAN CONSTRUCTION

(c) 5 Maintenance Ships (Escort Vessel) (in addition to three already ordered in Canada)

In November 1943 a programme for the supply of these ships was agreed with the Canadian authorities. It has not been possible to obtain authority to allocate these ships. It is now doubtful if this programme can be achieved and it is essential that the matter be taken up with Canada afresh. Drawings are available for conversion of 10,000 ton VICTORY type ships; if this type is not available new drawings will have to be prepared which will cause further delay. It is doubtful if any of these could be delivered in Canada now before March 1945. These ships are required - three in October 1944 and two in January 1945, and it appears that they must be at least three months behind programme.

(d) 5 Maintenance Ships (L.S.T.)

The same remarks apply as for (c) above. Two of these ships are required in January 1945 and the remaining three in step with L.S.T. construction in the United Kingdom or in accordance with any L.S.T. allocation from the United States; and it seems that they must be some months late.

(e) 4 Maintenance Ships (Major Landing Craft)

The same remarks apply as for (c) above. These ships are required in January 1945 and it seems must be some months late.

(f) 2 Maintenance Ships (Armament)

The same remarks apply as for (c) above. These ships are required in January 1945 and it seems must be some months late.

(g) 1 Maintenance Ship (Coastal Forces)

The same remarks apply as for (c) above. This ship is required in January 1945 and it seems must be some months late.

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This document was considered at *C.O.S. (44) 109<sup>th</sup> Meeting (6) March 27.*  
**C. O. S. (44) 308 (0)**  
**31ST MARCH, 1944**

WAR CABINET

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

"CROSSBOW"

Tenth report by Assistant Chief of Air Staff (Intelligence)

This report follows the Ninth Report by Assistant Chief of Air Staff (Intelligence) C. O. S. (44) 266 (0) dated 18th March, 1944.

SUMMARY

Repair and construction of ski sites

1. There has been an increase of 5 (from 10 to 15) during the past fortnight of sites where repairs and/or construction is known to be proceeding.

Fitting of launching rails and installation of machinery

2. Camouflage at launching points prevents positive identification of rails, but there are signs of their presence at two sites in the Cherbourg Peninsula and at one near Dieppe. Except for a report of the delivery of compressed air bottles at ski sites, no evidence of the installation of machinery has yet been received.

Large sites

3. A building similar to the main structure at WATTEN is being erected at SOTTEVAST. Activity at WIZERNES and WATTEN continues.

Offices of the War Cabinet,  
S.W.2.

**31ST MARCH, 1944**

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ANNEX

Repair and construction of ski sites

1. A table at Appendix "A" shows the number of ski sites judged to be capable of operating in the near future, provided that the necessary machinery had been installed. The rates of fire would vary in accordance with the state of completion of each site. It will be noted that the number of sites where repair and/or construction is known to be proceeding has increased from 10 to 15 since the last report was issued. (Appendix "A" to C.O.S. (44)266(0) dated 18th March 1944).

Supply sites

2. The more advanced supply sites are being tidied up and construction is continuing at the remainder.

3. A recent photographic reconnaissance has revealed constructional activity near BRICQUEBEO in the Cherbourg Peninsula. There are 8 buildings, 6 of which are the same size as buildings on supply sites. 7 of the 8 known supply sites also have 6 of these buildings.

4. The existing supply site in the Cherbourg Peninsula (at VALOGNES) should be capable of supplying the 8 ski sites in that area without difficulty, and there seems to be no reason for building an extra one. Progress at BRICQUEBEO will be carefully followed in order to determine whether it has any connection with "Crossbow" activities

Fitting of rails to launching points

5. An examination of all available photographs has been made with the object of detecting signs of launching rails at ski sites. Heavy camouflage prevents an accurate assessment, but there are signs that rails may be in position at two sites in the Cherbourg Peninsula and at one near Dieppe.

Installation of machinery

6. A report, dated 15th January, states that steel compressed air bottles 1' 6" long x 2' 3/2" diameter have been delivered to an unspecified number of sites. The report adds that the bottles are to be filled to a pressure of 200 atmospheres, which corresponds to the pressures of compressor plants, 100 of which are stated in another report to have been ordered for delivery between September and December 1943. Subsequent reports indicate that deliveries had fallen badly behind schedule and no positive evidence has yet been received of their installation at ski sites.

Fuels for ski sites

7. A reliable report has been received to the effect that "T" and "Z" fuels will be used at ski sites. These are the same liquid fuels as are used for the propulsion of the Hs293 rocket bomb. The same report, however, also mentions a third fuel, which has not so far been identified, as being required at ski sites, but gives no clue to its purpose.

Pilotless aircraft trials

8. Trials held between 1st and 14th March have shown a considerably improved accuracy. On this basis, about 60% of the aircraft launched from France would fall in an area equal to Greater London.

Large sites

9. An interesting development has taken place at SOTTEVAST. At the north-western end of the main excavation a structure is being erected which has a

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marked resemblance to the new rectangular construction at WATTEN. It measures at present approximately 125 ft. by 145 ft., and there is a deep excavation beneath its north eastern side. The walls appear to be of heavy reinforced concrete. Construction is proceeding rapidly; concrete is being poured in at least four places. No further work appears to have been done on the two parallel trenches which are aligned on London.

10. Notes, with annotated photographs, on activities at WIZERNES and WATTEN are at Appendices "B" and "C" respectively. Both these sites have been bombed since the photographs shown in the Appendices were taken.

Propaganda

11. Attention in enemy propaganda to retaliation has remained at a very low level, except in broadcasts to England, where there were a number of reminders that the current raids on England did not represent the "real retaliation". This assurance was not found in German home propaganda.

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APPENDIX "A"

SITES POTENTIALLY OPERATIONAL IN THE NEAR FUTURE

	<u>Total number of sites</u>	<u>Cat. A</u>	<u>Cat. B</u>	<u>Cat. C or D</u>
1. Sites which have been 80% or more complete since (approx.) end of January 1944.	20	3	10	7
2. Repairs and/or construction proceeding.	15	11	3	1
3. Repairs and/or construction possibly proceeding.	6	5	1	-

SITES PROBABLY NOT OPERATIONAL IN THE NEAR FUTURE

4. Sites where no progress has been made since 31st January 1944.	28	24	2	2
5. Probably no repairs and/or construction proceeding.	8	8	-	-
6. Damage too recent to assess enemy's repair policy.	19	14	4	1
	<u>96</u>	<u>65</u>	<u>20</u>	<u>11</u>

30th March, 1944

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TOP SECRETAPPENDIX "B"NOTE ON ACTIVITY AT WIZERNES

(Reference should be made to the annotated photograph attached)

Rapid progress has recently been made with the installations at this site and some of the structures appear to be approaching externally, their final form. The following description, based on the attached photograph, is therefore given.

The most striking feature of the site is the circular emplacement (3 on annotated print) 280 ft. in diameter which stands on the ridge dividing the WIZERNES quarry into two parts. It is on the edge of the western part of the quarry (1 on annotated print), and work in progress in this part of the quarry is clearly connected with the emplacement. The eastern part of the quarry (4 on annotated print) is not being used for any purpose connected with the military works. The circular emplacement now consists of an apparently solid core in the form of a truncated cone surrounded by a deep annular trench. The annular trench is revetted with concrete of considerable thickness, and there are indications that the core also will be clad with concrete. A circular section of which no details can yet be seen is taking shape on top of the core. It is connected by a bridge with a high building, probably a hoist, which projects above the general level of the camouflage covering the area (4), the centre of the circle this bridge connects with another at right angles, it leading only as far as the circumference of the top of the core. The circular emplacement is also connected by a ramp with a ledge running round the top of the southern face of the quarry (1), and by a camouflaged pipe-bridge (5) with the large concrete mixing plant (6).

Work is in progress on the floor of the western part of the quarry which is clearly connected with the work proceeding at the circular emplacement (3) and under the camouflage covering the area (4) on the top of the cliff to the south. Tunnel entrances can be seen at (2). These appear to be raised some distance above the quarry floor, since outside each of them there is a raised platform probably used for loading spoil into trains running on tracks at floor level of the quarry. It can be seen also that the rail track which runs diagonally across the quarry and enters the southern tunnel is raised on an embankment.

The two platforms are joined a short distance outside the portals of the tunnels by a transverse platform. Between this and the quarry face below the circular emplacement stands a tall hammer-headed crane which can lift material to a platform alongside the circular emplacement.

Outside the quarry, across the railway, several buildings have been erected. The western group (7) are probably stores; the eastern group includes a concrete mixing plant (6). From the concrete mixing plant a bridge leads across the main railway line and connects with the pipe leading to the circular emplacement and with another pipe leading towards the northern tunnel entrance. Hence it may be concluded that concreting is being carried out below ground.

North of the groups of buildings (6) and (7) a railway siding leads to area (8) where stores are dumped. A buried pipe (10) supplies water from the river Aa to the concrete mixer and to the circular emplacement.

Camouflage has been applied extensively. The area (4) above the quarry is effectively covered by netting, and netting - fortunately almost transparent - covers nearly threequarters of the circular emplacement. The concrete mixer together with its associated buildings and the stores buildings (8) are also camouflaged by netting.

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Reference should be made to the annotated photographs of the quarry and its surroundings. The following is a list of the features shown in the photographs and their approximate positions relative to the quarry. (1) Western part of WIZERNES quarry. (2) Tunnel entrances. (3) Circular emplacement. (4) Camouflaged area above quarry. (5) Pipe bridge (camouflaged). (6) Concrete mixing plant. (7) Stores buildings. (8) Rail served stores dump. (9) Eastern part of WIZERNES quarry. (10) Buried water pipe to concrete mixer and circular emplacement.

KEY TO ANNOTATED PRINT NO. 00002 OF SORTIE FA/254 (107 Sqn)  
TAKEN ON 16th MARCH, 1944


1. Western part of WIZERNES quarry.
2. Tunnel entrances.
3. Circular emplacement.
4. Camouflaged area above quarry.
5. Pipe bridge (camouflaged).
6. Concrete mixing plant.
7. Stores buildings.
8. Rail served stores dump.
9. Eastern part of WIZERNES quarry.
10. Buried water pipe to concrete mixer and circular emplacement.

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
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*[Faint, illegible typed text on a document page, likely a report or letter, partially obscured by the photograph.]*



A/254/107 No. 00002

Neg No 37C15

Taken on 16.3.44

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APPENDIX "C"

NOTE ON ACTIVITY AT WATTEN

(See annotated print attached)

It now appears that the building on this site is reaching completion. The main structure is a rectangular building (1 on print) 220 ft. by 130 ft. which has been erected on the southern part of the foundations of the original buildings after their destruction by bombing. This new building has now reached a considerable height, and its roof, which is of heavy concrete carried on steel beams, is almost complete. There is at present no rail access to the building by standard gauge line, but a standard gauge line is being laid out which will lead to the east side of the building at the level of the floor. At the excavation work on the standard gauge branch leading from WATTEN is being pressed on.

Two concrete mixing plants (2 and 3 on print) are in operation. That on the north side of the site (3) is supplying concrete by means of the ramp (4) to the roof of the building (1).

Part of the original structure is seen at (5) and (6). Some attempt at clearance has been made here but no reconstruction seems to have been carried out. The stores dump at (7) is being used in connection with the new construction.

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KEY TO ANNOTATED PRINT NO. 3026 of SORTIE J/607 TAKEN  
ON 13th MARCH 1944.

- 1. Main building 220 ft. by 130 ft.
- 2. Concrete mixer.
- 3. Concrete mixer.
- 4. Ramp leading to roof of (1).
- 5. Remains of old structures.
- 6. Remains of old structures.
- 7. Stores dump.

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KEY TO ANNOTATED PRINT NO. 3026 of SORTIE J/607 TAKEN  
ON 13th MARCH 1944.

- 1. Main building 220 ft. by 130 ft.
- 2. Concrete mixer.
- 3. Concrete mixer.
- 4. Ramp leading to roof of (1).
- 5. Remains of old structures.
- 6. Remains of old structures.
- 7. Stores dump.

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
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
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# WATTEN

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C.O.S. (44) 309 (0)

1ST APRIL, 1944

WAR CABINET

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

SERVICE LEAVE AND TRAVEL

Note by Secretary

At their Meeting<sup>m</sup> held on 30th March the Committee on "OVERLORD" Preparations considered a memorandum by the First Lord of the Admiralty on the subject of Service leave and travel.

2. The memorandum showed, inter alia, that at the Naval Depots in the Southern ports the shortage of sleeping accommodation would make it necessary to continue the practice of granting night leave to personnel who had their homes in the neighbourhood.

3. The Committee on "OVERLORD" Preparations invited the Chiefs of Staff to examine, as a special problem, the arrangements to be made with regard to local night-leave in the Southern ports when the briefing of "OVERLORD" formations had taken place.

(Signed) L.C. HOLLIS

ices of the War Cabinet,  
S.W.1.

1ST APRIL, 1944.

✓ O.P. (44) 6th Meeting  
✓ O.P. (44) 16

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1ST APRIL 1944

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WAR CABINET  
CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

OPERATION NEPTUNE - EVACUATION OF CASUALTIES

Memorandum by Supreme Commander,  
Allied Expeditionary Force

1. At their Meeting\* held on 23rd March 1944, the Chiefs of Staff invited the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, to accept the fact that one of the ten (10) carriers to be made available for "OVERLORD" will not be fitted with water ambulances, and that one (1) other may not be so fitted.
2. As no technique has yet been developed for embarking casualties in open anchorage without the use of water ambulances, hospital carriers without water ambulances will be of little use in the early crucial stages of "OVERLORD".
3. The Supreme Commander, therefore, while accepting the proposals, requests the Chiefs of Staff:
  - a. To give the highest priority to fitting the PRAGUE with water ambulances.
  - b. To invite the Admiralty to advise on the technique for hoisting in casualties from DUKWs and small craft into the ISLE OF JERSEY, and to fit the necessary hoists to enable this to be done.

For the Supreme Commander:

(Signed) W.B. SMITH  
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army,  
Chief of Staff

Offices of the War Cabinet, S.W.1.

1ST APRIL 1944.

\* C.O.S. (44) 98th Meeting (0), Conclusion 3(e)

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WAR CABINET

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

OPERATION MARETH - EVACUATION OF CHERBOURG

Memorandum of the Supreme Commander  
Allied Expeditionary Force

At their meeting held on 28th March 1944, the Chiefs of Staff invited the Supreme Commander to accept the fact that the 'OVERLORD' will not be made available for 'OVERLORD' until the end of the year and that one (1) extra week will be required for the development of the equipment of the French 2nd Armoured Division. The Supreme Commander, therefore, while accepting the proposals, requests the Chiefs of Staff to give the highest priority to fitting the PRAGUE with water ampoules. To invite the Admiralty to advise on the technicalities for fitting in canisters from DUKW's and small craft into the ISLE OF TERREHUELLE and to fit the necessary points to enable this to be done.

For the Supreme Commander:

(Signed) W.S. SMITH

Assistant General, W.S. SMITH  
Chief of Staff

1st Deputy, War Cabinet, S.W.1.

1ST APRIL 1944

C.O.S. (44) 311 (0) Meeting (0)

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1ST APRIL 1944

WAR CABINET

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

FRENCH PARTICIPATION IN OVERLORD -

MOVE OF LE CLERC DIVISION

Note by Secretary

The attached reply\* from SCAEF, to the Chiefs of Staff enquiry concerning the implications of the move of the equipment of the French 2nd Armoured Division, is being taken into account by the Joint Planning Staff in a report which they are preparing (in anticipation of instructions) on the full implications of the move of this division.

2. It is proposed to place this paper on the Chiefs of Staff Agenda with the Joint Planning Report, when ready.

(Signed) L.O. HOLLIS

Offices of the War Cabinet, S.W.1.

1ST APRIL 1944.

\* Annex

Annex II to C.O.S. (44) 103rd Meeting (0)

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2ND APRIL 1944

SPECIAL CIRCULATION

WAR CABINET  
CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

"CROSSBOW"

14th Progress Report by the Deputy Chief of the Air Staff

Previous Reference C.O.S. (44) 271 (0)

Classification of "Ski" Sites

65 sites are now classified as Category A; of the remaining 31, 28 are scheduled for attack by the Tactical Air Forces and the Eighth Air Force.

2. The state of structural completion of sites in Categories B, C and D, is as follows:-

90 - 100%	.....	10
80 - 89%	.....	8
70 - 79%	.....	6
60 - 69%	.....	3
50 - 59%	.....	1

Under 50% or apparently abandoned 3

31

Attack of "Ski" Sites

3. During the period 19th March - 1st April, heavy bombers of the Eighth Air Force carried out attacks against 12 "Ski" sites on one day; aircraft of the Tactical Air Forces carried out attacks on 8 days, weather conditions on other days being unsuitable. A statement of sites attacked and bomb tonnage dropped is given below, details being shown in Annex II.

	<u>No. of Sites</u>	<u>Bomb Tonnage</u>
	<u>Attacked</u>	<u>Dropped</u>
TACTICAL AIR FORCES	22	690
EIGHTH AIR FORCE	12	528
Total "Ski" sites attacked during period	<u>31</u>	<u>1,218</u>

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Since the commencement of operations against "Ski" sites, 96 sites have been attacked and 15,936 tons of bombs dropped.

4. At Annex I is a Graph showing the weekly effort in terms of bomb tonnage dropped on "Ski" sites and large sites. It will be noted that there has been a progressive decrease in the effort against "Ski" sites which is due to unfavourable weather and to the diversion of medium bombers against other targets. The effect of this decrease has been partly offset by the increased accuracy achieved by the Tactical Air Forces. The targets which are now outstanding, however, are in areas strongly defended by A.A. and becoming increasingly difficult to attack.

Results of Attacks on "Ski" Sites

5. (i) Results of attacks on "Ski" sites during the period 19th March - 1st April are as follows:-

Category A .....	6
Category B .....	2 (2 possibly A)
Category C .....	7
Category D .....	13
No Cover .....	3

(ii) Cumulative Results

11 sites, previously assessed as Category A have been repaired and re-assessed in lower categories. Three of these have subsequently been attacked and made Category A again. Taking these re-assessments into account, and embodying the results of paragraph 5(i) above, the cumulative results to date are as follows:-

Category A .....	65
Category B .....	20
Category C .....	11
Category D .....	Nil

Attack of Large Sites

6. Details of attacks during the period against large sites are shown below:-

	<u>Attacks</u>		<u>Bomb Tonnage</u> <u>Dropped</u>
	<u>19th March/1st April</u>		
WIZERNES	2 visual		342
MINOYECQUES	2 visual		319
SIRACOURT	1 visual		124
WATTEN	{ 2 blind bombing		294
	{ 2 visual		315
			<u>1,394</u>

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Since the commencement of operations against "Ski" sites, 96 sites have been attacked and 15,936 tons of bombs dropped.

4. At Annex I is a Graph showing the weekly effort in terms of bomb tonnage dropped on "Ski" sites and large sites. It will be noted that there has been a progressive decrease in the effort against "Ski" sites which is due to unfavourable weather and to the diversion of medium bombers against other targets. The effect of this decrease has been partly offset by the increased accuracy achieved by the Tactical Air Forces. The targets which are now outstanding, however, are in areas strongly defended by A.A. and becoming increasingly difficult to attack.

Results of Attacks on "Ski" Sites

5. (i) Results of attacks on "Ski" sites during the period 19th March - 1st April are as follows:-

- Category A ..... 6
- Category B ..... 2 (2 possibly A)
- Category C ..... 7
- Category D ..... 13
- No Cover ..... 3

(ii) Cumulative Results

11 sites, previously assessed as Category A have been repaired and re-assessed in lower categories. Three of these have subsequently been attacked and made Category A again. Taking these re-assessments into account, and embodying the results of paragraph 5(i) above, the cumulative results to date are as follows:-

- Category A ..... 65
- Category B ..... 20
- Category C ..... 11
- Category D ..... Nil

Attack of Large Sites

6. Details of attacks during the period against large sites are shown below:-

	<u>Attacks</u> <u>19th March/1st April</u>	<u>Bomb Tonnage</u> <u>Dropped</u>
WIZERNES	2 visual	342
MIMOYECQUES	2 visual	319
SIRACOURT	1 visual	124
WATTEN	{ 2 blind bombing	294
		2 visual
		<hr/> 1,394 <hr/>

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Reference:- <b>CAB 80 / 82</b>												
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7. The above attacks have resulted in the following damage to sites:-

(i) WIZERNES

Direct hits on the circular emplacement and on the camouflaged area above the quarry. Direct hits on the platforms outside the tunnels, blocking the entrances. Severe damage to the concrete mixing and conveyor plant. The main railway line and sidings are blocked by craters and by the collapse of the concrete "pipe" bridge.

(ii) MIMOYECQUES

Strike photographs show a few direct hits on the camouflaged excavation between the tunnel entrances and also a number of bursts near the shaft heads and on the railway and approaching the site from the south-east. A full assessment of damage cannot be made until further cover is received.

(iii) SIRACOURT

The only fresh damage of any significance is caused by one near miss to the north end of the eastern structure.

(iv) WATTEN

2 direct hits have been obtained on the edge of the rectangular building, apparently causing slight damage to the roof.

8. Since operations against large sites commenced on the 31st January 1944, 3,806 tons have been dropped in 39 attacks and the damage is now classified as follows:-

- CATEGORY W (more than 3 months to repair)... 1 MARTINVEST
- CATEGORY X (1½ to 3 months to repair) ..... 2 LOTTINGHEM  
WIZERNES
- CATEGORY Y (2 weeks to 1½ months  
to repair) ..... 4 MIMOYECQUES  
SIRACOURT  
SOTTEVAST  
WATTEN
- CATEGORY Z (no damage of importance) ..... Nil

Offices of the War Cabinet, S.W.1,

2ND APRIL 1944.

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(ii) MIMOYECQUES

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CATEGORY X (1½ to 3 months to repair) .....	2	LOTTINGHEM WIZERNES
CATEGORY Y (2 weeks to 1½ months to repair) .....	4	MIMOYECQUES SIRACOURT SOTTEVAST WATTEN
CATEGORY Z (no damage of importance) .....	Nil	

Offices of the War Cabinet, S.W.1,

2ND APRIL 1944.

Reference:-


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ANNEX II

"SKI" SITES - SUMMARY OF ATTACKS  
FOR PERIOD 19th MARCH - 1st APRIL, 1944.

	<u>Attacks</u>	<u>Tonnage</u> <u>Dropped</u>
TACTICAL AIR FORCES.....	34	690
EIGHTH AIR FORCE.....	12	528
R.A.F. BOMBER COMMAND.....	-	-
	<u>46</u>	<u>1218</u>
No. of Sites Attacked 19th March - 1st April 1944.....	<u>31</u>	
TOTAL No. of Sites Attacked - 5th December 1943 - 1st April 1944.....	<u>96</u>	

"SKI" SITES - CUMULATIVE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT AS ON 1st APRIL, 1944.

CATEGORY A .....	65
CATEGORY B .....	20
CATEGORY C .....	11
CATEGORY D .....	-
	<u>96</u>

LARGE SITES - SUMMARY OF ATTACKS 19th MARCH - 1st APRIL, 1944.

<u>Target</u>	<u>Attacks</u>	<u>Tonnage</u> <u>Dropped</u>	<u>Present</u> <u>Assessment</u>
WIZERNES	2	342	CATEGORY X
MIMOYECQUES	2	319	CATEGORY Y
SIRACOURT	1	124	CATEGORY Y
WATTEN	4	609	CATEGORY Y
		<u>1394</u>	

LARGE SITES - CUMULATIVE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT AS ON 1st APRIL, 1944.

	<u>Order of</u> <u>Priority for Attack</u>
<u>CATEGORY W</u> (3 months to repair (Suspended)).... 1 - MARTINVEST	1. WIZERNES
<u>CATEGORY X</u> (1½ - 3 months to repair)..... 2 - LOTTINGHEM	2. WATTEN
	3. MIMOYECQUES
	4. SOTTEVAST
<u>CATEGORY Y</u> (2 weeks - 3 months to repair)..... 4 - SIRACOURT	5. SIRACOURT
	3. LOTTINGHEM
	(after "Ski" sites)
	SOTTEVAST
	MIMOYECQUES
	WATTEN
<u>CATEGORY Z</u> (No damage)..... -	


BOMB TONNAGE

	<u>Period</u>	
"SKI" SITES.....	19th March - 1st April 1944.....	1,218
LARGE SITES.....	19th March - 1st April 1944.....	<u>1,394</u>
		<u>2,612</u>
	<u>Period</u>	
"SKI" SITES.....	5th December 1943 - 1st April 1944.....	15,936

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ANNEX II

"SKI" SITES - SUMMARY OF ATTACKS  
FOR PERIOD 19th MARCH - 1st APRIL, 1944.

	Attacks	Tonnage Dropped
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EIGHTH AIR FORCE.....	12	528
R.A.F. BOMBER COMMAND.....	-	-
	<u>46</u>	<u>1218</u>
No. of Sites Attacked 19th March - 1st April 1944.....	<u>31</u>	
TOTAL No. of Sites Attacked - 5th December 1943 - 1st April 1944.....	<u>96</u>	

"SKI" SITES - CUMULATIVE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT AS ON 1st APRIL, 1944.

CATEGORY A .....	65
CATEGORY B .....	20
CATEGORY C .....	11
CATEGORY D .....	-
	<u>96</u>

LARGE SITES - SUMMARY OF ATTACKS 19th MARCH - 1st APRIL, 1944.

Target	Attacks	Tonnage Dropped	Present Assessment
WIZERNES	2	342	CATEGORY X
MIMOYECQUES	2	319	CATEGORY Y
SIRACOURT	1	124	CATEGORY Y
WATTEN	4	609	CATEGORY Y
		<u>1394</u>	

LARGE SITES - CUMULATIVE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT AS ON 1st APRIL, 1944.

	Order of Priority for Attack
CATEGORY W (3 months to repair (Suspended)).... 1 - MARTINVAST	1. WIZERNES
CATEGORY X (1½ - 3 months to repair)..... 2 - LOTTINGHEM WIZERNES	2. WATTEN
CATEGORY Y (2 weeks - 3 months to repair)..... 4 - SIRACOURT SOTTEVAST MIMOYECQUES WATTEN	3. MIMOYECQUES 4. SOTTEVAST 5. SIRACOURT 34. LOTTINGHEM (after "Ski" sites)
CATEGORY Z (No damage)..... -	

BOMB TONNAGE

Period	
"SKI" SITES..... 19th March - 1st April 1944.....	1,218
LARGE SITES..... 19th March - 1st April 1944.....	<u>1,394</u>
	<u>2,612</u>
Period	
"SKI" SITES..... 5th December 1943 - 1st April 1944.....	15,936
LARGE SITES..... 31st January - 1st April, 1944.....	<u>3,806</u>
GRAND TOTAL.....	<u>19,742</u>

Reference -  
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SUMMARY OF ATTACKS ON "SKI" SITES  
FOR PERIOD 19th MARCH - 1st APRIL 1944

Order of Priority for Attack	CONFIRMED SITES		Scheduled for Attack by	Total Tonnage Dropped During Period.	Total Tonnage Dropped to Date	Previous Assessments	Present Assessment
	Locality	Target No.					
(1 - 5 LARGE SITES)							
6	ZUDAUSQUES	XI/A/100	T.A.F. and EIGHTH A.F.	53.6	94.4		C
7	LA GLACERIE	XI/A/26(a)	"	31.3	89.3		C
8	HARDINVEST LE MOTTERIE	XI/A/26(c)	"	24.5	50.7		C
9	CORMETTE	XI/A/57	"	60.8	182.1	A	C
10	BOIS D'ESQUERDES	XI/A/11	"	30.4	199.7		C
11	GORENFLOS	XI/A/37	"	48.6	215.5		B
12	BRISTELLERIE	XI/A/26(a)	"	45.5	411.3		B
13	FLOTTEMANVILLE HAGUE II	XI/A/10(b)	"	45.5	164.7		C
14	VACQUERLETTE	XI/A/83	"	42.1	313.4	B - C	B
15	BONNIERES	XI/A/85	"	52.7	546.0		B
16	BOIS CARRE	XI/A/39	"	15.6	279.0	A	B
17	BOIS DES HUIT RUES	XI/A/73	"	57.1	606.6		B
18	WISQUES	XI/A/96	"	30.8	45.7		C
19	BEAUVOIR	XI/A/79	"	33.0	215.0	A - C	B
20	LINGHEM	XI/A/72	"	27.9	190.1		B
21	BEHEN	XI/A/59	"		144.3		B
22	LIGESCOURT	XI/A/40	"		218.6	A	B
23	FLOTTEMANVILLE HAGUE I	XI/A/10(a)	"	44.6	142.2		C
24	FORET NATIONALE DE TOURNEHEM	XI/A/88	"	23.4	129.2	B	C
25	BOIS COCQUEREL	XI/A/60	"		106.4		B
26	LE FLOUY FERME	XI/A/66	"		56.7	A	B
27	DOMART EN PONTHEU	XI/A/36	"	78.0	370.0		B
28	NOTRE DAME FERME	XI/A/112	"		85.0	A	B
29	BOIS DE LA JUSTICE	XI/A/74	"		117.6		B
30	MARQUENNEVILLE	XI/A/78	"		234.4		B
31	GROISSETTE	XI/A/15	"	14.3	190.5	A	B
32	PETIT BOIS TILLENCOURT	XI/A/62	"	69.6	169.1		B
33	LE GROSEILLIER	XI/A/121	"		72.9		B
<u>Not authorised</u>							
"	AGENVILLERS	XI/A/58	Suspended		76.2		A
"	AILLY LE HAUT CLOCHER	XI/A/38	"		578.7		A

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SUMMARY OF ATTACKS ON "SKI" SITES  
FOR PERIOD 19th MARCH - 1st APRIL 1944

Order of Priority for Attack	CONFIRMED SITES		Scheduled for Attack by	Total Tonnage Dropped During Period.	Total Tonnage Dropped to Date	Previous Assessments	Present Assessment
	Locality	Target No.					
(1 - 5 LARGE SITES)							
6	ZUDAUSQUES	XI/A/100	T.A.F. and EIGHTH A.F.	53.6	94.4		C
7	LA GLACERIE	XI/A/26(a)	"	31.3	89.3		C
8	HARDINVEST LE MOTTERIE	XI/A/26(c)	"	24.5	50.7		C
9	CORMETTE	XI/A/57	"	60.8	182.1	A	C
10	BOIS D'ESQUERDES	XI/A/11	"	30.4	199.7		C
11	GORENFLOS	XI/A/37	"	48.6	215.5		B
12	BRISTELLERIE	XI/A/26(d)	"	45.5	411.3		B
13	FLOTTEMANVILLE HAGUE II	XI/A/10(b)	"	45.5	164.7		C
14	VACQUERLETTE	XI/A/83	"	42.1	313.4	B - C	B
15	BONNIERES	XI/A/85	"	52.7	546.0		B
16	BOIS CARRE	XI/A/39	"	15.6	279.0	A	B
17	BOIS DES HUIT RUES	XI/A/73	"	57.1	606.6		B
18	WISQUES	XI/A/96	"	30.8	45.7		C
19	BEAUVOIR	XI/A/79	"	33.0	215.0	A - C	B
20	LINGHEM	XI/A/72	"	27.9	190.1		B
21	BEHEN	XI/A/59	"		144.3		B
22	LIGESCOURT	XI/A/40	"		218.6	A	B
23	FLOTTEMANVILLE HAGUE I	XI/A/10(a)	"	44.6	142.2		C
24	FORET NATIONALE DE TOURNEHEM	XI/A/88	"	23.4	129.2	B	C
25	BOIS COCQUEREL	XI/A/60	"		106.4		B
26	LE FLOU FERVE	XI/A/66	"		56.7	A	B
27	DOMART EN PONTIEU	XI/A/36	"	78.0	370.0		B
28	NOTRE DAME FERME	XI/A/112	"		85.0	A	B
29	BOIS DE LA JUSTICE	XI/A/74	"		117.6		B
30	MARQUENNEVILLE	XI/A/78	"		234.4		B
31	CROISSETTE	XI/A/15	"	14.3	190.5	A	B
32	PETIT BOIS TILLEN COURT	XI/A/62	"	69.6	169.1		B
33	LE GROSELLIER	XI/A/121	"		72.9		B
<u>Not authorised</u>							
"	AGENVILLERS	XI/A/58	Suspended		76.2		A
"	AILLY LE HAUT CLOCHER	XI/A/38	"		878.7		A
"	ARDOUVAL	XI/A/110	"		120.9		A
"	AUDINCOURT	XI/A/94	"		188.1		A

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Order of Priority for Attack	CONFIRMED SITES		Scheduled for Attack by	Total Tonnage Dropped During Period	Total Tonnage Dropped to Date	Previous Assessment	Present Assessment
	Locality	Target No.					
<u>Not authorised</u>							
"	BAILLY LA CAMPAGNE	XI/1/31	Suspended		99.1		A
"	BEAULIEU FERME	XI/1/91	"		77.7		A
"	BEAUMONT LE HARENG	XI/1/115	"		58.0		A
"	BEAUTOT	XI/1/124	"		56.6		A
"	BELLEVUE	XI/1/51	"		61		A
"	BELLEVILLE-EN-CAUX	XI/1/77	"		165.1		A
"	BELMESNIL	XI/1/105	"		66.9		A
"	BOIS DE CREQUY	XI/1/82	"		145.7		A
"	BOIS D'ENFER	XI/1/99	"		74.3		A
"	BOIS DE POTTIER	XI/1/54	"		192.4		A
"	BOIS DE LA COUPELLE	XI/1/67	"		244		A
"	BOIS DE RENTY	XI/1/102	"		199.7		A
"	BOIS MEGLE	XI/1/114	"		25.5		A
"	BOIS DE WARIPPEL	XI/1/25	"		160.1		A
"	BOIS REMPRE	XI/1/53	"		174.8		A
"	BONNETOT	XI/1/27	"	7.1	86.6		A
"	BRUNEHauptRE	XI/1/24	"		190.3		A
"	CAMPNEUSEVILLE	XI/1/45	"		54.0		A
"	CHATEAU DE BOSMELET	XI/1/92	"		84.7		A
"	COCOVE	XI/1/70	"		197.1		A
"	DRIONVILLE	XI/1/50	"		41		A
"	ECALLES SUR BUCHY	XI/1/101	"		264.1		A
"	ECLIMEUX	XI/1/76	"		270.5		A
"	FEBVIN PALFART	XI/1/87	"	61.6	62.5		A
"	FORET D'HESDIN	XI/1/74	"		118.4		A
"	FREVAL	XI/1/30	"	36.1	211.3	A - B	A
"	GRAND PARC	XI/1/107	"		125.7	A - B	A
"	GUESCHART	XI/1/20	"		181.9		A
"	HAMBURES	XI/1/64	"		147.9		A
"	HEUDIÈRE	XI/1/106	"		42.5		A
"	HERBOUVILLE	XI/1/42	"		131		A
"	HEURINGHEM	XI/1/32	"		138.2		A
"	LABROYE	XI/1/22	"		343.2		A
"	LA LONGEVILLE	XI/1/117	"		108.9		A

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<u>Not authorised</u>						
"	BAILLY LA CAMPAGNE	XI/1/31	Suspended		99.1	A
"	BEAULIEU FERME	XI/1/91	"		77.7	A
"	BEAUMONT LE HARENG	XI/1/115	"		58.0	A
"	BEAUTOT	XI/1/124	"		56.6	A
"	BELLEVUE	XI/1/51	"		61	A
"	BELLEVILLE-EN-CAUX	XI/1/77	"		165.1	A
"	BELMESNIL	XI/1/105	"		66.9	A
"	BOIS DE CREQUY	XI/1/82	"		145.7	A
"	BOIS D'ENFER	XI/1/99	"		74.3	A
"	BOIS DE POTTIER	XI/1/54	"		192.4	A
"	BOIS DE LA COUPELLE	XI/1/67	"		244	A
"	BOIS DE RENTY	XI/1/102	"		199.7	A
"	BOIS MEGLE	XI/1/114	"		25.5	A
"	BOIS DE WARPEL	XI/1/25	"		160.1	A
"	BOIS HEMPRE	XI/1/53	"		174.8	A
"	BONNETOT	XI/1/27	"	7.1	86.6	A
"	BRUNEHauptRE	XI/1/24	"		190.3	A
"	CAMPNEUSEVILLE	XI/1/45	"		54.0	A
"	CHATEAU DE BOSMELET	XI/1/92	"		84.7	A
"	COOOVE	XI/1/70	"		197.1	A
"	DRIONVILLE	XI/1/50	"		41	A
"	ECALLES SUR BUCHY	XI/1/101	"		264.1	A
"	ECLIMEUX	XI/1/76	"		270.5	A
"	FEBVIN PALFART	XI/1/87	"	61.6	62.5	A
"	FORET D'HESDIN	XI/1/74	"		118.4	A
"	FREVAL	XI/1/30	"	36.1	211.3	A - B
"	GRAND PARC	XI/1/107	"		125.7	A - B
"	GUESCHART	XI/1/20	"		181.9	A
"	HAMBURES	XI/1/64	"		147.9	A
"	HEUDIERE	XI/1/106	"		42.5	A
"	HERBOUVILLE	XI/1/42	"		131	A
"	HEURINGHEM	XI/1/32	"		138.2	A
"	LABROYE	XI/1/22	"		343.2	A
"	LA LONGEVILLE	XI/1/117	"		108.9	A
"	LA SORELLERIE II	XI/1/93	"	46.5	99.2	A
"	LA SORELLERIE III	XI/1/26(b)	"		95.2	A
"	LE GRISMONT	XI/1/95	"	107.2	158.2	A
"	LE MEILLARD	XI/1/75	"		192.0	A

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Order of Priority for Attack	CONFIRMED SITES		Scheduled for Attack by	Total Tonnage Dropped During Period	Total Tonnage Dropped to Date	Previous Assessment	Present Assessment
	Locality	Target No.					
<u>Not Authorised</u>							
"	LE NIEPPE	XI/A/36	Suspended		45.8		A
"	LE MESNIL ALLARD	XI/A/18	"		134.7		A
"	LES HAYONS	XI/A/108	"	10.8	219.8		A
"	LES PETITS MORAUX	XI/A/89	"		109.5		A
"	LIVOSSART	XI/A/120	"		79.5		A
"	LONGUEMONT	XI/A/63	"		65.9		A
"	LOSTEBARNE	XI/A/68	"		346.3		A
"	MAISON PONTILIEU I	XI/A/21(a)	"		64.9		A
"	MAISON PONTILIEU III	XI/A/21	"		112.5		A
"	MESNIL AU VAL	XI/A/41	"	44.2	146.1		A
"	MONTORGUEIL	XI/A/81	"		60.6		A
"	MOYENNEVILLE	XI/A/61	"	45.7	215.6		A
"	NOYELLE-EN-CHAUSSEE	XI/A/44	"		90.5		A
"	LE PETIT BOIS ROBERT	XI/A/52	"		106.0		A
"	POMMERETAL	XI/A/56	"		96.8		A
"	PREUSEVILLE	XI/A/29	"	7.8	174.0		A
"	PUCHERVIN	XI/A/47	"		77.7		A
"	QUOEUX	XI/A/80	"		124.8		A
"	ST. ADRIEN	XI/A/109	"		47.9		A
"	ST. AGATHE D'ALLIEREMENT	XI/A/46	"	5.4	100.3		A
"	ST. JOSSE AU BOIS	XI/A/19	"		344.0	A - B	A
"	ST. PIERRE DES JONQUIERES	XI/A/28	"		266.0		A
"	VACQUERIE LE BOUCQ	XI/A/71	"		166.8		A
"	MAISONCELLE	XI/A/55	"		83.3	A	B
"	RUISSEAUVILLE	XI/A/65	"		85.1	B	C
"	BOUILLANCOURT	XI/A/84	"	9.1	75.3		C

Estimated number of tons dropped 19th March - 1st April, 1944 ..... 1,218

Estimated number of tons dropped 5th December 1943 - 1st April, 1944.....15,936

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C.O.S. (44) 314(0)

3RD APRIL, 1944

WAR CABINET

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

S.O.E. OPERATIONS IN BULGARIA

Copy of letter (R4785/18/G) dated 1st April 1944,  
from the Foreign Office to the Secretary, Chiefs  
of Staff Committee

x x x

You will already have seen Angora telegram No.429<sup>+</sup> about the interruption of communications between Turkey and Bulgaria.

2. Action on the lines which Hugessen hopes for would, of course, serve both our Bulgarian and Turkish policy. It would not merely help to bring about chaos in Bulgaria, which is exactly what we want, but apart from the stoppage of chrome deliveries to Germany, it would mean a complete disruption of Turco-German trade.

3. We appreciate, however, the difficulties which stand in the way of the realisation of any such proposal. Developments in the Balkans have put Bulgaria down to No.5 among bombing targets in the Balkans. We have discussed with S.O.E. the question of an operation against the Ardar and Maritsa bridges. Such an operation both in our opinion and that of S.O.E. is not a practical proposition. It would require a very long time to organise, its success would be doubtful and it would nearly certainly compromise S.O.E. Moreover, even if it succeeded, its value would not be very great, because the bridges could be speedily repaired, and so long as the sea route to Burgas and Varna is open, an alternative route for supplies from Turkey to Germany is open.

+ Annex

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The only possibility of doing anything effective on the lines suggested by Hugessen is to develop the guerilla movement in Bulgaria as well as increase S.O.E. activities there. For this purpose an increase in the aircraft available for S.O.E. work in the Balkans would be necessary. We have asked you before now for such an increase for operations in other countries, but we have always come up against the refusal of the American Chiefs of Staff. We feel, however, that we are in duty bound to make yet another appeal for a renewed approach to the Americans on this occasion. There is this point to be borne in mind. By increasing our effort in this direction, we should, besides helping to interfere with an important source of German supplies especially chrome, further increase the difficulties of the Bulgarian Government at a moment when their position is extremely shaky. If aircraft were made available for work in Bulgaria, we would on our side do everything to assist S.O.E. to make the best use of the supplies thus put at their disposal. We should, for instance, be prepared to allow them as far as possible to use Turkey as a base from which to infiltrate their personnel over the Bulgarian border and generally to give them a wider latitude than they have hitherto enjoyed in Turkey.

I am sending a copy of this letter to "C.D.".

(Signed) O.G. SARGENT

Offices of the War Cabinet, S.W.1.

3RD APRIL 1944

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ANNEX

- Copy of a telegram (No.429) dated 25th March 1944  
from Angora to the Foreign Office

Personal for Secretary of State.

Although the remark made from Ministry of Foreign Affairs recorded in paragraph 10 of my telegram No.419 is not (repeat not) to be regarded as official, it certainly indicates the real solution to the chrome question. Moreover the probability that the Germans will seize control in Roumania and Bulgaria as they have done in Hungary seems good reason for intensifying attacks on the Bulgarian railway system and for destruction of bridges on the Turkish frontier.

2. I am only sorry that I must still be cautious about these bridges to the extent of advising that attacks on them should not be carried out by, or be traceable to, our organisations in Turkey. It is important at this time not to give the Minister for Foreign Affairs the opportunity to strengthen his position by claiming that we are trying to embroil Turkey with Germany. I have reluctantly had to advise against certain proposed S.O.E. activities against Axis shipping at Istanbul (Constantinople) on this ground and the same principle applies to attacks on bridges from Turkey. Short of this I hope that everything possible will be done to disrupt the latter's railway connexion and to destroy bridges. The last sentence of your telegram No.220 was not encouraging and I trust that it may be possible to ensure effective action with the minimum delay. If sabotage is difficult I hope that high priority can be given to bombing and that attention will also be given to Burgas.

3. [Grp. undec: ? My United States colleague] who has frequently urged the destruction of communications during the past year, tells me that he has just sent a further telegram to Washington urging that this is the real solution of the chrome question.

[OTP]

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*This document was considered at Bod(44) 109<sup>th</sup> Meeting (6) June 8.*  
C.O.S. (4) 315(V)

3RD APRIL, 1944.

WAR CABINET

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

FRENCH PARTICIPATION IN "OVERLORD"

*X X X*  
Copy of letter (A/C/15) dated 3rd April, 1944 from the Foreign Office to the Secretary, Chiefs of Staff Committee

We understand that the Chiefs of Staff will very shortly consider a paper, J.P. (44)92 (Final), dealing with the proposal to bring back the Leclerc Division to the United Kingdom with a view to its participating in "Overlord". While we are not concerned with the details of the method by which the transport of this Division might be effected, nevertheless we think that the Chiefs of Staff, when taking this J.P. paper, may care to have the views of the Foreign Office on the participation of a French division in the liberation of France. We consider that it is politically most important that at least one French division should participate in "Overlord" and that it should be engaged at as early a date as possible.

2. The French Committee of National Liberation are particularly anxious to let it be known that an appreciable French force is taking an active part in the operations which, it is hoped, will result in the liberation of France. The assurance of such active participation will be of the greatest assistance in all our dealings with the French Committee of National Liberation, both now and in the future.

3. This consideration has perhaps greater force, since it appears likely that there will be no other operation, at any rate until some time after "Overlord" has been launched, in which French forces, apart from comparatively small units, could participate.

4. Moreover, on the Prime Minister's instructions, Mr. Duff Cooper has informed General de Gaulle privately that the Prime Minister himself is much in favour of the Leclerc Division fighting with us in the main battle. (Foreign Office telegram to Algiers No. 255 of 10th March, 1944).

5. Finally, we believe that the effect on the French people of an announcement in the early stages of the battle that French troops had landed in force would be electric. We have no doubt that the knowledge that French troops were fighting in France alongside British and American troops would both stimulate local resistance to the enemy and enormously increase the degree of help and co-operation which we might expect to obtain from the French in the theatre of operations and in liberated territory - or at the very least increase their reluctance to assist the enemy.

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6. While it might be possible to make the French understand, that for operational reasons, the Leclerc Armoured Division could not be put ashore in the first assault, I think it would be more difficult to convince them of the impossibility of putting this Division into the battle until an appreciable time after several other armoured divisions had been landed; still more would the non-use of the Leclerc Division in "Overlord" prove a bitter disappointment to the French. This disappointment would have far-reaching political and psychological effects both during Operation "Overlord" and afterwards.

7. We therefore hope it may be possible for the Chiefs of Staff to recommend that this Division should be brought back to this country in time to participate in the early stages of "Overlord".

X X X

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C.O.S. (44) 316 (0)

4TH APRIL, 1944

WAR CABINET

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

BOMBING OF ROME AND VATICAN PROPERTY

Copy of letter dated 3rd April, 1944  
from the Foreign Office to the Secretary,  
Chiefs of Staff Committee

\* \* \*

You will have seen Osborne's telegram No. 199 of 26th March from the Vatican giving the text of a statement by the German High Command, published in the "Messagero", claiming that German troops have been withdrawn from Rome and that no military traffic of any kind passes through or within the city.

The publication of this statement coincides with what is clearly a concerted Roman Catholic appeal to the Allies, inspired by the Vatican, to avoid damage to Rome. In the last week or so we have had appeals addressed to the Prime Minister and to the Secretary of State from Roman Catholic Archbishops in the leading South American States; the Apostolic Delegate has handed in a memorandum to the Foreign Office containing an urgent appeal from the Cardinal Secretary of State that the belligerents should prevent destruction to Rome; the Spanish Charge d'Affaires has, on the instructions of his Government, said that the latter are willing to submit to the German Government any reasonable conditions which the Allies may put forward, with the object of avoiding damage to or the destruction of Rome: the Roman Catholic Archbishops of Australia are reported to have made a demarche on the subject, and finally Mr. de Valera has sent an appeal to the Prime Minister.

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The German statement, contained in Osborne's telegram, which from a propaganda view we cannot leave unanswered, and these various appeals from Roman Catholic sources, have led us to consider once again the question of the possible demilitarisation of Rome, and my Secretary of State would be grateful if the Chiefs of Staff would examine the question anew and let us have their views as a matter of urgency.

It seems to us that we can either (a) state publicly that for military reasons, which might be elaborated, we must reserve all our rights as a belligerent and cannot consider any proposals for treating Rome as an open city; or, alternatively, (b) offer to accept Rome as an open city subject to conditions on the lines which we considered last year, when the Italian Government wished to declare Rome an open city. You will remember that the Americans suggested certain conditions set out in J.S.M. 118 of 2nd August, 1943, while very similar suggestions were set out in my Secretary of State's telegram to the Prime Minister (Concrete No. 221 of 15th August), further relevant telegrams are FMD 24 of 18th September, FMD 36 of 29th September, (telegrams from Field-Marshal Dill to the Chiefs of Staff), and JSM 1218 and 1223 of 30th September and 1st October.

In asking the Chiefs of Staff to examine these two alternative courses of action, my Secretary of State would like to emphasize that in his view the political considerations for adopting alternative (b) are considerably stronger than they were last year. If we continue to bomb Rome and if the Germans then make use of the city to an extent which will force us to attack them there when our forces draw nearer to Rome, any resultant damage is likely to be ascribed not only by Italian opinion but by opinion all over the world to intransigence on our part, and is likely to result in a blot on our good name for some time to come.

In the above connexion the Chiefs of Staff will have noticed a number of recent telegrams from Osborne, which have been confirmed from other reputable sources, that considerable resentment is being caused all over German-occupied Italy by our strategic bombing operations; that Anglo-American prestige is rapidly sinking as a result; that feeling in occupied Italy is becoming sympathetic to the Germans, and that Russian prestige is gaining at our expense.

Perhaps the Chiefs of Staff could weight the military importance and value of the present bombing of so-called military targets throughout Italy as against the political and moral effects which this bombing is undoubtedly producing on the Italian population and on world public opinion, in addition to the actual damage it is doing to buildings and works of art. May the remedy not lie in a more careful choice of military targets and in a greater use of expert precision bombing? Again, it is possible that with events moving as they are in the Balkans, greater military results might perhaps be produced by diverting part of this bombing effort from Italian to Balkan targets?

\* \* \*

(Signed) O.G. SARGENT

Offices of the War Cabinet,  
S.W.1.,

4TH APRIL, 1944.

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SECRET

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

WASHINGTON, D. C.

APRIL 4, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

SUBJECT: BOMBING OF ROME AND ITALIAN AIR FORCE

FROM: THE CHIEFS OF STAFF

DATE: APRIL 4, 1944

RE: The German statement, contained in Osborne's telegram, which from a propaganda view we cannot leave unanswered, and these various appeals from Roman Catholic sources, have led us to consider once again the question of the possible demilitarisation of Rome, and my Secretary of State would be grateful if the Chiefs of Staff would examine the question anew and let us have their views as a matter of urgency.

\* \* \*

(Signed) O.G. SARGENT

Offices of the War Cabinet,  
S.W.1.,

4TH APRIL, 1944.

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It seems to us that we can either (a) state publicly that for military reasons, which might be elaborated, we must reserve all our rights as a belligerent and cannot consider any proposals for treating Rome as an open city; or, alternatively, (b) offer to accept Rome as an open city subject to conditions on the lines which we considered last year, when the Italian Government wished to declare Rome an open city. You will remember that the Americans suggested certain conditions set out in J.S.M. 118 of 2nd August, 1943, while very similar suggestions were set out in my Secretary of State's telegram to the Prime Minister (Concrete No. 221 of 15th August), further relevant telegrams are FMD 24 of 18th September, FMD 36 of 29th September, (telegrams from Field-Marshal Dill to the Chiefs of Staff), and JSM 1218 and 1223 of 30th September and 1st October.

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\* \* \*

(Signed) O.G. SARGENT

Offices of the War Cabinet,  
S.W.1.,

4TH APRIL, 1944.

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C.O.S. (44) 317 (0)

4TH APRIL, 1944

WAR CABINET

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

RETURN OF L.S.T.'s FROM MEDITERRANEAN

Memorandum by First Sea Lord

Statement of L.S.T. remaining in the Mediterranean after present withdrawals have been completed and all 26 new U.S. L.S.T. have arrived.

	Estimated number which are serviceable on 10th April.	Estimated refitting which might return in later convoy.	Estimated long term repair unlikely to be ready for over a month.	Total
British L.S.T.(2)	N11	4 or 6	4 or 2	8
Greek L.S.T.(2)	3	-	-	3
U.S. L.S.T.(2)	42	-	-	42
<b>Total L.S.T.(2)</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>4 or 6</b>	<b>4 or 2</b>	<b>53</b>
British L.S.T.(1)	2	-	1	3
	47	4 or 6	5 or 3	56

2. Proposals which have been made for the withdrawal of L.S.T. after the cancellation or postponement of "ANVIL"

British Chiefs of Staff

In the course of the meeting with General Eisenhower<sup>6</sup> at which General Eisenhower's proposal<sup>+</sup> that a further 26 L.S.T.

<sup>6</sup> C.O.S. (44) 95th Meeting (0)  
<sup>+</sup> C.O.S. (44) 278 (0)

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should be withdrawn from the Mediterranean and arrive U.K. by 30th April was discussed, the following points were made -

(1) General Bedell Smith stated that if 14 L.S.T. could be made available in time for the "OVERLORD" Assault the "OVERLORD" position would be comfortable."

(11) The First Sea Lord explained that 19 L.S.T. each carrying 1 L.C.T. could be withdrawn from the Mediterranean between the last week in April and the middle of May without affecting Anzio maintenance and without reducing the lift in the Mediterranean to less than one division.

These views were sent to J.S.M. Washington in C.O.S.(W) 1228.

U.S. Chiefs of Staff

After consideration of the British proposals the U.S. Chiefs recommended that General Eisenhower's requirements should be met both as regards numbers and dates, i.e. 26 L.S.T. to arrive by 30th April except 12 which should arrive by 15th May. They later modified this view to "we request that the difference in Supreme Commander Allied Expeditionary Force, recommendation of 26 L.S.T. and the British Chiefs of Staff recommendation of 19 L.S.T. be adjusted". With regard to date they noted that "the British Chiefs of Staff would ask the Allied Commander in Chief, Mediterranean to determine whether landing craft can be released earlier than the dates specified in our proposal." It is assumed that "our" was a mistake for "their".

3. Action taken

General Wilson was requested to take into consideration in his remarks on the proposed General change in Strategy in the Mediterranean, the U.S. Chiefs proposal to withdraw amongst other landing ships and craft 26 L.S.T. of which all except 12 were to arrive by 30th April and the remaining 12 by 15th May. No reply has yet been received.

4. Action Required

(1) To find out the effect on the Mediterranean of the withdrawal of the full 26 L.S.T. In this connection it is of interest that during the last week the daily Anzio target of 4,000 tons per day has been reached by discharge from M.T. ships alone on most days.

(11) To decide on the actual number of L.S.T. to be withdrawn from the Mediterranean. At present this lies between the British Chiefs of Staff proposal of 19 L.S.T. carrying 19 L.C.T. or the equivalent of 22 L.S.T. and the U.S. Chiefs of Staff proposal that 26 L.S.T. and NO L.C.T. should return.

+ J.S.M. 1593  
/ COSMED 73

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(iii) To decide on a programme for the return of the L.S.T. which have to come. At present the British Chiefs of Staff propose that 14 L.S.T. should arrive by 15th May and General Eisenhower is satisfied with this. The U.S. Chiefs of Staff would like this to be improved on.

5. Suggested Action

With regard to 4(1). Since no reply has been received from General Wilson I suggest that a hastener should be sent which might be worded so as to obtain more precise information than that requested in COSMED 73.

With regard to 4 (ii). I suggest that the hastener might contain instructions to propose a programme.

I attach a proposed draft signal.† In order to avoid delay I think this should be repeated to J.S.M. Washington.

With regard to 4 (iii). When the effect on the Mediterranean of the withdrawal of the L.S.T. is known it will be necessary for the Chiefs of Staff to consult General Eisenhower and agree how many L.S.T. are to come.

6. Convoys from the Mediterranean

In case it may be of use, I show below a list of the convoys likely to be involved -

<u>Convoy</u>	<u>Date of leaving Bizerta</u>	<u>Date of arrival in U.K.</u>
MKS 45	7th April	24th May
MKS 46	17th April	4th May
MKS 47	27th April	14th May
MKS 48	7th <del>April</del> May	24th May

(Intld.) A.B.O.

of the War Cabinet,  
S.W.1.,  
14 APRIL, 1944

+ ANNEX

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To ensure the programme for the return of the L.S.T. which have to come at the end of the month of May...

ANNEX

Following for General Wilson from Chiefs of Staff, Reference COSMED 73.

Proposals for the return of L.S.T. for "OVERLORD" are that a maximum of 26 L.S.T. and NO L.C.T. or a minimum of 19 L.S.T. carrying a total of 19 L.C.T. should return to U.K. as early as possible.

It is essential that at least 14 L.S.T. should arrive U.K. by 15th May and it is desirable that as many as possible of the total number coming would arrive by 4th May (MKS 46) the remainder arriving by 15th May.

2. Request your early remarks on the effect on present Mediterranean operations of the proposals in 1 above.

3. Request you will suggest programme for the return of up to 26 L.S.T. You should indicate if possible but without delaying your reply:-

- (a) How many will be British and how many U.S.
- (b) If any have not been refitted.

ANNEX

ANNEX

DRAFT SIGNAL TO GENERAL WILSON FROM THE CHIEFS OF STAFF

COSMED.....

Following for General Wilson from Chiefs of Staff, Reference COSMED 73.

Proposals for the return of L.S.T. for "OVERLORD" are that a maximum of 26 L.S.T. and NO L.C.T. or a minimum of 19 L.S.T. carrying a total of 19 L.C.T. should return to U.K. as early as possible. It is essential that at least 14 L.S.T. should arrive U.K. by 15th May and it is desirable that as many as possible of the total number coming would arrive by 4th May (MKS 46) the remainder arriving by 15th May.

2. Request your early remarks on the effect on present Mediterranean operations of the proposals in 1 above.

3. Request you will suggest programme for the return of up to 26 L.S.T.

You should indicate if possible but without delaying your reply:-

- (a) How many will be British and how many U.S.
- (b) If any have not been refitted.

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G.O.S. (44) 318 (O)

APRIL, 1944

WAR CABINET

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

OPERATIONS IN BURMA

EMPLOYMENT OF CHINESE FORCES

Reference: G.O.S. (44) 95th Meeting (O), Minute 5)

Note by Secretary

The attached copy of a message<sup>m</sup> which the President sent to General Chiang Kai-Shek on about 20th March, on the subject of the participation of the Yunnan Force in the battle in Burma, is circulated for information.

(Signed) L.C. HOLLIS

Offices of the War Cabinet,  
S.W.1.

4TH APRIL, 1944

■ ANNEX.

ANNEX

MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE GENERALISSIMO

The situation in northern Burma has reached a very critical stage, one which I think can be capitalized to our great advantage or, if we fail to take advantage of the opportunities, might result to our serious disadvantage.

Your Chinese Corps on the Ledo Road has administered a severe setback to the Japanese with heavy losses to the enemy in men and also in ground and prestige. It is a magnificent outfit. General Stilwell was able to employ the U.S. regiment to considerable advantage and altogether the heavy reverse administered to the crack 18th Japanese Division represents an important victory.

Coupled with this the British forces on the Arakan coast have administered heavy losses to the Japanese troops which endeavoured to cut the British communications.

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Probably what is the most important of all, highly trained British Long Range Penetration Groups transported a specially organized American Air Force and with American Engineers, have been established rather firmly in the vicinity of Kawdaw, approximately 160 miles in the rear of the Japanese lines, have been generously supplied, by air transport, anti-aircraft, radar detection equipment, and fighter and bomber air units. These last on one day destroyed on the ground approximately 20 per cent. of the Japanese aircraft in Burma. The location of this unit provides an immediate and very serious threat to the Japanese supply lines leading up to the 18th Division, confronting your troops on the Ledo Road, and the line supplying the Japanese Division facing your Yunnan troops.

Quite evidently without any knowledge of this serious threat to their communications the Japanese have become involved in an advance threatening Imphal and the base communications for the Hump traffic. Serious as this threat might ordinarily be, under present conditions it can be developed into a catastrophe for the Japanese. General Stilwell reports that the Chinese Ledo Corps is now at Jambu Bum and in a few days should be near Shadupup. He reports that your men are full of fight and have carried themselves splendidly during the most difficult operations of the past three weeks. He feels that if your Yunnan force would advance into Tengchung and possibly to Kungling there is a good chance for the Ledo Corps to reach Myitkyina.

However, I doubt if General Stilwell, deep in the jungle and heavily preoccupied with the fighting there, fully realizes the extent of the opportunity which is now presented to us. I am told here that unless some reinforcement reaches the remnants of the 18th Japanese Division that unit must crumple before the advance of our troops. It is probable that such an effort of reinforcement will be made by withdrawing a regiment from the 56th Division facing your Yunnan troops since the expected appearance of the strong force near Kawdaw will deter the Japanese from moving any units of the reserve divisions in that vicinity towards the Ledo front. The heavy fighting on the Arakan front and on the Imphal front together with the progress of another of Wingate's penetration groups towards the heart of the Japanese communications between Mandalay and Myitkyina, should involve the Japanese in a most serious dispersion or with the necessity of considerable withdrawals, to our great advantage. However, if no aggressive action is taken against our troops, the enemy will certainly recover from his present disadvantage.

I am communicating my views to you at length and in considerable detail in the hope that you will give orders to the commander of your Yunnan force to co-operate in developing what appears to be a great opportunity. I send you my very warm regards.

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ANNEX I

O.S. (44) 258 (07)

ATTACKS ON RAIL TARGETS IN ENEMY-OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

Memorandum by Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force

The attached study\* by the Air Commander-in-Chief is transmitted for consideration by the British Chiefs of Staff. The Supreme Commander considers the question raised to be a most urgent one.

Offices of the War Cabinet,  
S.W.1,  
15TH MARCH 1944.

ENCLOSURE

ATTACKS ON RAIL TARGETS IN ENEMY-OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

Copy of a Memorandum dated 10th March 1944 from the Air Commander-in-Chief, Allied Expeditionary Air Force

To:- The Supreme Allied Commander

You may remember that in my letter AEA/MS.689 of the 31st January I stressed the point that if we are to obtain the maximum effect from our air operations in preparing for and carrying out Operation "Overlord", we must not allow those operations to be restricted by the risk of inflicting casualties on the civil populations of the countries concerned.

2. It is becoming a matter of increasing urgency that we should obtain clearance for attacks on all the railway targets in Occupied Territory specified in our Outline Bombing Plan, since we are now reaching the stage where lack of such clearance may jeopardise our chances of completing the preparatory offensive in sufficient time to leave our bomber forces free to meet the

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ny commitments with which they will be faced on and around  
" Day.

The present situation regarding clearance of these targets set out at Appendix "A", from which it will be seen that out a total of 78 targets, only 28 have so far been completely cleared for day attack by medium and light bombers, 8 for attack day and night, and 4 for day attack by both medium and heavy bombers. This leaves 70 targets which have been cleared only partially or not at all; these are listed at Appendix "A".

To enable us to take full advantage of every opportunity for attacking these targets afforded by weather limitations and other commitments, and to give us the widest possible selection of alternative objectives, it is most important that the whole of the targets listed at Appendix "B" should be given conditional clearance without delay.

(Signed) T. LEIGH-MALLORY,

Air Chief Marshal  
Air Commander-in-Chief  
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY AIR FORCE

APPENDIX "A"

PRESENT STATE OF CLEARANCE OF RAILWAY TARGETS

<u>TARGET</u>	<u>Medium &amp; Light DAY</u>	<u>Heavies DAY</u>	<u>Heavies NIGHT</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
AERSCHOT				Ruling awaited
AMIENS/LONGEAU	Yes	Yes	Yes	Ruling awaited
ANTWERP/DAM				
ARRAS	No	No	No	
AUDUN LE ROMAN				Ruling awaited
AULNOYE	Yes	Yes	Yes	
BELFORT				Ruling awaited
BERTRIX				Ruling awaited
BETHUNE	No	No	No	
BLAINVILLE (nr. NANCY)	Yes	Yes	Yes	
BOULOGNE-SUR-MER	No	No	No	
BRUSSELS/MIDI				Ruling awaited
BRUSSELS/SCHAERBECK	Yes	Part	No	
BUSIGNY				Ruling awaited
CALAIS	No	No	No	
CAMBRAI	No	No	No	
CHALONS-SUR-MARNE	Yes	Yes	No	
CHARLEROI/MONCEAU	Part	No	No	
CHARLEROI/MONTIGNIES	Yes	No	No	
CHARLEROI/ST MARTIN				Ruling awaited
CHAUMONT				Ruling awaited
COLMAR				Ruling awaited

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T A R G E T	Medium &			REMARKS
	Light DAY	Heavies DAY	Heavies NIGHT	
ONFLANS JARNY				Ruling awaited
OURTRAI	Part	Part	Part	
REIL	Part	Part	Part	
ULMONT CHALINDREY				Ruling awaited
OUAI	No	No	No	
PINAL				Ruling awaited
HEMENT/HEIRELBEIGE	Yes	No	No	
LAINE ST. PIERRE	Yes	No	No	
ASSELT	Part	No	No	
ERSON	Yes	No	No	
EMELLE				Ruling awaited
UVISY	No	No	No	
ON	Part	Part	Part	
BOURGET	No	No	No	
MANS	Yes	Yes	Yes	
ENS	Yes	Yes	No	
EGE/KINLEEMPOIS	No	No	No	
EGE/BRESSOUX	Yes	No	No	
EGE/OUGREE				Ruling awaited
ILLE/FIVES	Yes	No	No	
ILLE/LA DELIVRANCE	Yes	Yes	No	
ONGWY				Ruling awaited
UVAIN	Part	No	No	
LES				Ruling awaited
MEMBOURG				Ruling awaited
LINES	Yes	No	No	
NTES/GASSICOURT	Part	No	No	
TZ	No	No	No	
HON	No	No	No	
NS	No	No	No	
TZEN	Yes	Yes	Yes	
LHOUSE/NORD	Yes	No	No	
LHOUSE/MAIN STATION				Ruling awaited
LHOUSE/ILLE NAPOLEON				Ruling awaited
LAUR/RONET	Yes	No	No	
ANCY	No	No	No	
TIGNIES	Yes	Yes	Yes	
RIS/BATIGNOLLES	No	No	No	
RIS/LA CHAPELLE	No	No	No	
RIS/NOSY LE SEC	Yes	No	No	
REIMS	No	No	No	
UEN/SOTTEVILLE	Part	No	No	
RRREGUEMINES	Yes	Part	No	
MAIN				Ruling awaited
GHISLAIN	Yes	No	No	
RASBOURG/HAUSEBERGEN	Yes	Yes	Yes	
RGNIER	Yes	No	No	
IONVILLE	Part	Part	No	
URCOING				Ruling awaited
URNAI	No	No	No	
URS/ST. PIERRE DES COFFES	Yes	Part	Part	
APPES	Yes	Yes	Yes	
OYES	No	No	No	
URES	Yes	Yes	Part	
LENCIENNES				Ruling awaited
LENEUVE ST. GEORGES	Yes	Part	No	

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APPENDIX "A" (cont).

T A R G E T	Medium &			REMARKS
	Light DAY	Heavies DAY	Heavies NIGHT	
3. CONFLANS JARNY				Ruling awaited
4. COURTRAI	Part	Part	Part	
5. CREIL	Part	Part	Part	
6. CULMONT CHALINDREY				Ruling awaited
7. DOUAI	No	No	No	
8. EPINAL				Ruling awaited
9. GHENT/MEIRELEBEKE	Yes	No	No	
10. HAINE ST. PIERRE	Yes	No	No	
11. HASSELT	Part	No	No	
12. HIRSON	Yes	No	No	
13. JEMELLE				Ruling awaited
14. JUVISY	No	No	No	
15. LAON	Part	Part	Part	
16. LE BOURGET	No	No	No	
17. LE MANS	Yes	Yes	Yes	
18. LENS	Yes	Yes	No	
19. LIEGE/KINLENPOIS	No	No	No	
20. LIEGE/BRESSOUX	Yes	No	No	
21. LIEGE/OUCREE				Ruling awaited
22. LILLE/FIVES	Yes	No	No	
23. LILLE/LA DELIVRANCE	Yes	Yes	No	
24. LONGWY				Ruling awaited
25. LOUVAIN	Part	No	No	
26. LURES				Ruling awaited
27. LUXEMBOURG				Ruling awaited
28. MALINES	Yes	No	No	
29. MANTES/GASSICOURT	Part	No	No	
30. METZ	No	No	No	
31. MOHON	No	No	No	
32. MONS	No	No	No	
33. MONTZEN	Yes	Yes	Yes	
34. MULHOUSE/NORD	Yes	No	No	
35. MULHOUSE/MAIN STATION				Ruling awaited
36. MULHOUSE/ILE NAPOLEON				Ruling awaited
37. NAIUR/RONET	Yes	No	No	
38. NANCY	No	No	No	
39. OTTIGNIES	Yes	Yes	Yes	
40. PARIS/BATIGNOLLES	No	No	No	
41. PARIS/LA CHAPELLE	No	No	No	
42. PARIS/NOSY LE SEC	Yes	No	No	
43. RHEIMS	No	No	No	
44. ROUEN/SOTTEVILLE	Part	No	No	
45. SARREGUEMINES	Yes	Part	No	
46. SOMAIN				Ruling awaited
47. ST. GHISLAIN	Yes	No	No	
48. STRASBOURG/H.AUSBERGEN	Yes	Yes	Yes	
49. TERGNIER	Yes	No	No	
50. THIONVILLE	Part	Part	No	
51. TOURCOING				Ruling awaited
52. Tournai	No	No	No	
53. TOURS/ST. PIERRE DES ORRES	Yes	Part	Part	
54. TRAPPES	Yes	Yes	Yes	
55. TROYES	No	No	No	
56. VAIRES	Yes	Yes	Part	
57. VALENCIENNES				Ruling awaited
58. VILLENEUVE ST. GEORGES	Yes	Part	No	

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APPENDIX "B"

RAILWAY TARGETS NOT YET COMPLETELY  
CLEARED FOR ALL TYPES OF ATTACK

- |                          |                               |
|--------------------------|-------------------------------|
| 1. AERSCHOT              | 36. LIEGE/BRESSOUX            |
| 2. ANTWERP/DAM           | 37. LIEGE/UGREE               |
| 3. ARRAS                 | 38. LILLE/FIVES               |
| 4. AUDUN LE ROMAN        | 39. LILLE/LA DELIVRANCE       |
| 5. BELFORT               | 40. LONGWY                    |
| 6. BERTRIX               | 41. LOUVAIN                   |
| 7. BETHUNE               | 42. LUMES                     |
| 8. BOULOGNE-SUR-MER      | 43. LUXEMBOURG                |
| 9. BRUSSELS/MIDI         | 44. MALINES                   |
| 10. BRUSSELS/SCHAERBECK  | 45. MANTES/GASSICOURT         |
| 11. BUSIGNY              | 46. METZ                      |
| 12. CALAIS               | 47. MOHON                     |
| 13. CAMBRAI              | 48. MONS                      |
| 14. CHALONS-SUR-MARNE    | 49. MULHOUSE/NORD             |
| 15. CHARLEROI/MONCEAU    | 50. MULHOUSE/MAIN STATION     |
| 16. CHARLEROI/MONTIGNIES | 51. MULHOUSE/ILE NAPOLEON     |
| 17. CHARLEROI/ST MARTIN  | 52. NAMUR/RONET               |
| 18. CHAUMONT             | 53. NANCY                     |
| 19. COLMAR               | 54. PARIS/BATIGNOLLES         |
| 20. CONFLANS JARNY       | 55. PARIS/LA CHAPELLE         |
| 21. COURTRAI             | 56. PARIS/NOSY LE SEC         |
| 22. CREIL                | 57. RHEIMS                    |
| 23. CULMONT CHALINDREY   | 58. ROUEN/SOTTEVILLE          |
| 24. DOUAI                | 59. SARREGUEMINES             |
| 25. EPINAL               | 60. SOMAIN                    |
| 26. GHENT/MEIRELBEKE     | 61. ST GHISLAIN               |
| 27. HAINE ST PIERRE      | 62. TERGNIER                  |
| 28. HASSELT              | 63. THIONVILLE                |
| 29. HIRSON               | 64. TOURCOING                 |
| 30. JEMELLE              | 65. TOURNAI                   |
| 31. JUVISY               | 66. TOURS/ST PIERRE DES CORPS |
| 32. LAON                 | 67. TROYES                    |
| 33. LE BOURGET           | 68. VAIRES                    |
| 34. LENS                 | 69. VALENCIENNES              |
| 35. LIEGE/KINKEMPOIS     | 70. VILLENEUVE ST GEORGES     |

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ANNEX II

Copy of a Minute dated 30th March, 1944 from  
Lieut.-General Sir Hastings L. Ismay to the Prime Minister

General Eisenhower has put forward to the Chiefs of Staff a request by the Air Commander-in-Chief, Allied Expeditionary Force, that permission be given for certain railway targets in Occupied Territory to be attacked by day or night without any operational restrictions, as part of the OVERLORD bombing plan.

2. The plan involves attacks on approximately 74 railway centres in France and Belgium. The Ministry of Home Security have estimated that unless evacuation reduced the number of civilian population living near the targets, between 80,000 and 160,000 casualties might be caused by the bombing, of which a quarter would be killed.

3. The plan has now been agreed to by the Supreme Allied Commander and the Chief of the Air Staff, and the latter has submitted a minute to you on the subject.

4. The Chiefs of Staff consider it essential to the success of the plan that permission to bomb the railway targets should be given as soon as possible, subject to the proviso that measures are taken to reduce to a minimum the risk of casualties to the civilian population, so far as this is practicable, without prejudicing the success of the operations.

5. The Chiefs of Staff request your approval for these railway targets to be attacked, subject to the proviso in paragraph 4 above.

6. The Chiefs of Staff consider that the civilian populations in France and the Low Countries, and particularly the railway operating personnel, must be warned that important railway centres in their countries may at any time be subjected to heavy air bombardment, and advised to evacuate the vicinity of such centres. They consider that the effect of this preparatory warning will be not only to reduce casualties, but also to increase the difficulties of operating the railways caused by the bombing. They therefore recommend that the Political Warfare Executive should urgently prepare the terms of such a warning and, if you approve, issue it as soon as possible.

7. A copy of this minute has been sent to the Foreign Secretary.

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5TH APRIL, 1944

WAR CABINET

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

BOMBING OF RAILWAY TARGETS IN ENEMY OCCUPIED TERRITORY

Report

In accordance with the instructions<sup>x</sup> of the War Cabinet we have arranged for the Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee to examine and report on the probable reactions of French and Belgian opinion to the bombing of railway centres in enemy occupied territory. Their report<sup>+</sup>, with which we are in general agreement, is attached.

2. With reference to paragraph 7 of the report, we would emphasise that we had not envisaged the wholesale evacuation of towns in or near which railway centres are located, but only the evacuation of the immediate vicinity of the target areas.

(Signed) A.F. BROOKE  
C.A. PORTAL  
ANDREW CUNNINGHAM

Offices of the War Cabinet,  
S.W.1.

5TH APRIL, 1944

x W.M. (44) 43rd Concs., Minute 7  
(Confidential Annex)  
+ J.I.C. (44) 135 (0) (Final)

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G.O.S.(44) 321 (0)

5TH APRIL, 1944

WAR CABINET  
CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

NEW ZEALAND'S MANPOWER

Copy of a letter dated 4th April, 1944 from Mr. Nash to General Ismay

\* \* \*  
For the information of the Chiefs of Staff, I am attaching hereto a letter\* that I have today sent to the Prime Minister in relation to the proposals for the re-adjustment of the use of New Zealand's manpower.

I mentioned the matter to Sir Alan Brooke at the War Cabinet last evening.

\* \* \* \* \*  
(Signed) W. NASH

Offices of the War Cabinet,  
S.W.1.  
5TH APRIL, 1944

\* Annex.

ANNEX

Copy of a letter dated 3rd April, 1944 to the Prime Minister from Mr. Nash

\* \* \*  
One of the main purposes of my present visit to the United Kingdom was to discuss with you and the Chiefs of Staff the best use to which the manpower of New Zealand could be put during the period between now and the end of the conflict in Europe.

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2. My Prime Minister, the Rt.Hon. Peter Fraser, has now advised me that on Thursday last, 30th March, the New Zealand Parliament accepted the New Zealand Government's proposals, which had been based on the recommendations of the United Kingdom and the Chiefs of Staff as communicated to Mr. Fraser by myself, and that these proposals followed negotiations with the representative of the Commander of the South Pacific and the Commander of the 3rd New Zealand Division, General Barraclough.

3. The plan provides for the release of 11,000 men from the 3rd New Zealand Division by October, in accordance with priority categories arranged with the New Zealand manpower authorities. The plan is based on the assumption that the 3rd New Zealand Division will not go out of existence but that a nucleus will be retained, capable of re-expansion if the reconstruction of the Pacific Division later becomes possible. These proposals have been adopted as an interim policy to enable the situation in Europe to become clearer and to permit of reconsideration of the withdrawal of the 2nd New Zealand Division after the fall of Rome, or at some other appropriate time.

4. The plan allows for the present operations in the Green(?) and Treasury Islands to be completed; it provides for the ultimate concentration of Unit Cadres in New Caledonia; it ensures continuity of association with the U.S. Command; it keeps our Cadre Force acclimatised; it saves shipping back to New Zealand all equipment which might, later, be shipped forward again if the Division is reformed; it enables the New Zealand Forces to use the good camp, recreation, hospital and training conditions in New Caledonia.

5. In June, the 3rd New Zealand Division would, in any case, have been in the forward area (Tropical) for nine months and relief would normally be expected in June or thereabouts. The policy accepted is merely an interim policy and the question of whether the New Zealand Division is to continue or to be completely liquidated cannot be decided until the problem of the withdrawal of the 2nd New Zealand Division from Europe has been finally considered.

6. Mr. Fraser proposes to discuss this matter with you in London and also with General Freyberg when he sees him.

7. No publicity whatever is being given to the withdrawal, which will be referred to whenever necessary as "controlled diversion of manpower from the Pacific to food production and allied occupations." Plans for utilising the services of the men released have been worked out, as have plans for increased farm production.

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5TH APRIL, 1944

WAR CABINET  
CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

STRATEGIC ASPECT OF THE DISCUSSIONS ON  
OIL POLICY

Report

It is our view that it is to our advantage that the Americans should have interests in Middle East oilfields and hence a strategic commitment.

2. Russia is a potential future danger to the Middle East area. Even if she could meet her total oil requirements from her own resources, she might still be tempted to look with envy upon the outlet to the Indian Ocean afforded by the warm water ports of the Persian Gulf. To be able to count with justifiable confidence upon American assistance against this danger is an over-riding advantage.
3. It is true that an extension of American influence in the Middle East, especially in Palestine, would present us with a complication of the internal security problem. This is a difficulty which we cannot, in any case, escape altogether, since the Americans already have very considerable interests in Middle East oilfields.
4. We conclude that the advantage of obtaining an American counterweight to Russian pressure far outweighs any possible complication of our internal security problem.
5. At Annex is an initial brief for the British Delegation on the strategic considerations.

(Signed) A.F. BROOKE  
C. PORTAL  
ANDREW CUNNINGHAM

Offices of the War Cabinet,  
S.W.1.,

5TH APRIL, 1944.

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ANNEX

BRITISH - UNITED STATES DISCUSSIONS ON OIL POLICY

STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS

Initial Brief for the British Delegation

From the strategic point of view it is in the interest of the whole British Commonwealth that oil should be available in the necessary quantity and quality in as many areas as possible, particularly in those areas which can most easily be defended. Hence it would be in our interest that reserves in the American Continent should not be unduly depleted.

2. In this connection it is understood that the American interest in the Middle East oil is based partly on strategic grounds, their contention being that they may eventually have to rely on these areas as their own resources are drying up. It is understood that this contention is largely invalid since the resources in North and South America are likely to be amply sufficient for defence purposes for many years, and from the military point of view, any additional requirements for the Pacific could be met from the East Indies. However, should this contention be substantiated it must be remembered that American continental resources constitute our most secure supply in war and therefore it is in our interest to take any step that may assist in their conservation.

3. On the other hand the Americans already have large commercial interests in the Middle East oil fields and this, from the military point of view, is to our advantage in that if we are ever called upon to defend them the chances of our obtaining American assistance will be increased. Moreover a potential aggressor might hesitate to interfere where both American and British interests are involved. There will be no advantage therefore in challenging the American claim to strategic interest in the Middle East oil. Our own interests being wider, the ultimate object should be to conclude a world wide agreement with the United States by which each Government would undertake to assist the other with oil supplies in time of emergency or war. It is essential that such an agreement should be world wide and not cover the Middle East alone; in this connection, it is an important consideration that the U.S. propose to introduce into the discussions at a later stage the Dutch and the Russians.

Priority of Development in the Middle East Area

4. The only potential external threat to the Middle East oil area is from the North and North West.

5. The existing Persian oil fields and concessions, which at present are 100% British owned, are in the territory of a weak and unstable Foreign Government, and we are in present circumstances precluded from maintaining forces in Persia in peace to protect these interests. The Iraq oil fields are within a British sphere of influence, but here again under our existing treaty we cannot in advance of an emergency despatch sufficient forces into Iraq to protect them from aggression. The proximity of these areas to possible aggression makes them extremely difficult to defend particularly against a sudden attack by air.

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SECRET

THE PERSIAN GULF - MEDITERRANEAN PIPE-LINE

PROVISION OF REFINERIES

Initial views for the pipe-line

From the strategic point of view it is in the interest of the whole British Commonwealth that oil should be available in the necessary quantity and quality in an area which is generally regarded as particularly important in those areas which are likely to be disturbed. It would be in our interest that reserves in the American continent should not be totally depleted.

In this connection it is understood that the American interest in the Middle East oil is based partly on the fact that the American position is that the oil reserves in the Middle East are not only a strategic asset but also a source of revenue for the countries in the area. It is understood that this position is likely to be supported by the American Government and the American oil companies. It is also understood that the American position is likely to be supported by the British Government and the British oil companies. It is also understood that the American position is likely to be supported by the French Government and the French oil companies. It is also understood that the American position is likely to be supported by the Dutch Government and the Dutch oil companies. It is also understood that the American position is likely to be supported by the Italian Government and the Italian oil companies. It is also understood that the American position is likely to be supported by the Japanese Government and the Japanese oil companies. It is also understood that the American position is likely to be supported by the Chinese Government and the Chinese oil companies. It is also understood that the American position is likely to be supported by the Indian Government and the Indian oil companies. It is also understood that the American position is likely to be supported by the Australian Government and the Australian oil companies. It is also understood that the American position is likely to be supported by the New Zealand Government and the New Zealand oil companies. It is also understood that the American position is likely to be supported by the South African Government and the South African oil companies. It is also understood that the American position is likely to be supported by the Canadian Government and the Canadian oil companies. It is also understood that the American position is likely to be supported by the United States Government and the United States oil companies. It is also understood that the American position is likely to be supported by the British Government and the British oil companies. It is also understood that the American position is likely to be supported by the French Government and the French oil companies. It is also understood that the American position is likely to be supported by the Dutch Government and the Dutch oil companies. It is also understood that the American position is likely to be supported by the Italian Government and the Italian oil companies. It is also understood that the American position is likely to be supported by the Japanese Government and the Japanese oil companies. It is also understood that the American position is likely to be supported by the Chinese Government and the Chinese oil companies. It is also understood that the American position is likely to be supported by the Indian Government and the Indian oil companies. It is also understood that the American position is likely to be supported by the Australian Government and the Australian oil companies. It is also understood that the American position is likely to be supported by the New Zealand Government and the New Zealand oil companies. It is also understood that the American position is likely to be supported by the South African Government and the South African oil companies. It is also understood that the American position is likely to be supported by the Canadian Government and the Canadian oil companies. It is also understood that the American position is likely to be supported by the United States Government and the United States oil companies.

6. The remaining areas on the Western and Southern shores of the Persian Gulf are more remote from any threat from the North but as yet are not fully developed. From the strategical point of view therefore, it is desirable that these should be developed and that efficient refineries should be established in their vicinity. In the interests of internal security such development should be carried out without interference with the existing satisfactory relationships between His Majesty's Government, the Arab Sheikdoms and the Oil Companies. In addition, if possible, nothing should be done which might weaken our relations with Ibn Saud.

Persian Gulf - Mediterranean Pipe-line

7. The Americans have in mind the construction of a pipe-line from the Saudi Arabian oilfields to the Mediterranean.

8. Assuming this to be a practical engineering proposition the strategical advantages of such a pipe-line would be:-

- (a) It would be an alternative to the existing Kirkuk-Haifa - Tripoli lines which would be further removed from any threat from the North. It would enable us to build up increased reserves in the Eastern Mediterranean.
- (b) It would save sea transport and reduce escort commitments in war.
- (c) It would increase the likelihood of U.S. assistance in protecting the sea route through the Mediterranean.
- (d) Experience has shown that a pipe-line is not particularly vulnerable to casual sabotage and, provided the territories through which it passes remain friendly and quiet, there would therefore be no serious commitment for its protection.

9. On the other hand the saving in tankers might result in a shrinkage in the total tanker tonnage available for emergency with a consequent reduction in the flexibility of oil distribution. Provided means can be devised for maintaining an adequate fleet of tankers, however, we see no objection to the construction of this pipe-line from the military point of view.

10. As regards the alignment of the pipe-line, if the Western terminus is at Alexandria we see the possibility of complications with the Egyptian Government which might prove embarrassing to both the Americans and ourselves in emergency. Provided therefore that satisfactory arrangements can be made for safeguarding the Western terminus, it should be in Palestine. To meet the possibility of the Persian Gulf or the Mediterranean being closed to shipping there would be great advantage if a suitable alignment could be found, from which an outlet could be constructed to the Red Sea should this ever be necessary. If it should be considered that a threat to our control of the Mediterranean or the Suez Canal might ever again become a possibility, direct piping to the Red Sea or possibly even to the Southern Arabian coast might be advisable.

Provision of Refineries

11. Apart from Haifa the only refineries of any consequence in the Middle East area are at Abadan and Bahrein. Should these be put out of action by an enemy the position would be extremely serious. It is of great importance therefore from the military

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The remaining areas on the western and southern shores of the Persian Gulf are more remote than the areas on the eastern shore. It is not clear whether these areas should be developed or not. It is suggested that the areas on the eastern shore should be developed first and that the areas on the western and southern shores should be developed later.

General

12. You will observe that the preceding paragraphs relate to the only potential external menace to our Middle East oil interests that exists. You should not conclude that this menace is considered real at the moment; on the contrary, it is quite possible that it will never materialise.

In either case, however, it would be highly dangerous if any hint that we were even considering this menace, let alone taking it seriously, were conveyed to the Americans in the course of your discussions with them.

(a) It will be an advantage to the Government to have a clear idea of the extent of the oil resources in the Middle East.

(b) It will be an advantage to the Government to have a clear idea of the extent of the oil resources in the Middle East.

(c) It will be an advantage to the Government to have a clear idea of the extent of the oil resources in the Middle East.

(d) It will be an advantage to the Government to have a clear idea of the extent of the oil resources in the Middle East.

(e) It will be an advantage to the Government to have a clear idea of the extent of the oil resources in the Middle East.

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(o) It will be an advantage to the Government to have a clear idea of the extent of the oil resources in the Middle East.

point of view that further refineries should be constructed. Their location will be a matter for more detailed planning when we know more of what the Americans have in mind.

General

12. You will observe that the preceding paragraphs relate to the only potential external menace to our Middle East oil interests that exists. You should not conclude that this menace is considered real at the moment; on the contrary, it is quite possible that it will never materialise.

In either case, however, it would be highly dangerous if any hint that we were even considering this menace, let alone taking it seriously, were conveyed to the Americans in the course of your discussions with them.

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C.O.S. (44) 323 (O)

5TH APRIL 1944

WAR CABINET

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

"OVERLORD" - POLITICAL WARFARE OUTLINE PLAN

(Reference: C.O.S. (44) 98th Meeting (O). Minute 5)

Note by the Secretary

The attached letter\* from the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, recording the results of his discussions with 'C' and with the Foreign Office, is circulated for the consideration of the Chiefs of Staff.

2. The gist of the last two paragraphs of S.C.A.E.F.'s letter has been communicated<sup>b</sup> by him to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
3. It is proposed to place this on the Agenda of the Committee as soon as a directive has been issued defining the degree of recognition to be afforded to the French Committee of National Liberation.

(Signed) L.C. HOLLIS

Offices of the War Cabinet,  
S.W.1,

5TH APRIL 1944

\* Annex  
b SCAF.12

A N N E X

Copy of Letter SHAEF/17100/33/Ops, dated 3rd  
April 1944, from S.H.A.E.F. to the Secretary,  
Chiefs of Staff Committee

Reference is made to a letter<sup>a</sup> to the undersigned from the Secretary, Chiefs of Staff Committee, dated 23rd March 1944, on the subject of the Political Warfare Outline Plan for "OVERLORD".

<sup>a</sup> C.O.S. (44) 98th Mtg (O), Min. 5, refers

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2. With respect to the comments made by 'C' contained in C.O.S. (44) 172 (0), attention is requested to the attached copy of a note\* which has been received from 'C' indicating his satisfaction with the results of the co-operation which has been achieved in connection with the safeguarding of his organisation in the implementation of the plan.

3. With respect to the comment by the Foreign Office that the section of the plan dealing with France is not acceptable as it stands, all reference to the Conseil de la Resistance has been changed to "such provisional authority as the Supreme Commander may be authorized or may decide to deal with".

4. The further comments by the Foreign Office appear to be of no particular importance, and the changes recommended are acceptable to us. Accordingly, as time is running short, the plan is being submitted to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Arrangements are being made to implement it as far as can be done in the absence of a directive indicating the degree of recognition to be afforded the French Committee of National Liberation. Until this is received certain limitations will, of necessity, be imposed upon the implementation of the French section of the plan.

\* Appendix

APPENDIX

Copy of Minute (C/6117) dated 27th March 1944  
from 'C' to S.H.A.E.F.

\* \* \*

I have been sent a copy of the letter<sup>o</sup> addressed to you on 23rd March on the subject of the Political Warfare Outline Plan for "OVERLORD". In paragraph two of this letter it is suggested that I should discuss with you how the interests of my organisation can be safeguarded.

During the past weeks I have maintained close liaison with P.W.E., particularly in regard to their plans for France and Belgium, and I am satisfied with the measures of co-operation which have been achieved. In these circumstances I do not think I need call upon your assistance at present, though I should very much like to be able to do so, if any difficulties arise at a later stage.

\* \* \*

<sup>o</sup> C.O.S. (44) 98th Mtg (0), Minute 5 refers

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6TH APRIL, 1944

WAR CABINET

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

OPERATIONS BY THE POLISH SECRET ARMY

Note by Secretary

The attached memorandum<sup>6</sup> by S.O.E. is circulated for information and record purposes.

(Signed) L.C. HOLLIS

Offices of the War Cabinet,  
S.W.1.,

6TH APRIL, 1944

<sup>6</sup> ANNEX I

ANNEX I

OPERATIONS BY THE POLISH SECRET ARMY

1. As the Russian advance approached areas containing a Polish population and in view of the Russo-Polish political crisis it recently became evident that:

- (a) The time was approaching when action by the Polish Secret Army would be most likely materially to assist the operations on the Eastern Front and Allied operations in general.
- (b) If the Secret Army did not act soon it was likely to be overrun by the Russian advance without ever having acted at all.
- (c) Action by the Secret Army on orders from the Polish Government in LONDON might be the most effective method of persuading the Russians that that Government was in fact endeavouring to co-operate and so assisting the Russo-Polish political negotiations.

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2. With a view to placing the possibilities before the Chiefs of Staff and Foreign Office, S.O.E. accordingly approached the Poles and asked for more precise information than had previously been available regarding the action which the Secret Army could undertake if ordered to do so.

Polish G.H.Q. thereupon despatched a telegram<sup>a</sup> to G.O.C. WARSAW, asking for his plans for:

- (a) Operations to be carried out with the material at present available to him.
- (b) Larger scale operations based upon local resources and material sent from here.

3. A reply<sup>a</sup> has now been received. From this it appears that the Secret Army intends to carry out a major operation in the areas of PRZEMYSL and SANOK between 10th April and 30th April. These areas contain important railway objectives; in PRZEMYSL a large viaduct carries the railway from KRAKOW to Lwow over the River SAN, and in SANOK there are numerous bridges and the line changes from single to double track. From past experience of Polish operations it may be taken that the actual interruption of traffic will last at least 48 hours. The potential effect of such an interruption at the present stage of operations on the Eastern Front is obvious.

4. In addition to the above Polish G.H.Q., WARSAW has indicated that the Poles are prepared to carry out the larger operation (EWA, referred to in (b) of Annex II) against the railway system in the KRAKOW-LWOW area from 1 May provided they can receive 48 containers of equipment (approximately 4 aircraft sorties) during the present moon period, delivered in the area of operations. Every effort is being made to ensure that this equipment is delivered.

5. In the normal course of sabotage operations in POLAND the Secret Army is carrying out attacks between the period 15th March and 15th April against trains in the areas of KRAKOW, RADOM and LUBLIN. These operations are referred to in a telegram<sup>b</sup> from G.O.C. Secret Army dated 22nd March.

6. All the above operations take place in the LWOW-KRAKOW area, since Polish G.H.Q. in LONDON asked for specific plans only in relation to the area where it seemed that most damage could be inflicted on the Germans in connection with the Russian advance.

Plans have, however, been asked for and preparations are being made for further large scale operations against German communications in other areas of POLAND, with particular reference to East-West traffic. This proposed action, details of which will be communicated as soon as possible, will show the assistance which the Polish resistance movement may be able to afford to operation 'OVERLORD'.

Polish G.H.Q. in LONDON has full control over the broad outline of operations, but necessarily the details are left to the local commander in the field. In particular exact dates must be left to the field to decide within limits of a week to ten days.

7. The above information has already been passed to the Foreign Office.

5th April, 1944

- Annex II
- ✓ Annex III
- ∅ Annex IV

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Faint, mostly illegible text on page 63, appearing to be a continuation of a report or document.

ANNEX II

TELEGRAM FROM POLISH G.H.Q. LONDON TO G.O.C. WARSAW

"In connection with the general situation on the Eastern Front it may be necessary to undertake diversive activity against the German lines of communication (principally railways) preferably between LWOW and KRAKOW on both lines to the front. I can see two methods of operation:-

- (a) Diversions to be carried out with your present available material. Report your ability to do this as regards extent and time. If you are able to stop movements on several lines simultaneously, give orders to have everything ready. Code word "JULA".
- (b) Second alternative consisting of larger scale operations based on your local possibilities and material sent from here. Broader method taking into account the total possibilities of your organisation and the explosive material which is to be sent from here. Report the approximate size of diversion, how much and where the material should be dropped also the time of action (zero hour) from the time of reception of material. Code word "EWA".

The time of carrying out the action plays of course a most important role.

The execution of either of these methods to be carried out only upon my order. We should like to receive your plan of action as soon as possible, at the latest the day before zero hour."

ANNEX III

COPY OF LETTER FROM POLISH G.H.Q. LONDON TO S.O.E. LONDON

We have just received an answer to our telegram despatched to the Field on the 11th March, regarding the sabotage of German lines of communication in the south of POLAND - code name JULA - this answer reads:-

"JULA will be carried out in the area of PRZEMYSL and SANCK against railway lines, interrupting traffic for not less than 48 hours. I can carry this out between 10th April and the end of the month after receipt of your order to proceed. The choice of the day, however, will have to be left to me to decide."

To this telegram our Commander-in-Chief has sent his order reading as follows:

"Proceed with JULA. Report to me the exact day a few days in advance as I wish to inform the British".

's' BUREAU

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COPY OF LETTER FROM POLISH G.H.C. LONDON TO  
S.O.E. LONDON

In connection with the general situation in Eastern Europe it will be necessary to conduct active activity in the region of communication lines of railway, post and telegraph lines of the West. It is necessary to have available in the West a reserve of material and personnel which can be used in the event of a general offensive. It is necessary to have available in the West a reserve of material and personnel which can be used in the event of a general offensive. It is necessary to have available in the West a reserve of material and personnel which can be used in the event of a general offensive.

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COPY OF LETTER FROM POLISH G.H.C. LONDON TO  
S.O.E. LONDON

We have just received an answer to the telegram mentioned in the field on the 22nd March. The answer is in the lines of communication to the G.H.C. - code name 'S'. This answer is as follows: "The G.H.C. will be carrying out in the West a reserve of material and personnel which can be used in the event of a general offensive. It is necessary to have available in the West a reserve of material and personnel which can be used in the event of a general offensive. It is necessary to have available in the West a reserve of material and personnel which can be used in the event of a general offensive."

ANNEX - IV

COPY OF LETTER FROM POLISH G.H.C. LONDON TO  
S.O.E. LONDON

I have received the following message from the G.O.C., Secret Army, dated 22nd March; this is in answer to a telegram in which I stressed the necessity of informing us in advance of any operation, if full credit is to go to the Secret Army.

"Large scale actions and among them attacks on trains are carried out on my orders. I specify the kind of action, the time limits and the area. Smaller scale actions carried out more or less constantly are organised by Area Commanders according to general instructions issued by me periodically. For the period 15th March to 15th April, the areas of KRAKOW, RADOM and LUBLIN have been instructed to carry out two attacks on trains. Results will be reported immediately."

'S' BUREAU

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C.O.S. (44) 325 (0)

6TH APRIL, 1944

WAR CABINET

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

THE REOCCUPATION OF NAURU AND OCEAN ISLAND

Note by Secretary

The attached Memorandum<sup>2</sup> by the Secretary of State for the Dominions is circulated for consideration by the Chiefs of Staff.

(Signed) L.C. HOLLIS

Offices of the War Cabinet,  
S.W.1.

6TH APRIL, 1944

<sup>2</sup> Annex 1

ANNEX I

Copy of a Memorandum dated 4th April, 1944  
from the Secretary of State for the Dominions  
to the Secretary, Chiefs of Staff Committee

Sir Arthur Gage, the United Kingdom member of the British Phosphate Commission (which is a body appointed jointly by the Governments of the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand to carry on the phosphate undertakings in Nauru and Ocean Island) recently returned to this country from an official visit to the Pacific, in the course of which he visited Washington, Suva, Pearl Harbour, Melbourne and Wellington. During his tour, he raised with various United Kingdom and United States Service authorities the question of the reoccupation of Nauru and Ocean Island but was unable to obtain any definite information about plans for such an operation.

2. Australia and New Zealand formerly drew the whole of their phosphate supplies from these islands, but since the occupation by the Japanese they have been dependent on supplies from Makatea and from the much more distant sources of the Red Sea, North Africa, and, more recently, Florida. The whole of the output of Makatea, however, with such supplies from the other sources as it has been possible to ship, have been quite inadequate to replace the supplies from Nauru and Ocean Island, with the result that for the past two years and more application of superphosphates, which are essential to full agricultural production in Australia and New Zealand, has

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amounted to barely 50 per cent. of the normal pre-war basis of application. The effect of this shortage is, of course, cumulative, and there is a grave need of much increased supplies of phosphates if these Dominions are to be able to reach the production targets which they have been asked to achieve, or even to maintain their production at its present levels. While the Commonwealth and New Zealand Governments have a very direct interest in this matter, the production of meat, dairy produce, etc., which they have been asked to achieve is required not only for their own purposes, but in order to maintain the ration in the United Kingdom, to supply United States forces in the South and South-West Pacific areas and to make some provision for relief; the supply of adequate quantities of phosphate to these two Dominions is, therefore, a matter also of very direct interest and importance to the United Kingdom and United States Governments. This interest extends not only to the actual supply and production aspect but also to the saving of shipping which would result from the availability of supplies through the shorter haul from Nauru and Ocean Island.

3. The Phosphate Commissioners expect that it will take some considerable time after the reoccupation of the islands to repair the damage and to get production started again. If adequate supplies of fertilisers are to be secured for Australia and New Zealand and relief to shipping through the shorter haul (and to some extent also relief to the overall supply position) is to be achieved within a reasonable time, the sooner the islands are recovered from the Japanese the better.

4. The importance of this question, not only to the two Dominion Governments concerned but also to the United States and United Kingdom Governments, is obvious. The United Kingdom Departments concerned whom I have consulted fully endorse what I have said in paragraphs 2 and 3 above. I should be grateful if the Chiefs of Staff, provided they see no objection, would arrange to have the matter raised with the Combined Chiefs of Staff and urge that all possible steps should be taken to reoccupy the islands as early as practicable. Any further appraisal which the Combined Chiefs of Staff might desire to have of the importance of the phosphate supply question in relation to the overall food situation would doubtless be furnished by the Combined Food Board.

(Signed) CRANBORNE

ANNEX II

Extract from a letter from Sir A. Gaye, The British Phosphate Commissioners, 21, Ebury Street, S.W.1, to Sir Eric Machtig, Dominions Office, dated 23rd March, 1944

\*\*\*\*\*

I venture to suggest that Appendix 5<sup>+</sup> should be brought to the notice of the Secretary of State as soon as possible.

\*\*\*\*\*

+ Annex III

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ANNEX III

RE-OCCUPATION OF NAURU AND OCEAN ISLAND

In August 1943 we received secret instructions both in London and in Melbourne to prepare for returning to these islands, which had been in Japanese occupation since August 1942, within a few months. I believe that at that time it was intended to take the islands by assault in November. Late in August our Chief Engineer, Mr. W.V. Bott, visited Pearl Harbour and conferred with Admiral Nimitz and his staff. He took with him detailed plans illustrating the difficulty of landing an attacking force, with the result that the project was abandoned for the time being. I have no doubt that the information furnished by Mr. Bott prevented a disastrous failure. On 11th November Mr. Gaze telegraphed to me saying that the operation was postponed. I replied "I am not surprised." Nor was I disappointed, for it had seemed to me from the first that an attempt, even if successful, to retake the islands was useless, so far as a resumption of phosphate production was concerned, so long as the enemy remained in occupation of Tarawa and others of the Gilbert Islands to the East and the Marshall and Caroline Islands to the North and North-West. The re-instatement of the phosphate installations would have been impossible with enemy air and naval bases so near.

When I arrived in Fiji on 25th January, the situation was very different. The enemy had been driven out of the Gilberts, and that same day at Funafuti I had seen more than 30 units of the American fleet steaming out of the lagoon; this sight prepared me for the news, which came a day or two later, of the attack on the Marshalls. The prospects of regaining Nauru and Ocean Island were now much brighter. On 26th and 27th January I had long discussions with Sir Philip Mitchell on the procedure to be followed. He emphasised that the islands would remain for some time in the military operational area and that all phosphate work would have to be carried on under military direction. This would call for the exercise of great patience and tact. We agreed that immediately after enemy resistance was overcome representatives of the B.P.C. and of the civil administration should land on each island, take stock of the condition of the phosphate installations, attend to the needs of the population (if any), and generally set about the task of restarting peace-time activities. They would be followed as soon as possible by a larger party including technicians and a labour force with the necessary materials and equipment for reconstruction. As regards labour, Sir Philip offered, subject to military approval, the services of a Fijian Field Company R.E. including skilled and semi-skilled tradesmen, with European officers, and of labour battalions later on for the work of mining and loading phosphate. This will be invaluable. Before I left he advised me to see Admiral Nimitz on my way home and impress on him the urgent importance of retaking the islands, and he telegraphed to the Admiral asking him to meet me at Pearl Harbour early in March.

In Melbourne I found that Mr. Bott had prepared detailed plans for the re-instatement of the moorings and the shore installations. The plans, though elaborate, were flexible and after full discussion were approved, subject of course, to such modifications as might be found necessary in the light of conditions existing on the islands at the time of our return there. Provision was made for the recruitment of labour in the Gilberts as in pre-war days; I had some doubts about this but said that I would consult the High Commissioner on my return to Suva. It was considered that the Australian Government, being responsible for the civil administration of Nauru, would wish to make their own arrangements for the re-occupation of that island; it is to be hoped, however, that they

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will not refuse the co-operation of Sir Philip Mitchell, who is both able and willing to help. Labour supply is in my opinion a matter for the British Phosphate Commissioners, and under clause 13 of the Nauru Agreement the Commonwealth Government cannot interfere.

I arrived back in Suva on 29th February, and conferred with the High Commissioner and Colonel Fox-Strangways, Resident Commissioner for the Gilbert and Ellice Islands Colony. I reported on my discussions in Melbourne, and, as I anticipated, Sir Philip said that the military authorities absolutely forbade recruitment of civilian labour in the Pacific Islands. He repeated his offer to let us have a Fijian Field Company and, later, labour battalions, if we could provide transport, we of course to be liable for their army pay. I suggested that we should supply rations and, if possible, tents. I telegraphed to Melbourne accordingly and suggested that our Ocean Island Manager should go to Suva to discuss labour details and also to confer with Mr. Ramsay, the Administrative Officer already selected for duty at Ocean Island. The offer of help applies equally to Nauru.

The High Commissioner told me that he had arranged for Admiral Nimitz to see me at Pearl Harbour on 3rd March. At Canton Island, where I stopped for a few hours, I met Admiral Newton, Admiral Nimitz's chief of staff, on his way to Noumea. He told me that Admiral Nimitz had been called away on urgent business and that I was to see Admiral Towers instead. On arrival at Pearl Harbour I had a long but unsatisfactory interview with this officer. Either he had little knowledge of any proposed operations against our islands or thought it better to conceal his knowledge. He implied that the present intention was not to attack, but to starve out the enemy. I replied that from our point of view this would be useless: the Japanese on the islands would die of old age first, for they could support themselves on coconuts and fish, and the only sufferers would be the native populations, if any still survived. He seemed surprised to learn that the islands produced coconuts! He made one interesting suggestion: would Australia or New Zealand, he asked, undertake the operation? Of course I could not answer this question, but as Australia and New Zealand are vitally concerned in the recovery of the islands they might be very willing to fight for them, Australia perhaps tackling Nauru and New Zealand Ocean Island. An advance party of Gilbertese landed at night from rubber boats, armed with tommy-guns, grenades and knives, might simplify the operation. The Gilbertese have many old scores to pay off against the Japanese, and Colonel Fox-Strangways assured me that they would readily volunteer and could be quickly trained for the job. Finally, Admiral Towers said that the decision rested not with Admiral Nimitz, but with the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington, and he advised me to state the case to them. So I telegraphed to Mr. Brand, the Head of the British Food Mission in Washington, asking him, if possible, to arrange a meeting.

On my arrival in Washington on 8th March I was fortunate, with the help of Brigadier-General Redman, in getting an informal interview with Field-Marshal Sir John Dill and Admiral Sir Percy Noble. I explained the position to them and, without of course committing themselves to any promise of action, they showed keen interest in the proposition. I left with them a short memorandum setting out the importance of resuming phosphate production on the islands and the history of previous suggestions for retaking them. They said that Admiral Nimitz was in Washington and they would try to get me an interview with him. Later I had a message from Admiral Nimitz expressing his regret that through pressure of other work he had been unable to meet me, and adding that he fully appreciated the importance of the case and had instructed his staff at Pearl Harbour accordingly.

I spoke again to Brigadier-General Redman, pointing out that the job must be tackled some time, that it would not become easier, that nothing was to be gained by delay, and that food production would gain by quick action. He agreed and said that it would be helpful if I could get the matter referred to the War Cabinet immediately on my return to London.

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This document was considered at *62nd* Meeting (O) Minute 6.

C.O.S. (44) 326 (O)

7TH APRIL 1944

WAR CABINET

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

STOPPAGE OF LEAVE AND TRAVEL WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE  
TO SERVICE PERSONNEL EMPLOYED IN THE ADMIRALTY, THE WAR  
OFFICE AND THE AIR MINISTRY

Report by the Second Sea Lord, the Adjutant-General and  
the Air Member for Personnel

We have considered the question<sup>b</sup> put forward by the Chiefs of Staff. All three Services have already issued confidential instructions on the policy for the stoppage of leave and travel to Commands on the lines of the instructions approved by the Overlord Preparations Committee (O.P. (44) 6th Meeting, Conclusion 1). A copy of the War Office instructions is attached.<sup>a</sup>

2. As to the question of leave of personnel of the three Services serving in the Admiralty, War Office, Air Ministry and other Government Departments, it was agreed that the same regulations should apply, except that rest days should not count as leave. Service personnel in these appointments may continue to spend these days at their homes even though these may be outside London. It must be understood, however, that this refers only to the place where they would normally live but for their appointment in London, and no other travel for any leave purpose is permissible while the leave ban is in force.

Offices of the War Cabinet, S.W.1.

7TH APRIL 1944.

<sup>b</sup> C.O.S. (44) 109th Meeting (O), Minute 11.

<sup>a</sup> Annex

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ANNEX

THE WAR OFFICE,  
LONDON, S.W.1.

23rd March 1944

URGENT MEMORANDUM

To: **Commander-in-Chief 21st Army Group,**  
**Commander-in-Chief Home Forces,**  
**All Commands at Home, G.Os.C. Northern Ireland**  
**and London District**

The arrangements below are likely to be put into effect at short notice, but have not yet been confirmed. It is important therefore, that the contents should be restricted to as few officers as possible. It will not therefore, be issued below Brigade or equivalent commanders. Confirmation will be notified by telegram on receipt of which the instructions may be issued to all concerned as Confidential.

Stoppage of Leave

1. All privilege leave and leave on 48 hours short pass will be suspended with effect from 6th April 1944. This applies to leave both between and within Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Eire. Those who proceed on leave up to the act of suspension need not be recalled.

On no account will the quatum be exceeded prior to this date.

2. Agricultural Leave is suspended from 5th April 1944.

3. The following leave may continue after 5th April 1944.

(a) Embarkation Leave

This will continue as at present except for troops of 21st Army Group.

(b) Disembarkation Leave

This will continue as at present.

(c) Compassionate Leave

This will continue under existing rules, except that it must be approved by an officer not below the rank of Major General. Special compassionate leave may be granted to personnel who have been prevented by work, from taking leave between 1st January and 5th April 1944, and are considered to be in need of a rest.

(Signed) B. MAYFIELD,  
Lieut.-Colonel, A.A.G.  
for Director of Personal Services

Appendix

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THE WAR OFFICE  
LONDON, E.C. 6

1st April 1944

MEMORANDUM

To: Commander-in-Chief 21 Army Group  
Commander-in-Chief Home Forces  
All Commands at Home, G.O.s.C., Northern Ireland  
and London District

The arrangements below are to be put into effect as  
soon as possible, but not later than 5/6 April. It is  
important to ensure that the arrangements are put into  
effect as soon as possible. It will not be possible to  
issue orders for the arrangements to be put into effect  
until the arrangements have been approved by the  
appropriate authorities. It is requested that you  
will be notified by return of post of the date  
instructions may be issued to all concerned as confidential.

REQUIREMENTS

All private leave and leave on account of illness  
to be suspended with effect from 5/6 April 1944. This applies  
to leave both between and within Great Britain and Northern  
Ireland and Eire. There will be no suspension of leave on the  
basis of suspension of leave on account of illness.

On no account will any leave be extended prior to this  
date.

Appropriate leave to be suspended from 5/6 April 1944.  
The following leave to be suspended after 5/6 April 1944:

- (a) Accumulated leave  
This will continue to be present except for  
groups of the Army Group.
- (b) Unauthorised leave  
This will continue to be present.
- (c) Compassionate leave  
This will continue under existing rules, except  
that it will be suspended by an officer and before  
the date of his departure. Special consideration  
leave may be granted to personnel who have been  
suspended from leave on account of illness and  
whose leave has not been suspended. This will  
be at the discretion of the appropriate authority.

(Signed) B. MAYFIELD  
Lieut.-Colonel, A.A.G.  
For Director of Personnel Services

APPENDIX

Copy of a telegram from the War Office

To: Commander-in-Chief 21 Army Group  
Commander-in-Chief Home Forces  
All Commands at Home, G.O.s.C., Northern Ireland  
and London district.

Instructions contained in urgent memorandum B.M.4774  
(A.G.4.a) 23 March may now be issued confidentially  
and will be enforced from midnight 5/6 April.  
Personnel already on leave at that date need not be  
recalled.

(Signed) B. MAYFIELD  
Lieut.-Colonel, A.A.G.

1st April 1944.

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*This document was considered at 127<sup>th</sup> Meeting (C) March 8.*

C.O.S. (44) 327 (0)

7TH APRIL, 1944

WAR CABINET  
CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

CONCURRENT AIR DEFENCE PLANS FOR OPERATIONS

"OVERLORD" and "DIVER"

Note by Secretary.

The attached copy\* of a letter from SCAEF is circulated for information and record purposes.

(Signed) L.C. HOLLIS.

Offices of the War Cabinet,  
S.W.1.

7TH APRIL, 1944.

\* Annex.

ANNEX

COPY OF LETTER SCAEF/16607/38A/GCA DATED  
4TH APRIL, 1944, FROM SCAEF TO THE  
SECRETARY, CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

It is agreed that the 96 Heavy Anti aircraft and 138 Light Anti aircraft guns in A.D.G.B., earmarked for "DIVER", are acceptable as reinforcements for the purely "OVERLORD" deployment. It is also agreed that these guns shall be withdrawn to their "DIVER" sites should the "CROSSBOW" threat materialize.

2. To ease the administrative difficulties of handling this possible move, which will also involve the additional U.S. and 21 Army Group Units earmarked for "DIVER", it would be appreciated if as much notice as possible can be given, over and above the agreed minimum of 18 days.

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