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C.O.S.(45) 81st Meeting

WAR CABINET

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

MINUTES of Meeting held on THURSDAY,
29TH MARCH, 1945, at 3.30 p.m.

PRESENT:

Lieut.-General Sir Archibald E. Nye,
Vice Chief of the Imperial General
Staff. (In the Chair)

Air Marshal Sir Douglas Evill, Vice-Admiral Sir Neville Syfr-t,
Vice Chief of the Air Staff. Vice Chief of Naval Staff.

THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT:

Major General E.I.C. Jacob,
Office of the Minister
of Defence.
(For Items 1 & 2)

Brigadier V.D. Thomas,
Combined Operations
Headquarters.
(For Item 5)

SECRETARIAT:

Colonel D. Capel-Dunn
Lieut.-Colonel L.J. Carver
Major E.G.S. Elliot

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1. WORLD ORGANISATION - MILITARY STAFF COMMITTEE

THE COMMITTEE considered:-

- (A) P.H.P.(45) 6 (Final)⁺ - a Report by the Post Hostilities Planning Staff in which they examined the composition and functions of the Military Staff Committee referred to in the Dumbarton Oaks conversations, and discussed its organisation.
- (B) C.O.S.(45) 52 - a Note by the Secretary covering comments by the Dominions Office on, and suggesting an amendment to paragraph 15 of the above paper.

The Committee were informed that it was the intention as far as possible to confine the discussions at San Francisco to reaching agreement on the wording of the Charter for the proposed World Organisation. The P.H.P. paper before them went into more detail than would be needed at San Francisco, and would only be required in the next stage when the organisation of the bodies to be set up in support of the World Organisation came to be discussed. On the other hand, there would clearly be advantage in drawing attention at an early stage to the problems involved in the setting up of a Military Staff Committee. It was therefore agreed that the Report should be referred to the Chiefs of Staff for their consideration, subject to any amendment which might be found necessary as a result of the ensuing discussion by the Vice Chiefs of Staff.

During the course of the discussion the following points were made:-

- (i) There was a tendency in the P.H.P. report to treat the Military Staff Committee as if it were a separate functional organisation whereas, in fact, it would exist solely for the purpose of advising the Security Council and of acting as an instrument of that body.
- (ii) The distinction should be more clearly brought out between the Military Staff Committee as such and the permanent military representatives of the Great Powers at the headquarters of the World Organisation. The members of the Military Staff Committee were the Chiefs of Staff of the Great Powers. At the headquarters of the organisation there would have to be military staffs, each of which would have a head responsible for the day to day routine direction of the work of those staffs. As it was not to be expected that the Chiefs of Staff would in all cases be able, in person, to attend meetings of the Military Staff Committee, they would, on occasion, have to be represented. Their representatives might well be the heads of the permanent military staffs at the headquarters of the Organisation, but the two functions were distinct.

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- (iii) While it might prove, in practice, desirable on the Military Staff Committee itself, for the Chiefs of Staff to be represented, on occasions when they could not be present in person, by a single senior officer (who would, of course, be entitled to bring with him senior advisers from all or any of the services), it was unnecessary, at this stage, to reach a firm decision on this point. The organisation of the Military Staff Committee, itself might resemble that of the Combined Chiefs of Staff Committee, which was composed of the Chiefs of Staff of the United States and of the United Kingdom who met in person at intervals. Normally, however, British representation on that Committee consisted of the heads of the service missions in Washington as representatives of their Chiefs in London.
- (iv) With reference to paragraph 5, it was considered essential to retain the right for all three Chiefs of Staff to attend the Military Staff Committee, although in practice this option might not always be exercised.
- (v) With regard to paragraph 7(a), it was incorrect to state that the Military Staff Committee would have the duty of organising the negotiation of the agreements referred to. That task would be a function of the Security Council, who would, no doubt, take advice from the Military Staff Committee itself.
- (vi) Paragraphs 5 and 12 would require revision in the light of the views expressed at (ii) above.
- (vii) Paragraph 13 should be recast. The only plans likely to be acceptable, at any rate to begin with, were those connected with ensuring the control of Germany and Japan.
- (viii) With reference to C.O.S.(45) 52, the amendments proposed by the Dominions Office were approved.

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THE COMMITTEE:-

- (a) Took note with approval of the Report by the Post Hostilities Planning Staff as a preliminary examination of the problems connected with the setting up of the proposed Military Staff Committee.
- (b) Instructed the Secretary to amend the Report in accordance with the views expressed in discussion, and to circulate it, as amended, for their consideration the following week.

2. INTERNATIONAL AIR CORPSP.H.P.(45) 5 (Final) ⁺(Previous Reference: C.O.S.(44) 295th Mtg. (O), Min. 5)

THE COMMITTEE had before them a Report by the Post Hostilities Planning Staff containing their examination of certain proposals put forward at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference by the U.S.S.R. for the formation of an International Air Corps.

Although the Report now before them provided a useful study of the problem, it was pointed out that, if any new proposals connected with the establishment of an International Air Corps should arise at San Francisco, the delegation would have to refer back to London for instructions. This could not be done until the form of these proposals had been revealed. That being the case, it was agreed that, subject to any amendments that might prove necessary, the Report should be referred in the first instance to the Chiefs of Staff, together with a recommendation that it should be submitted to the Prime Minister under cover of a note suggesting, subject to his approval, that the Report should be handed to the U.K. Delegation as background and in order to enable them to speak with one voice if the matter should be raised at San Francisco.

SIR DOUGLAS EVILL said that, before referring to the Chiefs of Staff, he would like to discuss the Report further in the Air Ministry. There were certain amendments which he would wish to see incorporated in the paper, and further amendments might prove necessary as a result of his discussions in the Air Ministry. He proposed, therefore, that the Air Ministry should be invited to circulate for the consideration of the Committee at their meeting the following week, a revised version of the Report incorporating all the amendments which the Air Ministry would wish to see introduced.

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SIR NEVILLE SYFRET agreed to this suggestion, and proposed:-

- 'X'
- (i) that a general reference should be inserted in paragraph 11 to the financial difficulties which would beset the establishment of an International Air Corps on the lines of either proposal A or proposal B;
 - (ii) that the last sentence of paragraph 18 should be amended, since it would not be the World Organisation that would appoint the Supreme Commander;
 - (iii) that mention should be made in the covering note to distinctive markings, which was dealt with at present only in paragraph 16 of the Annex.

THE COMMITTEE:-

- (a) Took note that the Vice Chief of the Air Staff would discuss P.H.P.(45) 5 (Final) further in the Air Ministry.
- (b) Invited the Air Ministry to revise the Report in the light of the discussion referred to at (a) above; to incorporate the amendments proposed by the Vice Chief of Naval Staff at 'X' above; and to circulate the Report, as amended, for their consideration the following week.

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3. ALLIED COMMISSION FOR AUSTRIA - JOINT SERVICES
PROGRESS REPORT NO. 2.

C.O.S.(45)200(O)

(Previous Reference: C.O.S.(45)38th Meeting, Minute 7)

THE COMMITTEE had before them a joint report by the Chiefs of the three Service Divisions of the Allied Commission for Austria (British Element) on the progress of planning and preparations covering the period 27th January to 23rd March, 1945.

SIR ARCHIBALD NYE suggested that reports of this nature should be kept as short as possible in future.

THE COMMITTEE:-

- (a) Approved the conclusions in paragraph 15 of the report.
- (b) Agreed with the proposals of the Air Officer Commanding in Chief, Mediterranean and Middle East, that the chain of command of the Air Division should be on similar lines to that of the Army Division.

4. COAST DEFENCES - EAST AFRICA COMMAND.

C.O.S.(45)47

THE COMMITTEE had before them a report by the Defence of Bases Committee recommending that all coast artillery defences in East Africa Command should be placed in care and maintenance with the exception of the guns at Berbera which should be withdrawn. A draft telegram to the Commander in Chief, East Africa to this effect was annexed to the report.

THE COMMITTEE:-

- (a) Approved the report by the Defence of Bases Committee.
- (b) Subject to one minor amendment, approved the draft telegram to the Commander in Chief, East Africa and instructed the Secretary to arrange for its despatch.*

* Sent as OZ 2031.

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5. COMBINED OPERATIONS HEADQUARTERS ESTABLISHMENTC.O.S.(45)50

(Previous Reference: C.O.S.(44)329th Meeting, Minute 3)

THE COMMITTEE had before them a memorandum by the Chief of Combined Operations requesting approval to certain amendments to the establishment of Combined Operations Headquarters.

SIR ARCHIBALD NYE said that the establishment of Combined Operations Headquarters had been framed at a time when major amphibious operations in Europe were in prospect. These operations had been accomplished and it now seemed as if the European war was nearly at an end. He considered that further efforts should now be made to reduce the establishments of all organizations, including that of C.O.H.Q. In order to ascertain the extent to which reductions might be achieved, he suggested that the Chief of Combined Operations should be invited to submit a further report giving the details of the organization of his Headquarters, and indicating where the work being performed was of so essential a character that no further reductions in strength could be made.

SIR DOUGLAS EVILL agreed that the manpower position was such that it was necessary to reduce establishments wherever possible, even of those organisations which, like C.O.H.Q., were doing valuable work. He recognised that this might result in C.O.H.Q. being compelled to refuse work which they were asked to undertake by theatre commanders.

BRIGADIER THOMAS said that C.O.H.Q. had received demands from all theatres for experimental work in connection with current operations, including the Rhine crossing. This had prevented a reduction in the establishment which they had hoped to make after OVERLORD. When re-deployment plans were complete and training commitments for forces for the Far East were known, it should be possible to make progressive reductions.

- THE COMMITTEE:-

- (a) Took note of the memorandum by the Chief of Combined Operations.
- (b) Invited the Chief of Combined Operations to submit a further memorandum showing:-
 - (i) The organisation of his Headquarters and the work undertaken by each section.
 - (ii) Proposals for a progressive reduction of the personnel employed at C.O.H.Q.

Offices of the War Cabinet,
S.W.1.
30th MARCH, 1945.

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This document was considered by COS(45) 817 Meeting, Min 1 C.L.

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P.H.P. (45) 6 (Final).
25th March, 1945.

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Post Hostilities Planning Staff.

WORLD ORGANISATION - MILITARY STAFF COMMITTEE

Report by the Post Hostilities Planning Staff.

1. The object of this paper is to examine the composition and functions of the Military Staff Committee referred to in the Dumbarton Oaks Conversations+ and to discuss its organisation.

2. It was agreed at Dumbarton Oaks that the Military Staff Committee will "advise and assist the Security Council on all questions relating to the Security Council's military requirements for the maintenance of international peace and security".

3. It is unlikely, at any rate in the early stages, that member states will be prepared to empower their permanent delegates to the Security Council to take decisions binding on their governments in important matters. Probably such decisions will be made from time to time at meetings of the Foreign Ministers or heads of governments of member states. So also is it unlikely that the governments of states represented on the Military Staff Committee will be willing to allow their permanent representatives on that Committee, at the headquarters of the World Organisation, to commit them to important decisions on military policy. Since such decisions might affect the vital political and military interests of the states, they will probably be reserved to be dealt with at periodical meetings attended by the Chiefs of Staff of member states in person. For some time, therefore, it is to be expected that the scope of the work of the permanent members of the Military Staff Committee and their staffs will be very restricted, and most of the detailed staff work will continue to be done in the Service Ministries in the several national capitals.

COMPOSITION OF THE MILITARY STAFF COMMITTEE

4. It was recommended at Dumbarton Oaks (Ch.VIII B(9)) that:-

- (a) The Military Staff Committee should be composed of the Chiefs of Staff (or their representatives) of the five permanent members of the Security Council, i.e. U.K., U.S.A., U.S.S.R., China, France.

+ References throughout this paper are to Chapters of the Annex to A.P.W. (44) 96.
/ Chapter VIII B, para. 9.

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- (b) Other members of the World Organisation should be associated by invitation with the work of the Military Staff Committee when such association is required for the efficient discharge of the Committee's responsibilities.

5. If the Military Staff Committee is to operate efficiently and speedily it is important that its numbers should be kept as small as possible. We understand that the United States Delegation at Dumbarton Oaks made it clear that they did not feel that the wording of the agreement necessarily committed them to the number of representatives each state should have on the Committee. They indicated that they contemplated that a single representative might represent all the services of a member state. We therefore suggest that each state should have one representative only; in our own case this would be an officer of the Navy, Army or Air Force according to the matter under discussion.

FUNCTIONS OF THE MILITARY STAFF COMMITTEE.

6. The functions of the Committee are defined in the Dumbarton Oaks agreement as follows:-

"There should be established a Military Staff Committee the functions of which should be to advise and assist the Security Council on all questions relating to the Security Council's military requirements for the maintenance of international peace and security, to the employment and command of forces placed at its disposal, to the regulation of armaments, and to possible disarmament. It should be responsible under the Security Council for the strategic direction of any armed forces placed at the disposal of the Security Council". ∅

7. The most immediate tasks of the Military Staff Committee seem likely to be:-

- (a) To organise the negotiation of the agreements referred to in Chapter VIII B (5) of the Dumbarton Oaks Document and examine and approve them when made. These will deal with the numbers and types of forces, the nature of the facilities and the assistance to be placed at the disposal of the Security Council by member states of the World Organisation.
- (b) Determination of the strength and degree of readiness of national air force contingents placed at the immediate disposal of the Security Council (Ch. VIII B(6)).

∅ Chapter VIII B para.9.

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- (c) The military aspects of the control of such ex-enemy territories as may be administered by the Security Council.*
- (d) Co-ordination and supervision of the development and maintenance of United Nations bases.

8. At a later stage the Committee will be called on to undertake further tasks. The following list, though not exhaustive indicates the kind of responsibility that may devolve upon it.

- (a) Collating information furnished by member states.
- (b) Making broad strategic plans for the application of armed forces, including recommendations for their employment and command (Ch.VIII B(8) and (9)).
- (c) Co-ordinating plans and military arrangements by member states and within or between regional organisations (Ch.VIII C(3)).
- (d) Co-ordinating and supervising joint exercises, cruises and flights undertaken by member states on a regional or inter-regional basis.
- (e) The strategic direction of armed forces placed at the disposal of the Security Council (Ch.VIII B(9)).
- (f) The regulation of armaments. (Ch.VIII B(9))

9. It appears likely that for some time to come:-

- (a) The system of voting on the Security Council finally adopted will be such that military action will never be taken against states with permanent seats on the Council.
- (b) Military action to implement decisions of the Security Council will be the responsibility of member states or groups of states organised regionally, subject to the general strategic direction of the Military Staff Committee (Ch.VIII B(7) and (9)).
- (c) Member states will be responsible for the administration of forces, bases and other facilities provided by them (Ch.VIII B(5)).

ORGANISATION OF THE MILITARY STAFF COMMITTEE.

10. A permanent staff will be required to assist the Military Staff Committee in carrying out the functions outlined above. This staff will be composed of the military delegations of the five permanent members of the Security Council.

* The responsibility for the occupation and control of Germany and Austria is likely to remain with the major allied powers at least until the German military forces have been completely disarmed and disbanded. It seems possible, however, that the World Organisation may assume responsibility for the control of certain other ex-enemy territories at an earlier stage - e.g. the Italian Colonies.

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11. The staff work required to carry out the functions of the Military Staff Committee, however limited in scope, will meet with the many practical difficulties inherent in any organisation which attempts to co-ordinate the varying military policies of numerous states. The British and American Staffs working under the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington often find progress difficult although only two nations are represented, speaking the same language and united in a common aim to win the war. In an organisation which will contain representatives of the staffs of five separate states, such difficulties cannot but be greatly accentuated.

12. It is therefore important that the Military Staff Committee and its staff should start in a comparatively small way and should only be expanded as required to deal with the tasks progressively undertaken. We suggest that each member state should be permanently represented on the Military Staff Committee by a high ranking officer who would represent his Chiefs of Staff during the periods between meetings of the several Chiefs of Staff in person. This officer should be assisted by a permanent staff which, in the initial stages, need not be large.

Planning.

13. We foresee many practical difficulties in establishing any joint planning organisation for the purpose of preparing plans (as proposed in Chapter VIII B(8)) to be put into execution by armed forces placed at the disposal of the World Organisation. The following are examples of these difficulties:-

- (a) It is too much to hope that complete secrecy will be maintained regarding the work of the Military Staff Committee.
- (b) Any plan for the employment of armed forces must contemplate action against some State who may and probably will be a member of the World Organisation. Such a state may well have close links with one or other of the Great Powers. The mere knowledge that a plan was being prepared before there was any obvious need for it might itself create a situation in which peace would be endangered or might exacerbate already strained relations.
- (c) The plans required will necessarily affect important political and military interests of the Powers who are to provide the forces and facilities. Yet any system which involved constant reference back to five National Governments would be very cumbersome. The difficulty of obtaining agreement amongst five nationalities would also be considerable.

We believe that in practice plans for the application of armed force will normally be made on a regional basis and that in each region there will always be at least one of the permanent members.

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Regional Arrangements.

14. The Dumbarton Oaks proposals contemplate that member states may group themselves together under regional arrangements for "dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action" (Ch.VIII C(1)). No "enforcement action", however, may be taken under such arrangements without the authorisation of the Security Council. Any regional Military sub-committees must, therefore, be subordinate to the Military Staff Committee which will supervise and co-ordinate their activities.

15. For security reasons it might be necessary for detailed regional plans to be prepared by the permanent member state (which alone is not liable to enforcement action) heading each region, and for the necessary co-ordination within the region to be ensured through staff talks. The Military Staff Committee should be kept fully informed of these regional plans so that the fullest information is always available to the Security Council to enable it to take decisions regarding the application of the forces at its disposal. All permanent members would thus be fully informed at all times as to the plans made on behalf of the World Organisation.

Secretariat.

16. A strong Secretariat will be required to serve the Military Staff Committee. Security, although difficult to achieve in such an organisation, will be less easily prejudiced if the Secretariat of the Military Staff Committee is limited to nationals of the permanent members. The personnel of this Secretariat must be specially chosen, as on them will depend in no small measure the success of the whole organisation. They will probably provide the chief connecting link between many committees and sub-committees working on many varied tasks, and they will have to play a large part in securing the successful fusion of widely differing points of view. For these reasons the Secretariat of the Military Staff Committee should form part of the Secretariat of the World Organisation.

Recommendation.

17. We recommend that this paper be made available as a brief for the United Kingdom delegation to the forthcoming United Nations Conference at San Francisco.

(Signed) C.C.A. ALLEN.
F.C. CURTIS.
R. SOREL-CAMERON.

25th March, 1945.
1, Richmond Terrace,
S.W.1.

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P.H.P.(45)5(Final).
25th March, 1945.

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Post Hostilities Planning Staff

INTERNATIONAL AIR CORPS.

Report by the Post Hostilities Planning Staff.

1. Arising from certain proposals put forward (and subsequently withdrawn) by the U.S.S.R. at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, the Prime Minister expressed his views on the question of an International Air Corps. We were instructed* by the Chiefs of Staff to examine and report.

2. These instructions were given while the Dumbarton Oaks Conference was still in progress. Since then, the Dumbarton Oaks document was completed and has been submitted by the inviting powers (including the United Kingdom) as a basis for discussion at San Francisco. That document proposes that members of the United Nations would be prepared to place quotas of their national forces at the disposal of the World Organisation. Within these quotas, certain air force contingents are to be held immediately available. The strength and degree of readiness of these contingents would be determined by the Security Council of the World Organisation on the advice of a Military Staff Committee.

Object.

3. In view of these developments we consider it desirable to examine the whole problem from first principles, in order to determine how the air forces, placed at the immediate disposal of the World Organisation, could best be organised to achieve the objects put forward in the original Soviet proposal, namely to provide:-

- (a) A threat of swift and powerful action which would act as a deterrent to would-be aggressors.
- (b) A striking force under the direct control of the Security Council and immediately available to implement a decision by them to use force.

4. The existence of an International Air Force which could achieve these objects would greatly increase the power and prestige of the World Organisation, the success of which is of the highest strategic importance to the British Commonwealth.

∅ Washington Telegram No.4912 and J.S.M.220.

∧ C.O.S.(44)785(O).

* C.O.S.(44)295th Mtg.(O).

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5. In this paper the term, "International Air Corps" (I.A.C.), denotes any air forces made immediately available to the World Organisation to enable it to take urgent military measures.

Practical Limitations to which any International Air Corps would be subject.

6. It will not be possible for the World Organisation to take military action against any of the Permanent Members of the Security Council (i.e. the U.K., the U.S.A., the U.S.S.R., China and France). An I.A.C. could, therefore, only act against other states including ex-enemy nations such as Germany or Japan.

7. An I.A.C. may not be completely effective so long as nations against whom it may be used retain independent armed forces beyond those required for police purposes. An I.A.C. will, in any case, only provide an immediate striking force - other and larger forces of all arms will be required if subsequent and prolonged action proves necessary.

8. At Dumbarton Oaks, the Soviet representatives argued that a force placed under the immediate control of the Security Council could be brought more rapidly into action than would be the case if orders of the Security Council were implemented by national governments.

There are two potential sources of delay in bringing forces under the authority of the Security Council into action:-

- (a) Delay in reaching a decision to use force, i.e., the time it takes the Governments represented on the Council to authorise their representatives to agree to action. It is inconceivable that governments would delegate the power of decision on such matters to their representatives.
- (b) Delay in translating a decision of the Council to use force into military action.

The former depends on political factors, and the existence of an I.A.C. could not reduce the time taken to reach a decision. The latter depends both on political factors (e.g. procrastination by governments), and on military factors (the time taken to bring forces into action). The existence of an I.A.C. under the immediate control of the Council could reduce only one of the possible causes of delay by shortening the time required to get forces into action. In any case the political factors under (a) are likely to cause the greatest delay.

Types of International Air Corps.

9. An International Air Corps might take several forms. In this paper we seek to determine what form is most likely to achieve the objects defined in paragraph 3 above, within the framework of the type of World Organisation that seems likely to emerge from the San Francisco Conference.

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A. A completely International Air Corps.

10. The international character of an I.A.C. might best be demonstrated in an Air Corps organised without regard to the different nationalities of its personnel. It would be recruited, equipped, trained, administered and controlled by the World Organisation and would owe allegiance only to it.

11. The organisation of the air forces at the disposal of the World Organisation on this basis would, however, present the following major difficulties:-

- (a) The maintenance of the force on a scale commensurate with its world wide commitments would involve many practical difficulties, including the creation of a vast administrative machine, as part of the World Organisation, which would be unlikely to work efficiently.
- (b) Member states would at present be reluctant to provide the technical and administrative services, information and intelligence necessary to make such a force efficient.
- (c) Nationals of states against whom action was to be taken would probably have to be withdrawn from units for each operation.
- (d) It would be difficult to keep the technical equipment abreast of scientific developments, since the World Organisation could not, presumably, manufacture its own equipment, and it is unlikely that member states would be prepared to pool their latest scientific discoveries.

Apart from these practical difficulties, we consider that the creation of such an I.A.C. would involve a greater advance in international co-operation than states are yet prepared to accept.

12. We therefore consider that such a completely International Air Corps is at present impracticable. At Dumbarton Oaks it was indeed generally accepted that the air forces at the disposal of the World Organisation should at present be organised on the basis of national contingents.

B. An International Air Corps composed of National Contingents entirely maintained and controlled by the World Organisation.

13. Contingents of national air forces would be provided by member states and would retain their national identity and composition. They would be organised, equipped, trained and controlled by the World Organisation. A force organised on this basis could achieve the objects set out in paragraph 3 above. It could be argued that freedom from direct control by any state would help to ensure that the force would be available at any time for direct action.

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14. Member states would, however, at present be reluctant to accept a complete loss of control over their contingents furnished to the I.A.C. Further, the organisation of the air forces at the disposal of the World Organisation on this basis would involve all the difficulties enumerated in paragraph 11 above, although in a lesser degree than for a completely international Air Corps.

We therefore conclude that the organisation of an I.A.C. on this basis would, at present, be impracticable.

C. An International Air Corps composed of National Contingents maintained by Member States.

15. The most practicable solution seems to be for member states to undertake to maintain contingents of their national air forces at a degree of readiness determined by the World Organisation. These contingents would be equipped and trained by their parent state but would be at the disposal of the World Organisation for operations and for combined exercises.

16. The Security Council would be kept informed of the precise location of all squadrons earmarked for the I.A.C. National contingents would normally be stationed at airfields under their own control, and, in view of the increasing range of bomber aircraft, could generally operate from such airfields.

17. Upon the direction of the Security Council, national contingents would, however, be ready to proceed to an appointed destination within a specific time limit.

The concentration of I.A.C. contingents at appropriate bases could be made in anticipation of an emergency, and might in itself prove an adequate deterrent to a potential aggressor. The concentration of national contingents for combined exercises would foster international co-operation and goodwill; while such visible evidence of the reality of the I.A.C. would enhance the prestige of the World Organisation as an instrument for peace.

18. The Security Council, advised and assisted by the Military Staff Committee, would be responsible for the preparation of plans and the strategic direction of the force. Tactical control of contingents would remain the responsibility of their own commanders. The World Organisation might appoint a supreme commander if the situation so required.

19. An I.A.C. organised on these lines would be a logical development of the proposals formulated at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference.* It would be the best method that could at present be devised to achieve the objects of the Soviet proposal set out in paragraph 3 above. If the participating States are really determined to make a success of the scheme, we believe that it is capable of completely achieving these objects.

* A.P.W. (44)96. The expression "International Air Corps" does not appear in the record of the Dumbarton Oaks Conversations. The U.S.S.R. wished to use this term in connection with the arrangements mentioned in Chapter VIII (B)(6) of the document; the U.K. delegation was prepared to agree but the U.S.A. were not.

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20. Our suggestions regarding the lines on which the national air force contingents placed at the disposal of the World Organisation could be organised, and should function, to justify the title of an International Air Corps, are at Annex.

Recommendation.

21. We recommend that this paper should be made available as a brief for the United Kingdom delegation to the San Francisco Conference.

(Signed) C. C. A. ALLEN.
F. C. CURTIS.
R. SOREL-CAMERON.

25th March, 1945.
1, Richmond Terrace,
S.W. 1.

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ANNEX.Introduction.

1. In our main paper we have concluded that the most practical method, at present, of organising the air forces, placed at the immediate disposal of the World Organisation as an advanced striking force, would be on the basis of national contingents organised, equipped, trained and maintained by their parent states at a degree of readiness laid down by the World Organisation.

We examine below the lines on which such an I.A.C. could be organised and how it should function. The references in brackets below refer to the relevant proposals formulated at Dumbarton Oaks.*

Employment.

2. The principal function of the I.A.C. will be to take immediate and independent air action. Co-operation with land and sea forces, in operations undertaken by the World Organisation, should be carried out by national air force contingents other than those specifically earmarked for the advanced striking force (I.A.C.). The I.A.C. contingents could, of course, be integrated with other national or regional forces for subsequent action. Action by the I.A.C. would range from demonstration flights or leaflet dropping to heavy bombing attack.

Composition.

3. To carry out the functions outlined above, the I.A.C. should be composed of a main force of Heavy, and possibly, also Medium bomber squadrons. Lighter/bomber squadrons should be included for use where attacks by the main bomber force might be considered too drastic. These units could be modified for use as escort fighters if fighter opposition to the main force were expected.

4. The exact composition of forces required in support of the I.A.C. will depend upon circumstances. For example, it might be necessary to include defensive fighter squadrons and make provision for A.A. defence, if an air operation against a power possessing air forces was undertaken from airfields situated in a country with inadequate air defence. Photo-reconnaissance squadrons will probably be required, since it may prove undesirable for the I.A.C. to have to rely on units outside its control for photographic cover which forms an essential part of any intelligence system.

5. On the other hand it might not be necessary to earmark air transport squadrons for the I.A.C., since these could be supplied, together with other services, by member states who will be responsible for the administration of their own contingents.

* A.P.W. (44) 96

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Contributors to an International Air Corps.

6. There are the following reasons why the I.A.C. is likely, in practice, to consist of contingents from a few states :-

- (a) The I.A.C. must be a powerful and efficient force to carry out its restricted functions swiftly and decisively. For some considerable time only a few states will possess the most suitable and efficient aircraft and equipment.
- (b) The limitation of the number of states will simplify the problems of command, equipment, organisation, security and joint exercises, and increase the likelihood of rapid action.

7. It would, in any case, be necessary for the contingents of the smaller states to be equipped and trained by the states providing the largest contingents. The smaller states which did not contribute contingents might be able to help by the provision of bases or other facilities.

Earmarking of Units.

8. It has been accepted (Chapter VIII B (6)) that member states will hold certain units of their national air forces at an agreed degree of readiness for use by the World Organisation. This can only be done by earmarking specific units. Some loss of flexibility of national air forces, must, therefore, be accepted. We consider that member states should, however, retain the right to exchange squadrons thus earmarked for the I.A.C. by agreement with the Security Council through its Military Staff Committee.

Size of the International Air Corps.

9. It is impossible at this stage to estimate the probable size of the I.A.C. The I.A.C. must be of sufficient size to allow a margin over the forces of the states against which it is likely to be used, and to allow of its being used in sufficient strength to reduce casualties to a minimum. Since it is designed to be an immediate striking force, there will not normally be time for expansion when an emergency arises. The power and prestige of the World Organisation will be increased in proportion to the strength of the striking force available, and the likelihood of aggression will be proportionately reduced.

Control and Command.

10. It has been accepted (Chapter VIII B (6) and (9)) that the Security Council will be responsible for determining the degree of readiness of I.A.C. contingents, and for the strategic direction of such forces. Broad strategic action will be co-ordinated and controlled by the Military Staff Committee, and it may be desirable for the World Organisation to appoint a Supreme Commander and staff for the general direction of operations or combined exercises. We consider, however, that for the sake of efficiency national contingents should remain under the operational control of their own commanders.

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Administration.

11. Administration of units will be the responsibility of their parent states. Each state will undertake to maintain its contingent organised, manned, equipped and earmarked, as agreed with the World Organisation, at a specified state of readiness. Any administrative liaison which is necessary can be arranged (as for other national contingents of forces placed at the disposal of the World Organisation) by the Security Council, through its Military Staff Committee.

12. Equipment. It would be impracticable for the equipment of contingents provided by different powers to be standardised. Agreements, however, regarding the standardisation of common user items as, for example, signals and navigational aids, would increase the rapidity of deployment and action and simplify the equipment of bases at which a certain amount of pre-stocking will no doubt be required.

13. Bases. Fully equipped base areas, available for the use of the I.A.C., should be provided at strategic centres to be determined by the World Organisation. The provision of bases is presumably included in the facilities which have been envisaged (Chapter VIII B (5)).

We consider that:-

- (a) Equipment and defences should as far as possible be supplied by the state providing the base.
- (b) Common services, e.g. accommodation, petrol, communications, should be provided by agreement between the state providing the base and the states which will be using it.
- (c) Stocks of bombs, ammunition, spare parts (sufficient for a pre-determined period), and repair and servicing equipment should be stored at base areas, under arrangements between the states concerned, co-ordinated by the World Organisation.

Bases and ancillary services will, in any case, be required for forces placed at the disposal of the World Organisation. We do not consider that the requirements for the I.A.C. should add materially to this commitment.

14. Personnel. Personnel would remain in their national air forces although serving with units earmarked for the I.A.C. Personnel included in the I.A.C. contingents will receive special training (e.g. flying and operational control, air raid reporting systems, languages) necessary to ensure good liaison with contingents from other states.

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It will, therefore, be desirable to have some arrangements whereby personnel should serve as far as possible with I.A.C. contingents for a specified period. Governments should nevertheless retain the right to exchange personnel with those in their I.A.C. Squadrons.

We see no reason to differentiate the conditions of service of personnel serving in I.A.C. units from those prevailing in the relative national air force. It may, however, be necessary to institute special allowances for personnel, when contingents from different states are serving together at base areas, in order to avoid any discrepancy in living and messing conditions likely to create grievances.

15. Reserves. Since national contingents will be maintained at full strength by parent states, and will be used as striking forces only, there will be no need to include reserve squadrons within the I.A.C.

16. Distinctive Markings. We consider that personnel serving in I.A.C. units should wear a distinctive badge, and that aircraft used by the I.A.C. should have special markings, for the following reasons:-

- (a) The I.A.C. will not undertake operations on behalf of the World Organisation under the exclusive orders of their national governments. It is desirable that the international character of I.A.C. operations should be demonstrated.
- (b) The prestige of the World Organisation would be enhanced by the existence of units bearing such special markings.
- (c) The esprit de corps of the I.A.C. would be increased.

Training.

17. We consider that:-

- (a) Training of each national contingent should be the responsibility of its parent state which should undertake to maintain its I.A.C. units at a state of efficiency laid down by the World Organisation. Major powers might have to undertake such training for contingents supplied by minor powers.* (See para.8).

* Arrangements of this nature have in fact recently been made between His Majesty's Government and certain Western European states.

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- (b) Combined exercises (and staff training) of national contingents of the I.A.C. on an inter-state, regional or inter-regional basis should be the responsibility of the World Organisation.
- (c) Combined exercises including joint flights would have the advantage of:-
- (i) Demonstrating in peace the reality of the air power available to the World Organisation and enhancing the deterrent effect of the I.A.C.
 - (ii) Enabling higher Commanders and Combined Staffs to be trained in handling the I.A.C.
 - (iii) Enabling personnel of national contingents to meet and work together, overcome language difficulties, learn each others technical and tactical methods and establish "esprit de corps" based on their common purpose of preserving world peace.

Security.

18. The placing of contingents of national forces at the disposal of the World Organisation (Chapter VIII B (5)) in itself presents a danger to the United Kingdom of loss of security of new weapons and technical developments, since it may involve joint action and will probably involve joint exercises. We do not consider that the provision of certain additional air force units, to form an I.A.C. on the lines suggested, will materially add to the danger of loss of security because:-

- (a) We shall normally retain control of our I.A.C. contingent and of the bases at which it will be located. We shall therefore be able to take appropriate measures for the security of individual items of equipment.
- (b) Contingents of an I.A.C. need not be so closely integrated for joint operations as would be the case for other arms.
- (c) It would not in any case be necessary to compromise the secrets of our air defences.

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