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C.O.S. (44) 129th Meeting (O).

BIGOT

WAR CABINET

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

MINUTES of Meeting held on THURSDAY,
20TH APRIL, 1944, at 10.30 a.m.

PRESENT:

Field Marshal Sir Alan F. Brooke,
Chief of the Imperial General
Staff. (In the Chair)

Marshal of the Royal Air Force,
Sir Charles F.A. Portal,
Chief of the Air Staff.

Admiral of the Fleet,
Sir Andrew B. Cunningham,
First Sea Lord and Chief
of Naval Staff.

Lieut.-General Sir Hastings L. Ismay,
Office of the Minister of Defence.

THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT:

Captain G. Grantham, R.N.,
Admiralty
(For Items 1-3)

Brigadier C.S. Sugden,
War Office
(For Items 1-3)

Air Commodore W. Dawson,
Air Ministry
(For Items 1-3)

SECRETARIAT

Major-General L.C. Hollis
Colonel C.R. Price
Group-Captain A. Farle
Lieut.-Colonel L.J. Carver
Lieut.-Colonel D. Capel-Dunn

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1. PLANS FOR THE OCCUPATION OF NORTHERN NORWAYJ.P.(44) 73 (Final) *

THE COMMITTEE considered a report by the Joint Planning Staff in which, in anticipation of instructions, they had examined a letter* from the Foreign Office referring to requests made by the Norwegians in connection with our plans for the occupation of Norway.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL pointed out, in connection with recommendation 15(b), that if we were to inform the Russians that we did not intend to occupy Finmark, they might well arrange to do it themselves, and this was what the Norwegians wished to avoid. He suggested that we should inform the Russians of our plans for the occupation of Norway under RANKIN B conditions, in which we had explored the possibility of occupying that area.

THE COMMITTEE:-

- (a) Instructed the Secretary to reply to the Foreign Office on the lines of paragraph 15(a).
- (b) Invited the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force to include in his next periodical report for the Russians on preparations for "OVERLORD", a short summary of our plans for the occupation of Norway under RANKIN B conditions.

* C.O.S.(44) 253(0)

2. DECLARATION OF ROME AS AN OPEN CITY AND BOMBING POLICY IN ITALY(Previous Reference: C.O.S.(44) 111th Meeting (0), Minute 9)

THE COMMITTEE had before them:-

- (a) A report by the Joint Planning Staff, to which was attached a reply to a letter* from the Foreign Office, requesting the views of the Chiefs of Staff upon the question of the advisability of declaring Rome an open city. (J.P.(44) 98 (Final)). *

* U.O.S.(44) 316(0)

* copy attached -1-
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- (b) A note by the Secretary covering memoranda from Allied Force Headquarters and Marshal Badoglio, both of them dealing with the same subject. (C.O.S.(44) 352 (0)).

There was general agreement with the views expressed by the Joint Planning Staff in their draft reply to the Foreign Office, which were that we should not, on military grounds, declare Rome an open city. It was noted that Marshal Badoglio had been informed that no new factors had arisen which would lead to the conclusion that Rome could be declared an open city, and it was agreed that no further action would be necessary in connection with his letter to General Mason MacFarlane.

THE COMMITTEE:-

- (a) Took note of C.O.S.(44) 352(0).
- (b) Approved the draft reply to the Foreign Office attached to J.P.(44) 98 (Final), and instructed the Secretary to forward it, adding a paragraph to indicate that Marshal Badoglio's memorandum had been received after the preparation of the report, but that it had not led the Chiefs of Staff to alter their views.

6 C.O.S.(44) 352(0), Annex II

3. DISCUSSION WITH DIRECTORS OF PLANS

THE COMMITTEE discussed with Directors of Plans questions arising from a consideration of our future strategy in the Far East. A record of the discussion is contained in the Secretary's standard file.

THE COMMITTEE:-

Instructed the Joint Planning Staff to prepare for their consideration a report summarising the various courses of action in the Far East and Pacific, and setting out the arguments for and against each possible course of action.

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4. REOCCUPATION OF NAURU AND OCEAN ISLANDS(Previous Reference: C.O.S.(44) 119th Meeting (O),
Minute 5)

The attention of the Committee was drawn to a telegram^H from the Joint Staff Mission, referring to their previous telegram on the above subject.

THE COMMITTEE:-

Instructed the Secretary to telegraph^o to the Joint Staff Mission, instructing them to raise the matter officially with the Combined Chiefs of Staff Committee.

^H J.S.M. 1651

^o Subsequently sent as COS(W)2

5. DESPATCH OF YUGOSLAV PARTISAN AIRMEN TO RUSSIA

C.O.S.(44) 350 (O)

THE COMMITTEE had before them a copy of a letter from the Foreign Office, pointing out that there were certain objections to acceding to a request from Tito that permission should be granted for 60 Yugoslav Partisan Airmen to be sent to Russia in Soviet aircraft for training.

'X' SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that he was inclined to agree with the Foreign Office suggestion in paragraph 3 of their letter that Tito should be invited to consider a suggestion that the airmen should be sent to join other partisan airmen in the R.A.F.V.R.

SIR ALAN BROOKE recalled that Brigadier MacLean was at present in Algiers with General Wilson: he suggested that General Wilson should be invited to consult Brigadier MacLean in connection with this request, and that consideration of the matter should be deferred pending a reply.

THE COMMITTEE:-

Approved^o the suggestion by the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, and instructed the Secretary to telegraph⁺ to General Wilson accordingly.

^o Subsequent to the Meeting it was learnt that the Foreign Office had despatched a telegram (No.248) to Cairo (repeated Resident Minister Algiers) on the lines of 'X' above. A telegram was consequently sent to A.F.H.Q. drawing General Wilson's attention to the Foreign Office telegram and asking for his views.

⁺ COSMED 91

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6. "CROSSBOW"

(Previous Reference: C.O.S.(44) 128th Mtg. (O), Minute 1)

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said there was no change in the results achieved by attacks to date on "CROSSBOW" objectives. A number of attacks had, however, been carried out on the previous day, the results of which had not yet been assessed.

Referring to the view expressed by Air Chief Marshal Tedder at the meeting of the Defence Committee the previous evening on the letter which had been sent to General Eisenhower^x, that, if a satisfactory degree of effort was to be directed against "CROSSBOW" targets, it would be necessary to give them priority over "POINTBLANK", Sir Charles Portal suggested that as Air Chief Marshal Tedder had, he understood, already arranged for such priority to be given, no further action was necessary.

THE COMMITTEE:-

Took note of the above statement.

/ D.O.(44) 7th Meeting

x C.O.S.(44) 126th Meeting (O), Minute 6.

7. SITUATION IN EGYPT

(Previous Reference: D.O.(44) 7th Meeting (O), Minute 2)

THE COMMITTEE considered two telegrams^x from the Commanders-in-Chief, Middle East and from General Wilson respectively regarding the present situation in Egypt.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that there were a number of points which the telegram from the Commanders-in-Chief did not clear up satisfactorily. It did not appear to take into account the troops now in Syria or any possible developments in the Palestinian or Greek situations. He had sent a further telegram to General Paget requesting further details.

SIR ANDREW CUNNINGHAM said that though the risk of the enemy mining the Suez Canal was small, such operations could still be carried out from Rhodes. If mines were not spotted when they were dropped it might take as long as three weeks to clear the Canal as opposed to some 24 hours if the mines were spotted when dropped. He believed that the personnel engaged in mine watching numbered less than 400 and suggested that they should be retained for this duty.

THE COMMITTEE:-

- (a) Agreed to consider the matter further on receipt from General Paget of the details requested by the Chief of the Imperial General Staff;
- (b) Instructed the Secretary to inform the Prime Minister of the position^p

x CCL/393 and F.34427

p Annex

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8. CAPACITY OF INDIA AS A BASE(Previous Reference: C.O.S.(44) 125th Meeting (O). Minute 10)

Referring to a telegram^x from the Joint Staff Mission in reply to a request⁺ for details of the American plans for the development of air forces in India, SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that the information referred to was not sufficient to meet our requirements. He circulated a suggested telegram to the Joint Staff Mission.

THE COMMITTEE:-

Approved the terms of the draft telegram and instructed the Secretary to arrange for its despatch.[#]

x ZO 96
+ C.O.S.(W) 1289
Sent as OZ. 2067

9. BRAZILIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

THE COMMITTEE considered a telegram^x from the Joint Staff Mission requesting the views of the British Chiefs of Staff on a proposal put forward by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff that one Brazilian infantry division and one fighter squadron should be employed in the Mediterranean area.

It was agreed that the employment of Brazilians in the Mediterranean was undesirable in view of the difficulty of finding the shipping required to move them there and of the fact that there were already contingents from too many different nationalities engaged in that area. If the shipping required for this move could be made available, it would be better employed in other ways, for example, bringing Americans across for "OVERLORD".

THE COMMITTEE:-

Instructed the Secretary to draft and despatch a reply to the Joint Staff Mission in the above sense.

x J.S.M. 1650

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10. EXPLOSION AT BOMBAY - PROGRESS REPORT(Previous Reference: C.O.S.(44) 126th Meeting (O), Minute 7)

THE COMMITTEE referred to a telegram^x from General Auchinleck in continuation of his telegram⁺ of the 17th April on the administrative situation in India and with particular reference to the explosion in Bombay.

SIR ANDREW CUNNINGHAM said that he would enquire into the naval salvage situation which was reported, in paragraph 5 of the telegram, to be inadequate to cope with the situation.

THE COMMITTEE:-

- (a) Took note of General Auchinleck's progress report;
- (b) Took note that the Admiralty would enquire into the salvage situation in India.

x No. 73785/C.O.S.
+ No. 73421/C.O.S.

11. LIAISON BETWEEN MEDITERRANEAN COMMAND AND U.S.S.R.(Previous Reference: C.O.S.(44) 125th Meeting (O), Minute 12)

THE COMMITTEE took note of telegrams^x from No. 30 Military Mission, Moscow to A.F.H.Q. Algiers, reporting that the Soviet General Staff had agreed to a bomb line in the Balkans.

x MIL 1127 and 1128

12. OPERATION "ANVIL"(Previous Reference: C.O.S.(44) 128th Meeting (O), Minute 5)

THE COMMITTEE took note of a telegram^x from General Marshall to the Prime Minister concerning the directive for Mediterranean operations and the production of L.S.T.'s in the United States.

x No. W.24751 of 19th April

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13. POTENTIALITIES OF AUSTRALIA AS A BASEC.S.A.(44) 38 (0) *(Previous Reference: 'C.O.S.(44) 128th Meeting (0), Minute 6)

THE COMMITTEE had before them the final report by the Principal Administrative Officers Committee on the potentialities of Australia as a base.

SIR ANDREW CUNNINGHAM said that the reference to the Naval Mission in paragraph 2 of the report was inadequate; mention should be made of this Mission in the recommendations. He would discuss this question with the Fourth Sea Lord.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the recommendations regarding the despatch of the Army Mission and R.A.F. element were unsatisfactory in their present form. What was required was a recommendation as to the minimum party which should be sent, and not alternatives varying largely in scale. As regards paragraph 14 (b), action should be taken at once to implement this recommendation which need not be included in the revised final report.

THE COMMITTEE:-

- (a) Invited the Principal Administrative Officers Committee to revise their report in the light of the above remarks;
- (b) Invited the War Office, in consultation with the Air Ministry, to take immediate action to implement recommendation 14 (b).

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Offices of the War Cabinet, S.W.1.

20TH APRIL 1944.

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ANNEX

Copy of a Minute (C.O.S. 607/4) dated
20th April 1944 to the Prime Minister
from the Secretary

Reference the discussion on the Egyptian situation at last night's meeting of the Defence Committee,* the Chiefs of Staff have now received the telegram at Flag 'A' from the Commanders-in-Chief, Middle East. This telegram is not clear on a number of points. It does not appear to take into account the troops now in Syria, or possible developments in Palestine or in the Greek situation.

2. C.I.G.S has therefore sent a telegram requesting further details. On receipt of these details the Chiefs of Staff will again consider the matter and will report to you.

(Signed) L.C. HOLLIS

* D.O.(44) 7th Meeting, Minute 2

^ C.C.L. 393.

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J.P.(44)73(Final) *Circulated for the consideration of the Chiefs of Staff*
17TH APRIL, 1944.

WAR CABINET
JOINT PLANNING STAFF

PLANS FOR OCCUPATION OF NORTHERN NORWAY
Report by the Joint Planning Staff.

In anticipation of instructions, we have examined a letter from the Foreign Office referring to requests by the Norwegians about plans for the occupation of Norway.

NORWEGIAN REQUESTS

2. The letter under reference covers two particular requests:-

(a) The Norwegian Government have asked that planning for entry into Norway, in the event of a German withdrawal, should not be confined to Southern Norway but should also provide for the occupation of Northern Norway.

(b) General Hansteen, Commander-in-Chief Royal Norwegian Forces, has asked the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Scottish Command, that in the event of a complete German disintegration, forces should be introduced at an early stage into Trondheim and the Trondelag area. He has also stressed the importance which the Norwegian Government attaches to the early occupation of Finmark.

3. With regard to (a) above, the Norwegian anxiety is mainly due to their fear of a Russian occupation of Northern Norway. The Russians, however, have never shown much interest in any of our operations in that area; they have never asked us to consult them beforehand about such operations nor have they indicated a desire to participate in them. They have not questioned the desirability of our concluding a Civil Affairs agreement with the Norwegian Government. They have, in fact, not challenged our assumption that Norway is a sphere of Anglo-American responsibility. We think that we should keep them informed of our plans for the occupation of Norway and thus afford them no excuse for unilateral action in Finmark, without prior warning to ourselves.

* C.O.S. (44) 253(0).

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4. With regard to (b) above, the request for an early occupation of Trondheim and Finmark is based mainly on the fear of incidents between the German garrisons and the Norwegians and on the argument that it will be difficult to control South-eastern Norway before the Trondelag has been occupied.

EXISTING PLANS FOR THE OCCUPATION OF NORWAY

5. Plans for the occupation of Norway are being made to meet both "Rankin Case B" and "Rankin Case C" conditions. "Rankin Case B" conditions in Norway might arise as a result of German inability to find sufficient reserves for the Eastern, Western or Mediterranean fronts on all of which German resistance might still be protracted and determined. The object, therefore, of plans for Case B must be to follow up a German withdrawal from Norway. "Rankin Case C" conditions would only arise in Norway, as elsewhere, if complete German disintegration were taking place. The object in this situation would be to obtain a stranglehold on the centres of German military and civil administration both in Germany and German occupied territory. S.H.A.E.F. is, therefore, preparing different plans for each of these contingencies.

RANKIN CASE B

6. The forces available for the occupation of Norway consist of 52 British (Mountain) Division and Norwegian forces consisting of three independent mountain companies, one independent parachute company and one field battery.

7. The principal limitations in the provision of forces are:-

- (a) Administrative units of which there is a serious shortage in view of the demands for "Overlord".
- (b) Naval forces which will not be available for escorting convoys prior to and during the "Overlord" assault.
- (c) Shipping.

8. If the German withdraw from Norway in "Rankin Case B" conditions at any time from now on, we shall be able to occupy any two of the following:-

- (a) Finmark. (Hammerfest and Kirkenes.)
- (b) Tromso or Narvik.
- (c) Trondheim.

The limitation of resources will not permit the occupation of all three areas at once. The choice of the two areas to be occupied will depend upon circumstances at the time, e.g. whether or not the Germans evacuate Finmark.

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9. Plans are being prepared, as far as the limitation of resources permits, for the occupation of the areas in paragraph 8. These plans have not been discussed with representatives of the Norwegian Government because their disclosure would prejudice Operation "Bodyguard" and for this reason no disclosure should now be made.

RANKIN CASE C

10. Plans for the occupation of Norway under conditions of "Rankin Case C" have been completed and are known to the Norwegian Government. They provide for the introduction of a force of approximately one brigade group into Stavanger and Christiansand (south) and then:-

- (a) A move by sea to Oslo to establish the government.
- (b) A move north to Bergen and later to Trondheim which will be occupied by about D + 21.

11. In the "Rankin Case C" plan, full requirements of shipping for conveying forces to Norway can only be made available 35 - 45 days after the day on which the order for the collection of shipping is issued. The initial lift to Norway must, therefore, be made by H.M. ships with a limited number of M.T. ships for essential vehicles. The higher priority given to the introduction of forces into the Continent proper offers little prospect of any acceleration of the programme.

12. There is also to be a reserve British brigade group in U.K. which could be moved into Norway by H.M. ships in an emergency or later when the necessary shipping is available. Consideration is now being given to the areas in which this brigade might be employed.

13. There are, at present, no military reasons for the early occupation of Finmark or for advancing the stages by which forces should be sent to Trondheim under conditions of "Rankin Case C".

CONCLUSIONS

14. We conclude:-

- (a) That plans to take advantage of "Rankin Case B" will provide for the early occupation of Northern Norway subsequent to a German withdrawal. These plans, however, cannot be communicated to the Norwegian Government in view of the danger of prejudicing "Bodyguard".
- (b) That plans to meet "Rankin Case C" conditions provide for the early occupation of the centres of administration. This is the main object in all plans for "Rankin Case C".
- (c) That limitation of resources prevents the extension of plans in "Rankin Case C" to include the early occupation of the other areas suggested by the Norwegian Government and General Hansteen.

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- (d) That, as the Russians have shown no particular interest in this area, Norwegian apprehensions of a Russian occupation of Northern Norway are probably not at present justifiable; but that we should take the precaution of telling the Russians our plans in order to deny them any excuse for unilateral action in Finmark.

RECOMMENDATIONS

15. We therefore recommend:-

- (a) That the answer to the Foreign Office should be as follows:-
- (i) The Norwegian Government can rest assured that plans are being prepared for the introduction of forces into Northern Norway in the event of a German withdrawal.
- (ii) That in the event of complete German disintegration, plans are based on the assumption that the immediate object is to gain control of centres of civil and military administration. That would not, however, preclude the despatch of forces to other areas of Norway at a later date as they became available. The Norwegian Government would, no doubt, realise that in circumstances of complete German collapse the paramount object would be to obtain a strangle-hold upon Germany itself and that, in consequence, there must be limitations to the size of forces which could be immediately transported to areas of Europe other than Germany.
- (b) That the Russians should be informed of our plans for the occupation of Norway. This information might well be included in the next periodical Combined Chiefs of Staff summary of preparations for operations from U.K. and in the Mediterranean.

(Signed) G. GRANTHAM

C.S. SUGDEN

W.L. DAWSON

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17TH APRIL, 1944.

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J.P.(44)98(FINAL)

19TH APRIL, 1944

WAR CABINET
JOINT PLANNING STAFF

DECLARATION OF ROME AS AN OPEN CITY AND BOMBING
POLICY IN ITALY

Report by the Joint Planning Staff

As instructed*, we have, in consultation with the Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee, examined a letter^o from the Foreign Office, which raises questions of the advisability of declaring Rome an open city, and also of the military importance and value of the present bombing policy in Italy as compared with the political and moral effects. We have also taken into consideration a telegram⁺ from the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean.

2. We attach a draft reply to the Foreign Office at Annex I and a detailed Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee examination of the problems from the enemy's point of view at Annex II, together with a map indicating the rail and road communications of Central Italy.

(Signed) G. GRANTHAM
C.S. SUGDEN
W.L. DAWSON

- * C.O.S.(44)111th Meeting (O)
- o C.O.S.(44)316(O)
- + MEDCOS 86
- ^ J.I.C.(44)151(Revised Final)

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19TH APRIL, 1944.

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ANNEX I

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Draft Reply to Foreign Office

1. On the advisability of declaring Rome an open city, our views are as follows.

The loss by the Germans of road facilities through Rome for military traffic would not decisively impede the maintenance of their positions either at Anzio or on the Cassino front.

If the Germans were to dispense with the railway communications through Rome and the marshalling yards there, this would cause serious, though possibly not decisive, interference with their operations in the South. The denial of these rail communications would increase the present strain on their motor transport by necessitating road transport from railheads North of Rome either up to the front or to railways South of Rome and the lateral line through Tivoli. The denial of marshalling yards would cause serious impediment to the distribution of rolling stock.

2. We do not believe that, in these circumstances, the Germans would respect any agreement declaring Rome an open city. They would not hesitate, in emergency, to make full use of the communications through Rome.

3. There is insufficient evidence to enable us to assess exactly the extent to which the Germans have, in fact, demilitarised Rome. It seems probable, however, that some security troops and possibly some administrative personnel remain in the city. It is, however, clear that the Germans have as a matter of policy been making much less use of Rome for military purposes than formerly and that their troops have in general been excluded from the city.

4. It is relevant to mention that the enemy has not the means to defend Rome or its environs adequately against Allied air attack, and he is therefore likely to use all the methods he can to persuade us to diminish the scale and area of application of our attack.

5. If the Germans decided or were forced to withdraw north of Rome, although the main pursuit might not be through the centre of the City, it would be quite unacceptable to have an "out of bounds" area in the centre of the axis of our advance.

6. Once north of Rome, we should need to use all the through roads available until the railway could be put in working order. To maintain the momentum of our advance, particularly in view of the shortage of road transport units, it is essential to use the main rail communications through Rome and railway repair facilities at the earliest moment.

7. We should also require to use the signal communications network.

8. Our air superiority would enable us to provide adequate defence against the small scale of air attack which the Germans could develop against the city.

9. No Allied bombing is at present permitted other than against the railway yards. If, however, the enemy makes increased use of Rome, we retain the right to extend our bombing to other targets in the interests of operations.

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10. We consider, therefore, that if Rome were declared an open city, the Germans would only respect the declaration, if at all, so long as their operations were not prejudiced. On the other hand, even if they did respect it, such a declaration would very seriously restrict the ability of the Allied forces to follow up rapidly a German withdrawal North of Rome. Moreover, when we are fighting North of Rome, the communications through the city will be essential to us. The enemy must fully recognize how much we should thus be hampered.

11. There can, therefore, be no question of declaring Rome an open city.

12. As regards the general Allied bombing policy in Italy, experience in the past has shown that maintenance requirements are so small in relation to the total capacity of the railways available, that cessation of attacks on railway routes enable the enemy fairly quickly to make good the supply position which has been interrupted.

13. Allied air attacks in recent weeks have had considerable success in cutting the enemy's rail communications in Italy, particularly on the through lines from Northern Italy to Rome, all of which were recently cut on the level Fano-Arezzo-Poggibonsi-Cecina. There is evidence that this is causing the Germans great inconvenience at the moment and it must be imposing a considerable strain on their inadequate M.T. resources.

14. We understand that the German armies south of Rome have reserve supplies sufficient for only some three weeks, and it is important that every advantage be taken of the improving weather to increase attacks on communications to ensure that these reserves are decreased as much as possible before the next Allied offensive is launched.

15. Although these air attacks on our communications, useful as they are, have not hitherto decisively affected the ability of the enemy to sustain intensive fighting, there will be occasions when such air attacks will be of critical tactical importance to our operations. It is therefore essential to reserve our right to bomb whatever objectives the tactical situation demands.

16. We cannot, in any circumstances, forego the effective results which we are already obtaining from strategic bombing or the right to continue such attacks as will most effectively help our forthcoming offensive. Our attacks are already limited to the precision bombing of carefully selected targets.

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ANNEX IIJ.I.C.(44) 151 (O) (Revised Final)18TH APRIL, 1944DECLARATION OF ROME AS AN OPEN CITY AND BOMBING
POLICY IN ITALYReport by the Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee

In a letter from the Foreign Office dated 4th April, 1944 to the Secretary of the Chiefs of Staff Committee⁺ the issue is raised of the possible demilitarisation of Rome. In this connection we have assessed (i) the present military value to the Germans of Rome, (ii) the extent to which the enemy has in fact demilitarised the city, and (iii) the effect on the Germans of the present bombing attacks on transportation targets in Italy and the results these attacks are likely to achieve during the next month.

2. An agreement for the demilitarisation of Rome would have to include a precise definition of the area covered by the Agreement. The present boundaries of the City of Rome appear to include the San Lorenzo, Toscolana Trenestina and Ostiense marshalling yards, but not the Littorio.

(i) Military value to the Germans of Rome

3. Rome is about 75 miles from the Cassino Front and about 30 miles from the Anzio bridgehead.

4. The capacity of the railways passing through Rome represents approximately 80% of the total North and South railway capacity serving Southern Italy. Rome includes within its boundaries subject to the definition above, four marshalling yards, the biggest of which is San Lorenzo. In addition the Littorio yard lies immediately North of the city. Purely on capacity the railways down the East Coast and centre of Italy would be sufficient for the maintenance of the present German forces on both fronts.

5. In view of the proximity of Rome to the German fronts South of it, the value of the marshalling yards in the city is now that of a convenient railhead. Their loss might, however, cause serious difficulties in distribution. Accordingly their denial to the enemy would mean that the flexibility of his rail system would be further decreased, and that he would be thrown back on a railhead north of the city, with a correspondingly longer haul for M/T of which he is undoubtedly short. To make this strain on M/T really effective, however, the railhead would have to be forced considerably further North.

+ C.O.S.(44) 316 (O)

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6. Accordingly, disruption of German rail traffic to the present fronts South of Rome depends far more on the effectiveness of bombing considerably further North than on the loss of railway facilities in or through Rome.

7. Rome is the centre of a large network of arterial roads. According to one report the Germans have built two roads by-passing Rome one to the East and one to the West. Photographic confirmation of this is awaited. There are, however, many secondary roads by-passing the city which, although of lower quality, could be used for military traffic, particularly now that the weather is improving.

8. The loss by the Germans of road facilities through Rome for military traffic, even if the existence of two by-pass roads is not confirmed, would not decisively impede the maintenance of their positions either at Anzio or on the Cassino Front.

9. The exclusion of military personnel from Rome would undoubtedly cause inconvenience to administrative staffs. Apart from this, the exclusion of military forces as opposed to security troops is probably an advantage to the Germans in that it reduces the possibility of clashes with the civilian population. The fact that the Germans have, as a matter of policy, taken steps to exclude military forces from the city tends to support this.

10. Summary. In short, we believe that the demilitarisation of Rome would cause the Germans serious inconvenience, but should have no decisive effect on their ability to maintain their positions south of the city.

(ii) Extent of demilitarisation of Rome

11. We have insufficient evidence to enable us to assess exactly the extent to which the Germans have in fact demilitarised Rome. It seems probable, however, that some security troops and possibly some military administrative personnel remain in the city. It is, however, clear that the Germans, have, as a matter of policy, been making much less use of Rome for military purposes than formerly and that their troops have in general been excluded from the city.

12. We have no recent P.R. or other evidence to show how far the Germans are today making use of the marshalling yards in Rome. The effectiveness, however, of Allied air attacks in cutting railways north of Rome must have much restricted their use.

(iii) Effects of Allied bombing of Transport targets in Italy.

13. Allied air attacks in recent weeks have had considerable success in cutting the enemy's rail communications in Italy particularly on the through lines from Northern Italy to Rome all of which were cut at the end of the first week in April on the level Fano-Arezzo-Poggibonsi-Cecina, where some 20 blockages have been caused, 14 by the destruction of bridges. There is evidence that this is causing the Germans great inconvenience and it must be imposing a considerable strain on their M.T.

14. Past experience in Italy has shown that maintenance requirements are so small in relation to the total capacity of the railways available that when attacks on railway routes cease the enemy is enabled fairly quickly to build up again his supplies to a sufficient level.

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15. The most that can be said at this stage is that while the systematic attacks in the area Fano-Arezzo-Poggibonsi-Cecina are causing the enemy considerable inconvenience southwards, they are unlikely to be effective in seriously impeding the enemy's power of resistance either at Anzio or on the Cassino Front during the present relatively quiet period of fighting. If, however, with improving weather conditions these attacks could be sustained, they should seriously and perhaps decisively affect the ability of the enemy adequately to sustain fighting on an intensive scale for a long period of time.

Effect of demilitarisation of Rome on Allied operations once the Germans had withdrawn North of that city.

16. The Germans would probably insist that any agreement for the demilitarisation of Rome now should be in terms that would require us equally not to use Rome for military purposes when we occupied it.

(Signed) V. CAVENDISH-BENTINCK
J. A. SINCLAIR
F. F. INGLIS
C. A. G. NICHOLS (for D. N. I.)
C. G. VICKERS

Offices of the War Cabinet,
S. W. 1.
18TH APRIL, 1944.

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
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


NOTES

ROADS. There are some small roads which circle ROME. Their capacity is unknown as the river and rail bridges, of which hardly any exist, are of unknown load capacity. It is unlikely that the roads could be used at least continuously by heavy M.T. as they are.

RAILWAYS.

1. Capacities take no account of temporary severance of lines by bombing.
2. Certain double track lines now being worked as effective single lines only are shown thus 
3. The majority, (if not all) of the electrified lines in the area are now being worked by steam traction.
4. For the foregoing reasons, the railway capacities shown on this map differ considerably from those shown on the previous Tr.1(c) railway capacity map of this area dated Apr. 43.




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CENTRAL ITALY RAILWAY & ROAD CAPACITIES

SCALE. 1 : 800,000



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
RAILWAYS


Standard Gauge Lines	
" " " Electrified	
Narrow Gauge Lines	
" " " Electrified	
Double track lines now being worked as effective single lines only	
Capacities in Trains per day each way	12
Total net tonnage of Military Stores per day each way	3,600

ROADS.

Shewn thus

Red figures represent approximate capacity in tons per day.





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C.S.A.(44) 38(0)

17TH APRIL, 1944

WAR CABINET

PRINCIPAL ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICERS COMMITTEE

POTENTIALITIES OF AUSTRALIA AS A BASE

Final Report to Chiefs of Staff

Our interim report^x on the potentialities of Australia as a base was limited to consideration of the necessity for sending Missions to Australia. We now set out in broad terms the information which we have so far been able to obtain, and such conclusions as can be drawn as to the practicability of maintaining the forces required for the Pacific strategy.

Navy

2. As we explained in our interim report, the Naval information requires augmentation before conclusions can be reached. We have, however, no reason to suppose that the Daniel Mission, if the Prime Minister agrees that they should proceed, will not be able to report with little delay.

Army

3. From the available information (Annex A) we are unable to arrive at a firm opinion whether the necessary base facilities can be provided in Australia particularly in relation to the time factor. But we have found no evidence to suggest that Australia would prove an inadequate base.

4. We confirm the provisional conclusion drawn in our interim report that an Army Mission must be sent, since, as will be seen from Annex A, much essential information is lacking, of such detail and variety that most of it could not be obtained telegraphically.

5. On the assumption that the necessary reconnaissance and detailed information will be provided by the Australians, the minimum Army party required would be four officers, namely a D.A. & Q.M.G., A.Q.M.G., a Movements representative and one R.E. officer.

^x C.S.A.(44) 33(0)

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Although this minimum might suffice, we have no doubt that the task could be performed more quickly and satisfactorily if one representative of Signals and the main "Services" were added (Transportation, Supplies and Transport, Ordnance, Medical and R.E.M.E.). We would stress the time factor since apart from the necessity for an early strategic decision, as long time as possible is required for preparation and provision.

A second advantage of sending a larger party would result at a later stage should the Pacific strategy be adopted, when the local experience and contacts gained by these officers in Australia would be of great value in London.

6. Whatever the decision as to an Army mission, two administrative staff officers should go to Australia at once, to join General Dewing's staff (which includes no administrative staff officers). (It should be noted that General Dewing asked for administrative officers to be added to his staff before this project was ever mentioned). It is important that these administrative staff officers, fully qualified and briefed, should be at hand to advise the Australian staffs and Admiral Daniel assuming he is allowed to proceed on the solution of inter-service priorities which are bound to arise. These two officers would be added to the Army mission for the time being.

Air Forces

7. As explained in our interim report, the Air Ministry have been able to obtain information on those aspects of the problem which are peculiar to the R.A.F.; they have been able to draw the broad conclusion that, assuming a favourable solution of problems common to the Army and R.A.F., the necessary base facilities could be developed there for air forces of the size envisaged.

8. The administrative implications, from the R.A.F. point of view, of the use of Australia as a base are briefly reviewed in Annex B.

9. In addition to the purely R.A.F. aspects there are subjects which are mainly the responsibility of the Army, but in which the R.A.F. has vital interests and on which adequate information is not available in London. These are:-

- (a) Movement and transportation.
- (b) Accommodation for personnel, storage and non-technical maintenance.
- (c) Land line of communications.
- (d) Storage and bulk distribution of Petrol and Oil.
- (e) Hospitalisation.

These points are referred to in Annex A.

10. In the event, therefore, of a decision to send an Army Mission, the Air Ministry would wish to be represented on it on behalf of their administrative services, having problems common to the Army and R.A.F., and to send representatives of certain Air Ministry Directorates, namely Organisation, Equipment, Servicing and Maintenance and Works.

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11. If it is agreed that the Army shall send out two administrative staff officers as proposed in paragraph 6, irrespective of the decision as to an Army Mission, the Air Ministry would wish to send with these officers an R.A.F. officer to fulfil a similar function, since General Dewing has no R.A.F. administrative officer on his staff.

Combined Operations

12. It is understood that two officers from C.O.H.Q. will go with the Army Mission, if one is sent.

Conclusion

13. We feel that we are not in a position, apart from the purely R.A.F. aspect, to give advice, which may influence such an important decision on strategy, without an examination being carried out in Australia.

Our investigations have led us to believe that Australia can be developed into a satisfactory base, but it is not possible in London to assess the time factor in relation to proposed operations.

Recommendations

14. We recommend:-

- (a) The despatch of an Army Mission, consisting of 9 officers, namely

	D.A. & Q.M.G.
	A.Q.M.G.
Representatives of	{ Movements
	{ R.E.
	{ Transportation
	{ Supplies and Transport
	{ Ordnance
	{ Medical
	{ R.E.M.E.

together with 4 R.A.F. officers, representing the Directorates of

Organisation
Equipment
Servicing and Maintenance
Works.

We hope this recommendation will prove acceptable in the interests of getting information quickly; it is only in default of this recommendation being accepted do we recommend ~~that~~ a minimum party of 4 Army officers, namely

D.A. & Q.M.G.
A.Q.M.G.
Movements
R.E.

together with the four R.A.F. officers mentioned above, be sent.

- (b) That two Army Officers and one R.A.F. Officer be sent forthwith to augment General Dewing's staff, whether or not it is decided to send an Army mission.

(Signed) T.S. RIDDELL WEBSTER
A.F.E. PALLISER
C.L. COURTNEY
S.F. STEWART

Offices of the War Cabinet,
S.W.I.
17TH APRIL, 1944.

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Subject (I)	Information Available (II)	Information to be obtained (III)	Remarks (IV)
1. MOVEMENT AND TRANSPORTATION			
A. Ports			
(a) Port facilities available after allowing for use by Civil, ANP, USA and RN	A fair amount of standard port data is available (number of berths, depths of water, transit facilities etc) as contained in MCD. (Naval Port Director), Ports Register and various reports.	(a) Information to ascertain whether surplus port capacity exists, or can be developed in the time available, in areas which are in other respects suitable for base development (e.g. Details of traffic situation; technical data re possible future development).	The selection of ports (including groups of ports for the mounting of complete formations on overseas operations) vitally affects base layout, also examination of the railway problem - especially on account of the different gauges used in the different States
(b) Any projected development			
(c) Selection of ports for the use of the additional forces, as governed by (a) and (b), and capacity which can be made available.		(b) Data to enable assessment to be made of the port construction and operating requirements (both of personnel and equipment) which will have to be provided from outside AUSTRALIA.	When the initial selection of ports for the additional forces involved has been made, detailed technical data will be needed for a full appreciation.
(d) If capacity in (c) is insufficient for size of force, what further development will be required? What can be done by Australian resources and what outside help will be necessary (including equipment and material, also U.K. technical units)			
B. Railways (and other agencies) for clearance from and delivery to ports			
(a) Railway capacity available on the different systems after allowing for current or proposed use by Civil, ANP and USA.	Detailed information on railway facilities is available.	(a) Current traffic figures and spare capacity for the additional forces involved.	Railway capacity will be governed in almost every instance, especially in Queensland and Western Australia, by the small quantity of engines and wagons in relation to route mileage.
(b) Development and operating considerations as for ports (1(d) above).	Assumptions as to capacity on individual routes, subject to loco and rolling stock considerations, can be made; but these will require local confirmation.	(b) Information for estimating additional engines, wagons and operating staff required, and whether the engines and wagons can be imported and erected in the time available.	The load on the railways for the additional force involved can only be determined when the depot and training areas have been selected and their distance inland is known. Depot and training areas depend primarily on the ports available, but the port and railway problems are interdependent.
(c) Facilities for movement by other transportation agencies from and to ports (coastal craft, road and air)		(c) Information regarding Col.1(c) is almost entirely lacking.	
C. Shipping			
The extent to which Australian tonnage could contribute to the requirements of the additional forces involved both in a military role and as a relief to the internal transportation system during the assembly and training of the additional forces involved.	A considerable volume of ocean going and coastal shipping - Australian, British and American - is more or less permanently based on Australia. This shipping is used to meet the following commitments:- (i) Australian local naval and military services. (ii) U.S. Army requirements on the Australian coast and in the Pacific Islands. (iii) Coastwise shipments of essential commodities (coal, iron, steel, stone etc.) Although the exact tonnages allocated to each of these commitments vary a good deal from time to time, it is known that, in general, the total requirements are barely being met. Additional coastal or other local requirements on British account would therefore involve the provision of additional ocean-going or coastal shipping unless accompanied by a corresponding reduction in U.S. Army requirements. This cannot be investigated further until the extent of the additional requirements is known.	To assess what local shipping resources can be made available for the additional forces involved.	

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Subject (I)	Information Available (II)	Information to be obtained (III)	Remarks (IV)
<p>2. <u>ACCOMMODATION</u></p> <p>(a) Type and extent of existing accommodation.</p> <p>(b) Locations of accommodation suitable for formations and for training.</p> <p>(c) Availability of accommodation for base installations, units and reinforcement personnel</p> <p>(d) Transit accommodation</p>	<p>Location of existing military accommodation facilities is known in broad outline.</p>	<p>Details regarding:-</p> <p>(a) Suitability of areas, which must be selected not only for their administrative advantages, but will also be those most convenient to the Australian authorities.</p> <p>(b) Availability of existing accommodation; dependent upon requirements of AAF and US forces.</p> <p>(c) Technical data concerning additional construction of this is required.</p>	<p>Mobilisation centres for re-organisation of formations will be required.</p>
<p>3. <u>TRAINING</u></p> <p>(a) Spare and potential training facilities for the following:-</p> <p>Jungle Training Areas Ranges CQC's Bridging Camps Air Portable Training Centres Schools and Development Centres Mobilisation Centres</p>	<p>Locations and capacities of existing training establishments are known.</p>	<p>(a) Availability of existing establishment.</p> <p>(b) Suitability of areas for additional facilities required.</p>	<p>Location of training areas and establishments must be related to accommodation plan, in order to minimise internal movement.</p>
<p>4. <u>ENGINEER</u></p> <p>(a) Extent and rate of supply of all local material and plant.</p> <p>(b) The most suitable type of new accommodation, from aspects of climate and local materials.</p> <p>(c) Existence, storage, distribution, filtration of water supplies.</p> <p>(d) Airfield construction</p> <p>(e) Road network and bridging</p> <p>(f) Electric power</p> <p>(g) Sewage</p> <p>(h) Technical units which would be available</p>	<p>(a) Information largely available (see Item 7 Col. II (a)).</p> <p>(b); (c); (g) - Limited general information only; inadequate for an Engineer appreciation.</p> <p>(d) See Annex B, Paragraph 2</p> <p>(e) General information, from which it is understood that network is satisfactory but some bridging problems exist.</p> <p>(h) Nil</p>	<p>Information in Col. II is insufficient to enable the works programme and consequent import requirements to be assessed.</p> <p>Considerable additional detailed information is required on all subjects.</p>	<p>There is a surplus of airfield capacity which would be more than sufficient to accommodate the additional British air forces. Although the location of this surplus airfield capacity is known it is not known if these locations will be operationally acceptable. Nor is it yet known if they would be suitable in relation to the layout of the base as a whole.</p> <p>It is not therefore possible at this stage to assess what, if any, additional airfield construction will be necessary.</p>

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Subject (I)	Information available (II)	Information to be obtained (III)	Remarks (IV)
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5. <u>SIGNALS</u>			
<p>(a) Examination of the general system of inter-communication.</p> <p>(b) Capacity for expansion of existing telephone and telegraph system.</p> <p>(c) Examination of available plant and skilled labour if expansion proves necessary.</p> <p>(d) Technical personnel who would be available.</p>	<p>(a) and (b) Information in broad outline</p> <p>(c) Information as to plant available (see item 7 Col. II (a)). Information as to availability of skilled labour as in Item 10, Col. II.</p> <p>(d) Nil</p>	<p>Additional data required to assess import of material and personnel.</p>	<p>It is essential to be able to ascertain to what extent the existing communications layout can be related to the layout of the base as a whole.</p>
6. <u>SUPPLIES AND TRANSPORT</u>			
<p>(a) <u>Supplies</u></p> <p>(i) Examination of existing and potential facilities (including cold storage)</p> <p>(ii) Extent to which present and potential local production of Southern Dominions as a whole can be utilised.</p> <p>(iii) Examination of packaging and container problems involved.</p>	<p>(a) <u>Supplies</u></p> <p>(i) Information in broad outline but no details of what could be made available. Extent of civilian storage used for food export is known. No details of military installations.</p> <p>(ii) The Ministry of Food has adequate data to assess production of the Southern Dominions' present military and civil requirements; in addition sufficient data is available to enable them to assess potential output under specific conditions.</p> <p>(iii) Limited information available.</p>	<p>(a) <u>Supplies</u></p> <p>Additional data required as to storage facilities, and packaging and container problems.</p>	
<p>(b) <u>Petrol, Oil and Lubricants</u></p> <p>Examination of the following questions:-</p> <p>(i) Ocean Bulk storage</p> <p>(ii) Inland Bulk storage</p> <p>(iii) Inland Distribution</p> <p>(iv) Container Filling Installations</p> <p>(v) Manufacture of containers</p> <p>(vi) Availability of technical equipment and personnel</p> <p>(vii) Availability of rail and road tankers</p> <p>(viii) Inland water transport facilities.</p>	<p>(b)</p> <p>Considerable information can be obtained, but the extent to which installations are being used and the residual capacity is not known.</p>	<p>(b)</p> <p>Additional information required on many of the items detailed in Col. 1</p> <p>In particular information regarding developments since the arrival of U.S. Forces is required.</p>	

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Subject (I)	Information available (II)	Information to be obtained (III)	Remarks (IV)
<p>7. ORDNANCE</p> <p>Examination of the following</p> <p>(a) Extent to which local production could be utilised or developed beyond its present commitments for the following:-</p> <p>Ammunition Clothing Equipment Stores Vehicles Laundries</p> <p>(b) Existing and potential facilities for maintenance of the above.</p> <p>(c) Available and potential storage accommodation for the ammunition and ordnance stores, vehicles and equipment.</p>	<p>(a) Ministries of Production and Supply have adequate data to assess production which is in excess of present military and civil requirements; in addition sufficient data is available to enable them to assess potential output under specific conditions.</p> <p>(b) As above</p> <p>(c) None</p>	<p>Additional information required on (c)</p>	
<p>8. RE-RE</p> <p>(a) Spare of potential workshop facilities for Armoured fighting vehicle equipment and guns.</p> <p>(b) Spare and potential vehicle assembly plants.</p> <p>(c) Extent to which workshop machinery etc. can be provided in Australia.</p>	<p>(a) Information scanty</p> <p>(b) and (c) Information available (see Item 7 Col. II (a)).</p>	<p>Complete data required for (a)</p>	
<p>9. MEDICAL</p> <p>(a) Availability, hospital accommodation and facilities for converting existing buildings.</p> <p>(b) Availability of convalescent establishments</p> <p>(c) Examination of movement facilities between ports and hospitals.</p> <p>(d) Spare and potential production of medical stores in Australia.</p>	<p>(a) and (b) Hospital schedule available but no information as to "bed state". It is, however, understood that these facilities have never been utilised to an extent approaching their capacity.</p> <p>(b) None</p> <p>(d) Information available (see Item 7 Col. II(a)).</p>	<p>Details of "bed state". Full data on (c).</p>	
<p>10. LABOUR</p> <p>(a) Examination of available civilian labour potential, both skilled and unskilled, for such construction as is required and for operating the base.</p> <p>(b) Extent to which any AIF labour would be available</p> <p>(c) If military or civilian labour has to be introduced an examination of the type and numbers is required.</p>	<p>(a) Statistical information of Australian labour resources can be obtained. It is not, however, possible to forecast what Australian labour will be available for our purposes.</p> <p>(b) Not known</p> <p>(c) No information except that it is understood that American forces utilise coloured uniformed labour, and that Australian labour has been used extensively in the construction of the USA base which is now nearing completion.</p>	<p>Sufficient information to enable an assessment to be made of the labour required for the works programme, and for maintenance.</p>	<p>It is known that there is an acute manpower shortage in Australia. The provision of labour required will be a difficult problem.</p>

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ANNEX B.POTENTIALITIES OF AUSTRALIA AS A BASE.AIR FORCES.ASSUMPTIONS.

The investigations have been made on the following assumptions:-

- (a) Germany is defeated by 1st October, 1944.
 (b) The following R.A.F. Squadrons would be based on Australia:-

<u>No. of Squadrons</u>	<u>Type of Aircraft.</u>
20 Heavy Bombers	Lancaster
20 Tanker Bomber	Lancaster
15 Short Range Fighters	Spitfire
3 Reconnaissance (Ph. and Mapping)	Mosquito
4½ G.R./L.P. (medium)	Liberator
<u>62½</u>	

AIRFIELDS.

2. According to information obtained from Overseas Headquarters R.A.A.F. in London it is estimated that, subject to the provision of accommodation the following numbers of fully mobile Squadrons with the necessary ancillary units could be based on existing airfields.

48 S.E. Fighter
50 Medium Bomber or Fighter/Bomber
40 Heavy Bomber
<u>Total 138 Squadrons</u>

These facilities which are calculated on the basis of 1 Squadron per air strip are stated to be available over and above those at present in use by the R.A.A.F. and U.S.A.A.F. In general these locations are near the coast and/or the main railway system. It is not possible at present to comment on the suitability of the locations of existing airfields and there may be a commitment for new construction. This subject is referred to in Annex A, paragraph 4.

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PERSONNEL ACCOMMODATION

3. The general problem of providing accommodation of a permanent or semi-permanent nature for R.A.F. personnel in Australia can only be considered as part of the joint Army and R.A.F. requirements. Pending the provision of permanent or semi-permanent accommodation it is accepted that temporary accommodation in the form of tentage would have to be provided for the R.A.F.

EQUIPMENT STORAGE.

4. It is considered that the storage facilities required behind the lighter types of Squadrons could probably be provided from existing and planned R.A.A.F. resources. The provision of the necessary storage space behind the 40 Heavy Bomber and Tanker Bomber Squadrons would require to be considered as part of the overall Army and Air Force requirements for the storage of equipment.

PETROL AND OIL STORAGE.

5. It is estimated that petrol and oil storage for 18 of the lighter types of Squadrons could be provided from existing R.A.A.F. resources. The bulk storage facilities required by the Heavy Bomber and G.R./L.P. (Medium) Squadrons do not exist in Australia and their provision would have to be co-ordinated between the various users of petroleum products in the theatre.

SERVICING, SALVAGE AND REPAIR.

6. The 62½ R.A.F. Squadrons would have to be despatched to Australia with personnel and equipment for the first, second, third and fourth line maintenance organisation excluding the major repair of Heavy Bomber airframes. The provision of major repair facilities for Heavy Bomber airframes has been excluded on the ground that they could not be set up in less than say 18 months. It is considered, however, that the Squadrons could be built up and maintained as fully operational units within 2 - 3 months of their arrival in the theatre, subject to the provision of accommodation for base repair facilities. The problems relating to accommodation for these purposes would have to be considered as part of the joint Army and R.A.F. requirements.

SIGNALS.

7. An air defence organisation including Radar warning and Air Observer Corps for the protection of major ports and bases already exists in Australia as well as an extensive system of navigational aids including H/F., V.H.F. and D/F Fixer Systems and Beacons. Since the Air Forces would ultimately operate from advanced bases it would be necessary to despatch a complete signals component of the force including base maintenance facilities for the Squadrons. It is not possible to estimate to what extent existing land-line facilities could be made available and the Squadrons would, therefore, have to be supported by Air Formation Signals Units.

MEDICAL.

8. Part of the necessary hospitalisation could be provided from existing R.A.A.F. resources in the Southern States of Australia, the balance would have to be provided by Mobile Field Hospitals.

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